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THE ECONOMICS OF TOBACCO CONTROL IN LOW- AND MIDDLE-
INCOME COUNTRIES 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
Global best practice in tobacco control policy is anchored by the Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control which recommends that countries use, amongst other 
things, tax increases and advertising bans to reduce tobacco consumption. 
Furthermore, this is supplemented by various policy documents and technical manuals 
produced by the World Health Organisation and the World Bank which provide a 
more thorough justification of these policy measures. This thesis seeks to examine the 
application of these tobacco control policy measures on tobacco consumption in low- 
and middle-income countries. 
 
The thesis focuses on tax policy in low- and middle-income countries by moving the 
metric from price to affordability (which considers price and income simultaneously). 
This is important since many low- and middle-income countries are growing rapidly 
and price increases may not be reducing consumption. First, methods for measuring 
the affordability of cigarettes are proposed. Secondly, trends in affordability over time 
and across countries are investigated. Results show that cigarettes have become less 
affordable in high-income countries and more affordable in low- and middle-income 
countries since 1990, and at a faster pace in recent years. Furthermore, where 
cigarettes have become less affordable price increases have been the catalytic factor, 
while in those countries where cigarettes have become more affordable growth in 
prices has not kept pace with growth in incomes. The concept of affordability is 
operationalised by proposing a tax policy rule that explicitly targets affordability 
using a case study on South Africa. 
 
As taxes increase so do the incentives to avoid and evade taxes. As such the illicit 
trade in cigarettes can undermine tax policy by diverting legal sales to the illegal 
market rather than by encouraging a decrease in smoking. However, little country 
level research which estimates levels of illicit trade and its impact on tobacco control 
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policy has been conducted. Again this chapter uses a case study on South Africa, as 
an example of a low- and middle-income county that has pursued a policy of 
significant tax increases over time. The level of illicit trade is estimated and its impact 
on tax losses and consumption in the total market analysed. Analysis shows that illicit 
trade has not undermined tobacco control policy in South Africa.  
 
Finally, the thesis considers the impact that advertising bans have on tobacco 
consumption in the aggregate, paying particular attention to low- and middle-income 
countries. By modelling demand in a cross-sectional time series model the chapter 
concludes that comprehensive advertising bans significantly reduce tobacco 
consumption and that this impact is more significant in low- and middle-income 
countries than high-income countries. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In the
 
twentieth century, more than 100 million people died worldwide as a result of 
tobacco use (World Health Organisation, 2008). About one in twelve people alive 
today, or approximately 500 million people, will be killed by tobacco use in the future 
(Levine and Kinder, 2004). Tobacco use is the leading cause of preventable death 
worldwide and its use kills more people than tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS and malaria 
combined (World Health Organisation, 2008). By 2030, tobacco use is expected to be 
the single largest cause of death worldwide (Jha and Chaloupka, 1999). Along with 
this burden of disease, the economic costs of tobacco use are considerable. In addition 
to the direct costs of medical treatment for tobacco related diseases, indirect costs 
accrue through early mortality and morbidity. While few global estimates of these 
costs exist, the Tobacco Atlas (Shafey et al., 2009) estimates the total cost of tobacco 
use to be as much as 3.6% of global Gross Domestic Product annually, although other 
estimates place this cost lower, at 0.7% to 2% annually (Campaign for Tobacco Free 
Kids, 2001). 
 
Tobacco control is the area of public health which focuses on controlling and 
reducing tobacco use, thereby limiting and reducing its associated mortality and 
morbidity. Although it is now generally accepted that smoking, as well as passive 
smoking, is a significant cause of premature death (United States Department of 
Health and Human Services, 1989) it was not always the case. One of the most 
important events in the history of tobacco control occurred in 1964 when the United 
States Surgeon General warned of the proven causal relationship between cigarette 
smoking and lung cancer (United States Department of Health and Welfare, 1964). 
Although the medical community had long suspected this, the Surgeon General’s 
report was one of the first authoritative communications on the topic. This was 
preceded in the United Kingdom by the Royal College of Physicians ground-breaking 
report Smoking and Health (Royal College of Physicians, 1962) (see Peto, 1994, for a 
thorough review of the early science).  This encouraged a wave of regulation and 
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legislation in high-income countries as governments began to restrict the advertising 
of cigarettes, place warnings of the dangers of smoking on packaging and increase 
prices using taxation (Laugesen and Meads, 1991).
1
  
 
By 2020, 70% of those killed by smoking will be in low- and middle-income 
countries (Jha and Chaloupka, 1999). Gajalakshmi et al. (2000: 21) indicate that per 
capita tobacco consumption in low- and middle-income countries has nearly doubled 
between the early 1970s and early 1990s. Given this trend, it is becoming increasingly 
important and necessary to understand which interventions succeed in reducing 
tobacco consumption in such countries. Although the driving force behind tobacco 
control is within the realm of public health, economic interventions have been found 
to be the most successful in reducing tobacco consumption. These economic 
interventions aim to reduce consumption by reducing the demand for tobacco 
products.   
 
Lopez et al. (1994) propose a model which places countries and regions into one of 
four stages on a continuum of the tobacco epidemic. A country or region can be 
placed in one of the four stages based on smoking prevalence among men and women 
as well as deaths attributable to smoking-related disease. This model has gained 
popularity and is commonly used by researchers and tobacco control advocates to 
raise the profile of tobacco control in low- and middle-income countries. Many of 
these countries are at the lower end of the continuum and movement to the higher end 
of the continuum will be characterised by large increases in smoking prevalence and 
smoking-related disease. This is presented graphically in Figure 1.1, which shows 
how smoking prevalence in a country or a region typically develops, first among men, 
and then among women; it also shows how this will result in a considerable increase 
in smoking-related disease.   
 
Stage 1 of the tobacco epidemic is characterised by low rates of smoking prevalence--
the large majority of which occurs in men--combined with no apparent increases in 
smoking-related disease. Most countries that are currently considered to be in Stage 1 
are in sub-Saharan Africa. These countries are exclusively low- and middle-income 
                                                 
1
 Throughout, I use the term advertising to include the advertising, promotion of, and sponsorship by, 
tobacco products, but not marketing which includes distribution of tobacco products. 
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countries, but mostly low-income countries. Stage 2 of the tobacco epidemic includes 
those countries with growing smoking prevalence among men and early increases in 
smoking among women. Furthermore, these countries are seeing an increasing shift to 
youth smoking initiation and an increasing burden of smoking-related disease. Again, 
most of the countries currently in Stage 2 of the epidemic are low- and middle-income 
countries. The countries included in Stage 1 and 2 of the epidemic count for more 
than half the world’s population. In other words: more than half the world is yet to see 
smoking prevalence and smoking-related disease peak.  
 
Figure 1.1: Four stages of the tobacco epidemic 
 
Source: Lopez et al. (1994) 
Note: The horizontal axis represents a continuum of time in years that each stage of the epidemic is 
expected to last. 
 
Stage 3 of the epidemic is characterised by declining smoking prevalence among men, 
and to a lesser extent among women. However, the burden of smoking-related disease 
continues to rise due to a lag between smoking and the onset of disease. Up to a third 
of all deaths in countries in Stage 3 of the epidemic can be attributed to smoking, 
mostly in men. Both high-income and low- and middle-income countries are at Stage 
3 of the epidemic. Stage 4 of the epidemic is characterised by significantly declining 
smoking prevalence in both men and women, as well as declines in the burden of 
smoking-related diseases among men (although not among women). Smoking 
prevalence is similar to that of Stage 2; however, in Stage 3, the trends in smoking 
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prevalence are declining, whereas they are increasing in Stage 2. All Stage 4 countries 
are currently high-income countries. Many, although not all, of the countries in Stage 
4 of the epidemic have taken active steps to reduce tobacco usage through tobacco 
control programs as well as considerable efforts to reduce the affordability of tobacco 
products through tax increases. However, a caveat to the Lopez model is that it is 
based on the experience of rich Western countries. Low- and middle-income countries 
may or may not follow this trend. 
 
An important observation from the Lopez et al. (1994) model is how poorer, less 
developed countries (i.e. low- and middle-income countries) are located to the left of 
the continuum and richer, more developed countries (i.e. high-income countries) are 
to the right. Empirical evidence suggests that incomes in low- and middle-income 
countries are growing at a significantly more rapid pace than they are in high-income 
countries, and are thus “catching up” in terms of economic development. Cigarette 
consumption responds positively to income, and more rapid income growth is likely 
to result in more rapid growth in cigarette consumption. This “catching-up” has 
occurred at a more rapid pace in the 2000s (see Figure 1.2 below) and will likely 
result in many low- and middle-income countries, currently in Stages 1 and 2, moving 
to the right, into Stages 2 and 3. This has already been happening: per capita 
consumption in low- and middle-income countries has nearly doubled between the 
early 1970s and early 1990s (Gajalakshmi et al., 2000: 21). More recent data (ERC, 
2007) shows that aggregate consumption increased by 33.6% between 1990 and 2007 
in 123 low- and middle-income countries (43.3% if China is excluded) compared to a 
decline of 22.9% in 39 high-income countries.  
 
For example, Blecher (2010c) notes how the gap between youth smoking prevalence 
is significantly smaller between African countries and other low- and middle-income 
countries than the gap between adult smoking prevalence between the same groups of 
countries. This indicates that, in the future, adult smoking prevalence in Africa is 
likely to rise, resulting in many of the world’s poorest countries moving from Stage 1 
to Stage 2 of the epidemic. 
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Figure 1.2: Economic growth in high-income and low- and middle-income 
countries (1980-2008) 
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Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to consider the effectiveness of some important economic 
tobacco control interventions and to analyse them in the context of low- and middle-
income countries. It specifically focuses on two interventions that are argued to 
reduce the demand for tobacco, namely tax increases and advertising bans.  
 
Tax policy in low- and middle-income countries is different to tax policy in high-
income countries. First, the price elasticity of demand is higher, in absolute terms, in 
low- and middle-income countries than it is in high-income countries (Jha and 
Chaloupka, 1999). This means that tax policy could be a more effective tool in low- 
and middle-income countries than in high-income countries. Secondly, and more 
importantly for this thesis, low- and middle-income countries are growing 
significantly faster than high-income countries, meaning that the same tax increases 
may not result in falling consumption since increases in price may be offset by 
increases in income. Historically, the literature has placed the focus of tax policy 
explicitly on price. This thesis develops a method of analysis of affordability, i.e. the 
simultaneous analysis of price and income, in the context of tobacco tax policy. I also 
investigate how the illicit trade in tobacco products could potentially undermine 
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taxation policy in the context of a middle-income country which has pursued a 
relatively aggressive tax policy.  
 
The second set of interventions aimed at reducing demand is a set of policies which 
restricts and bans the advertising of tobacco products. Advertising is argued to 
increase the size of the aggregate market and thus policies to restrict or ban 
advertising are expected to reduce demand. However, this statement is contested by 
some who argue that policies to restrict and ban advertising should not be included in 
tobacco control strategies because advertising does not increase the size of the 
aggregate market, but rather the relative market shares of different brands. Since 
many countries have chosen to restrict and ban advertising of tobacco products, one 
can test the impact of such interventions on consumption and this thesis aims to do so.  
 
Before considering the outline of the thesis, the forthcoming section considers these 
policies in more detail and pays particular attention to the policy recommendations of 
various international institutions that have created frameworks by which countries can 
implement the tobacco control policies which are considered to be global best 
practice. 
 
 
1.1 TOBACCO CONTROL POLICY IN LOW- AND MIDDLE-INCOME 
COUNTRIES 
 
During the early
 
twentieth century, with the exception of the Great Depression, 
cigarette consumption in the United States rose steadily. Per capita cigarette 
consumption peaked in 1963 (United States Department of Agriculture, 2007), 
coinciding with the Surgeon General’s report, and has declined steadily since. This 
decline is attributable to greater knowledge of the health consequences of smoking 
and public advocacy and awareness; however, it is also related to policy interventions 
that restricted the advertising of tobacco products and increased the price of cigarettes 
through taxation (see Warner, 2006 for a thorough review of tobacco control in the 
United States). A similar trend exists in other high-income countries. However, as 
previously noted, the decline in consumption in high-income countries has been 
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accompanied by significant growth in consumption in low- and middle-income 
countries.  
 
International institutions like the World Health Organisation and the World Bank 
have been at the forefront of developing a set of policy interventions that can be 
considered global best practice in tobacco control. One of the first frameworks, 
specifically targeted at low- and middle-income countries, was Curbing the Epidemic, 
by the World Bank (Jha and Chaloupka, 1999). Subsequently, the adoption of the 
World Health Organisation’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control has created 
a legally binding obligation for parties with respect to tobacco control policies. Many 
parties that agreed to the treaty have adopted or are updating national legislation in 
order to meet these obligations (Nikogosian, 2010). Furthermore, the World Health 
Organisation’s MPOWER strategy provides a cost-effective package of evidence-
based interventions that countries can implement (see Section 1.1.3 for an explanation 
of the acronym MPOWER). The following section briefly describes these tools with 
particular reference to the areas that this thesis considers, namely tax and price policy, 
illicit trade (as it relates to tax policy) and bans on the advertising of tobacco products. 
 
 
1.1.1 World Bank’s Curbing the Epidemic 
 
In the late 1990s, as the spectre of tobacco control was turning firmly towards low- 
and middle-income countries, the World Bank’s seminal publication Curbing the 
Epidemic (Jha and Chaloupka, 1999) became an important document since it provided 
a clear evidence-based framework for tobacco control. Specifically, it provided a 
strong endorsement of taxation as a tobacco control tool in low- and middle-income 
countries and provided advice for them in what is now a well-known quotation: “The 
strategy, tailored to individual country needs, would include: (1) raising taxes, using 
as a yardstick the rates adopted by countries with comprehensive tobacco control 
policies where consumption has fallen. In these countries, tax accounts for two-thirds 
to four-fifths of the retail price of cigarettes” (Jha and Chaloupka, 1999: 83). 
 
Even though most low- and middle-income countries have not implemented policy 
rules in order to ensure that this target is met, Curbing the Epidemic has nevertheless 
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become an important international benchmark for tobacco taxation policies. 
Furthermore, it also advocates the implementation of comprehensive advertising bans 
as a tool to reduce the demand for tobacco. One of the most important factors in the 
success of this publication was its use of evidence from low- and middle-income 
countries as well as high-income countries in drawing its recommendations. Evidence 
of its popularity and success can be measures by its translation into ten languages (in 
addition to English). Discussions regarding an update of Curbing the Epidemic are 
ongoing. 
 
 
1.1.2 The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
 
The World Health Organisation’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control is the 
world’s first treaty that explicitly and exclusively deals with public health. The 
official process to negotiate the treaty began in 2000 when the World Health 
Assembly, the governing body of the World Health Organisation, unanimously 
adopted a resolution to launch political negotiations between World Health 
Organisation member states. However, the process of moving towards a global treaty 
began as early as 1994, when the 9
th
 World Conference on Tobacco or Health adopted 
a resolution in support of a treaty, but moved forward in 1996, when the World Health 
Assembly first asked the World Health Organisation to develop the treaty (see Taylor 
and Roemer, 1996). The treaty was unanimously adopted by the World Health 
Assembly in 2003 and entered into force in 2005. Currently (as of 29 October 2010) 
172 countries are party to the treaty, covering 87% of the world’s population.2 
Notable countries that are not party to the treaty include the United States, 
Switzerland (home to Philip Morris), Malawi and Zimbabwe (two of the world’s 
largest growers of tobacco). 
 
The treaty makes recommendation for tobacco control policies based on global best 
practice through the treaty text itself, through guidelines developed by the parties, and 
through working groups or protocols to the treaty approved by the Conference of the 
Parties, which is the decision making body of the treaty. In addition to best practice 
                                                 
2
 See the website of the Framework Convention Alliance (www.fctc.org) for the most up-to-date 
statistics. 
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tobacco control policies, the scope of the treaty includes issues of political and 
economic integration.  
 
Economic policy interventions developed in the treaty focus on both the demand and 
supply side. Part 3, “Measures Relating to the Reduction of Demand for Tobacco”, 
deals with tax and price policy (particularly Article 6: “Price and tax measures to 
reduce the demand for tobacco”), as well as the advertising  of tobacco products 
(Article 13: “Tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship”). Article 6 supports 
the use of taxes and prices as a policy tool to reduce tobacco consumption particularly 
in the young, in order to contribute to public health objectives. Article 13 recognises 
that “a comprehensive ban on advertising, promotion and sponsorship would reduce 
the consumption of tobacco products” and requires countries to implement such bans 
in accordance with local constitutional and legal principles. Furthermore, the 
Conference of the Parties has developed guidelines to assist parties to implement 
Article 13 (World Health Organisation, 2008c). These guidelines clearly go beyond 
straightforward bans on advertising, recommending restrictions and bans on 
marketing in the broadest sense, including bans on the display and visibility of 
tobacco products at retail points of sale, vending machines, internet sales, tobacco 
industry social responsibility programs and cross-border advertising. Furthermore, the 
guidelines also target the use of entertainment media and packaging as tools for 
promotion. 
 
Part 4, “Measures Relating To The Reduction Of The Supply Of Tobacco” deals with 
reducing the illicit trade in cigarettes (Article 15: “Illicit trade in tobacco products”). 
In addition to the treaty text, parties will consider adopting a Protocol on Illicit Trade 
in Tobacco Products at the Fifth Conference of the Parties in November 2012. A final 
round of negotiations for the protocol is scheduled to take place in March 2012. The 
purpose of the protocol is to define practices such as licencing, tracking and tracing, 
and due diligence that would assist in securing the supply chain, in order to assist 
governments in enforcing local and regional taxation and customs policies. One of the 
major issues has been the creation of a consistent international tracking and tracing 
system. Illicit trade is a transnational issue and requires cooperation across borders to 
eliminate it. The treaty and the protocol make recommendations to reduce illicit trade 
through the supply side. This thesis does not consider illicit trade as a supply-side 
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issue, but rather how it undermines tax policy as a tool to reduce the demand for 
tobacco. 
 
 
1.1.3 World Health Organization’s MPOWER Strategy 
 
In addition to the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, the World Health 
Organization has developed the MPOWER strategy as an inexpensive, evidence-
based tool aligned with the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (World 
Health Organisation, 2008a and 2009). It is a package of six measures, each 
represented by one of the letters in the abbreviation MPOWER. The letters represent: 
 
 Monitor tobacco use and prevention policies 
 Protect people from tobacco smoke 
 Offer help to quit tobacco use 
 Warn about the dangers of tobacco 
 Enforce bans on tobacco advertising promotion and sponsorship 
 Raise taxes on tobacco 
 
Of interest for this thesis are the “E” and “R” in MPOWER, representing advertising 
bans and taxation policy, respectively. In terms of advertising bans, MPOWER 
recommends that “a total ban on direct and indirect advertising, promotion and 
sponsorship, as provided in guidelines to article 13 of the WHO Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control, can substantially reduce tobacco consumption” 
(World Health Organisation, 2008a). Its recommendation in terms of tax policy is less 
prescriptive than Curbing the Epidemic or the Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control and even other MPOWER measures. However, it is clear on the importance it 
attaches to tax policy, indicating that “increasing the price of tobacco through higher 
taxes is the single most effective way to decrease consumption and encourage tobacco 
users to quit” (World Health Organisation, 2008a).3 
 
                                                 
3
 Subsequently, the 2009 update of MPOWER (World Health Organization, 2009) as well as the World 
Health Organization Technical Manual on Tobacco Tax Administration (World Health Organization, 
2010) provide more detailed recommendations. These are discussed more fully in chapter 6. 
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1.2 OUTLINE 
 
The thesis consists four main chapters. Chapters 2 and 3 consider the affordability of 
cigarettes in low- and middle-income countries. The concept of affordability has 
grown in prominence in recent years as the focus of tobacco control has shifted to 
low- and middle-income countries. Such countries are experiencing relatively rapid 
economic growth and the resulting growth in personal incomes means that even if 
cigarette prices are rising, cigarettes may still be becoming increasingly affordable, 
because income levels are rising more rapidly. Chapter 2 considers methodological 
and measurement issues of affordability. It then presents the trends in affordability 
since 1990, emphasising the importance of this measure rather than the narrower 
focus on price.  
 
Chapter 3 then considers the relevance of affordability in the context of taxation 
policy in low- and middle-income countries. It does so by using South Africa as a 
case study and proposes a policy rule directly linked to affordability. Chapter 4 
considers how illicit trade may undermine tobacco control efforts. Again, it uses the 
case study of South Africa and estimates the volumes of illicit trade and the resulting 
loss of taxation revenue. It then looks at the net impact of taxation policy on the 
total—not just the legal—market for cigarettes in South Africa. Chapter 5 evaluates 
the more controversial question of whether advertising bans on tobacco actually result 
in lower consumption. It does so using cross-sectional time series data and makes 
some important methodological improvements over the previous literature, 
particularly in respect of the measurement and treatment of the advertising ban policy 
variables and the inclusion of low- and middle-income countries in the sample. The 
following section provides a more thorough outline of each chapter. 
 
 
1.2.1 Chapter 2: The affordability of cigarettes in low- and middle-income countries 
 
This chapter provides a methodological contribution to the analysis of the 
affordability of cigarettes. Furthermore, it uses the understanding of the measurement 
of affordability to analyse trends in the affordability of cigarettes since 1990. 
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Cigarette affordability is determined by the interaction of consumers’ income levels 
and cigarette prices. An affordability measure, termed relative income price, based on 
per capita gross domestic product and originally developed by Blecher and Van 
Walbeek (2004) was calculated for 77 countries, while the minutes of labour 
affordability measures, originally developed by Guindon et al. (2002) and based on 
the Union Bank of Switzerland survey of earnings was calculated for 52 countries. 
 
The chapter shows that, expressed in a common currency, cigarettes are significantly 
more expensive in high-income countries than in low- and middle-income countries. 
There is a high degree of variance in cigarette prices within groups of countries with 
similar levels of income. Despite cigarettes being more expensive in high-income 
countries in absolute terms, they are on average more affordable than in low- and 
middle-income countries, especially if per capita gross domestic product is used as the 
measure of income. If one uses the Union Bank of Switzerland data as the measure of 
income, the finding that cigarettes are less affordable in low- and middle-income 
countries is less pronounced. It is argued that per capita gross domestic product is a 
more comprehensive and representative measure of income than the Union Bank of 
Switzerland’s survey of wages, especially for low- and middle-income countries, and 
that the relative income price is thus a better measure of affordability. 
 
Since 1990, cigarettes have become less affordable in most high-income countries. In 
contrast, among the low- and middle-income countries in the sample, cigarettes 
generally have become more affordable. Since 2000, and especially since 2003, 
cigarettes in low- and middle-income countries have become more affordable at a 
more rapid rate. Furthermore, I consider what drives changes in affordability over 
time. Generally, it is found that where cigarettes have become less affordable over 
time, the growth in prices has exceeded the growth in income, with the exception 
being countries suffering from severe economic crises.  
 
It is well-known that price increases, usually through increased taxes, are particularly 
effective in reducing the demand for cigarettes. While there have been many positive 
developments in tobacco control in the last decade, the most powerful tobacco control 
tool--increasing prices and taxes and thus decreasing cigarette affordability--appears 
to have been ignored in many countries. Although there is some methodological 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
a
 T
ow
n
24 
 
debate about how to best calculate affordability, the central message of this chapter is 
that cigarette affordability is an important determinant of consumption. Economic 
studies should not focus on prices and taxes without also considering incomes. If 
increasing the excise tax is an important component of a country’s tobacco control 
strategy, the benchmark should be set in terms of affordability, rather than in terms of 
real prices. If policy makers aim to make cigarettes less affordable, they should raise 
taxes so that the nominal price of cigarettes increases by more than nominal income 
(i.e. the sum of the inflation rate and the real per capita income growth rate). 
 
This chapter was originally published in two forms, firstly as a working paper by the 
Bloomberg Initiative to Reduce Tobacco Use (Blecher and Van Walbeek, 2008) and 
subsequently in the journal, Tobacco Control (Blecher and Van Walbeek, 2009). The 
work in this chapter has been updated with more recent data. The previous 
incarnations took the analysis up to 2006, while this chapter takes the data up to 2008 
for the relative income price method and 2009 for the minutes of labour method. 
Furthermore, the analysis of what drove changes in affordability over time is unique 
to this chapter and did not appear in the working paper or journal article. This work 
on affordability has been a long-time collaboration with Corné Van Walbeek, who 
also acted as supervisor for this thesis. 
 
 
1.2.2 Chapter 3: Targeting the affordability of cigarettes: a new benchmark for 
taxation policy in low- and middle-income countries 
 
This chapter aims to investigate the appropriateness of tax burden benchmarking (in 
other words, the percentage of the retail price occupied by taxes) in low- and middle-
income countries with rapidly growing economies, and to explore the viability of an 
alternative tax policy rule based on the affordability of cigarettes. The chapter outlines 
criticisms of tax burden benchmarking, particularly in the context of low- and middle-
income countries. It then considers an affordability based benchmark using relative 
income price as a measure of affordability. Using South Africa as a case study of a 
middle-income country, future consumption is simulated using both tax burden 
benchmarks and affordability benchmarks. Results show that a tax burden benchmark 
is not an optimal policy tool in South Africa and that an affordability benchmark 
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could be a more effective means of reducing tobacco consumption in the future. 
Although a tax burden benchmark was successful in increasing prices and reducing 
tobacco consumption in South Africa in the past, this approach has drawbacks, 
particularly in the context of a rapidly growing economy. An affordability benchmark 
represents an alternative that would be more effective in reducing future cigarette 
consumption.  
 
This chapter was originally published in the journal Tobacco Control (Blecher, 
2010a). It includes a number of improvements, most notably the use of more recent 
data. Furthermore, the price and income elasticity of demand have been calibrated to 
recent data rather than assumed from prior literature, as it was in the original article. 
Also, various options for how the industry passes on tax increases to the consumer are 
considered, whereas the previous article made a relatively naive assumption that the 
tax was passed on to consumers in its entirety. This assumption was not consistent 
with recent tobacco industry behaviour.  
 
 
1.2.3 Chapter 4: A mountain or a molehill: is the illicit trade in cigarettes 
undermining tobacco control policy in South Africa?  
 
This chapter estimates the size of the market for illicit cigarettes in South Africa 
between 1997 and 2009 in order to consider the impact of the illicit trade in cigarettes 
on the effectiveness of tobacco control policies. Estimates of the illicit market are 
made using data on smoking prevalence and simulations of smoking intensity. The 
paper shows that the size of the illicit market grew substantially from 1997 until 
peaking in 2000. The most recent estimates suggest that the illicit market occupied a 
significant portion of the total market, although significantly less than anecdotal 
claims by the tobacco industry. The chapter then considers the tax loss resulting from 
illicit trade and the scale of the total market; we find that although the scale of the 
illicit market is significant, it has not significantly undermined tobacco control policy. 
Consumption in the total market, i.e. the illicit and legal market, has declined 
consistently over time. At the same time, tax revenue from higher excise taxes has 
offset the tax losses as a result of illicit trade. The chapter ends with a postscript 
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examining the most recent claims of the tobacco industry. It compares the rhetoric of 
the tobacco industry with the actual situation.  
 
Although it is not necessarily possible to generalise from the results of this case study 
to other low- and middle-income countries, South Africa is seen as an important case 
study of illicit trade since it is one of the better known examples of a middle-income 
country in which taxation has been used as a tobacco control tool. 
 
This chapter was originally published in the journal Trends in Organized Crime 
(Blecher, 2010b). Like the preceding chapter, it includes a number of slight 
improvements, most notably the postscript and its use of more recent data. 
 
 
1.2.4 Chapter 5: The impact of tobacco advertising bans on consumption in low- 
and middle-income countries  
 
Tobacco advertising bans are commonplace in high-income countries but are less 
prevalent in low- and middle-income countries. The importance of advertising bans as 
part of comprehensive tobacco control strategies has been emphasised by the 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, which calls for comprehensive bans on 
tobacco advertising. The empirical literature suggests that comprehensive advertising 
bans have played a role in reducing consumption in high-income countries but that 
limited policies have not. This chapter extends this literature to include a significant 
number of low- and middle-income countries in the sample. In addition to the 
inclusion of the low- and middle-income countries, the chapter presents an 
econometric model that develops alternative methods to account for policies that 
restrict and ban tobacco advertising. These alternative methods are developed in 
response to a number of weaknesses and criticisms in the previous literature. A cross-
country time series demand model is employed where consumption is specified as a 
function of price and income, and advertising bans enter the model as a policy 
intervention in each country and time period. Fixed effects are used to control for 
differences between countries and time periods. The chapter finds that comprehensive 
advertising bans are effective in reducing consumption and that comprehensive bans 
have a greater impact on consumption in low- and middle-income countries than they 
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do in high-income countries. Data from 76 countries, of which 41 are low- and 
middle-income countries, between 1990 and 2005, are used. 
 
Like Chapter 2, this chapter was originally published in two forms, firstly as a policy 
paper by Economic Research South Africa (Blecher, 2008b) and subsequently in the 
Journal of Health Economics (Blecher, 2008a). The work in this chapter has been 
updated significantly. Improved consumption data, which allows for a more complete 
dataset and allows me to include significantly more countries in the dataset, has been 
sourced. Furthermore, greater attention is paid to the price data by using three 
measures rather than one, although the same source is used. Additionally, 
improvements have been made to the methods used in order to include advertising 
bans in an econometric model.  
 
 
1.3 OTHER ISSUES 
 
 
1.3.1 Data issues 
 
Data that interests researchers in low- and middle-income countries is usually scarce 
and of poorer quality than data in high-income countries. However, this is less of a 
problem when using aggregate data, which this thesis relies on, since a number of 
private sector firms have taken an interest in collecting aggregate data for a large 
cross-section of countries (including many low- and middle-income countries).  
 
A number of the chapters employ data from similar sources. Chapter 2 relies heavily 
on price data sourced from the Economist Intelligence Unit. This source has become 
popular in recent times since it is the only source of consistently collected time series 
data on prices that includes a large number of low- and middle-income countries. 
Chapter 2 also supplements the price data with income data from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators database. Chapter 3 uses data from local sources in 
South Africa, including data collated and organised by Van Walbeek (2005), which 
has been updated from the original sources using the same methods. This is 
supplemented with data from Statistics South Africa and the South African Reserve 
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Bank. Population data is sourced from the Actuarial Society of South Africa since it 
provides the necessary population projections. A detailed appendix discussion of the 
data is included. Chapter 4 also uses data from same sources as Chapter 3. In addition, 
other estimates of illicit trade volumes are sourced from Euromonitor. Chapter 5 uses 
consumption data from the ERC Group in addition to price data from the Economist 
Intelligence Unit and income data from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators database. Data on tobacco control policies in individual countries are 
obtained from a number of different sources, including international organizations, 
reference texts, original policy documents and interviews with country experts. The 
individual data sources are discussed and evaluated in detail in each chapter. 
 
Rather than using the terms developed and developing countries, I follow the World 
Bank’s country classification and refer only to high-income and low- and middle-
income countries. Low- and middle-income countries are sometimes broken down 
into three smaller groups: upper-middle-income countries, lower-middle-income 
countries and low-income countries. This standardization of high-income countries 
and low- and middle-income countries has no purpose other than to avoid confusion 
over the definitions of developed and developing country. The World Bank 
definitions are less subjective than other terms since they are defined by quantitative 
measures of per capita Gross Domestic Product. One country included in some 
samples is Taiwan, which is not a member of the World Bank and thus is not included 
in the listing. However, I consider Taiwan to be a high-income country. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
THE AFFORDABLITY OF CIGARETTES IN LOW- AND MIDDLE-INCOME 
COUNTRIES
4
 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Numerous studies over the past decades have shown that the demand for cigarettes is 
heavily influenced by changes in cigarette pricing.
5
 By raising the excise tax, policy 
makers are able to increase the retail price of cigarettes, thereby making the product 
less affordable.
6
 Whereas increases in cigarette price temper demand, an increase in 
income tends to increase the demand for cigarettes. 
 
The literature does not focus much on the impact of income on the demand for 
cigarettes. Even if it were known how much cigarette consumption changes in 
response to a change in consumers’ incomes, it would have limited policy relevance, 
since few economists would argue against economic growth on the grounds that it 
would increase the demand for cigarettes. 
 
In recent decades, some countries, mainly in Asia, have achieved unprecedented 
economic growth rates. In China, India, Indonesia, Vietnam and Bangladesh real per 
capita gross domestic product (GDP) has grown at annual rates of 6% or more. Rapid 
economic growth increases purchasing power. Cigarette demand generally increases 
with income, especially in low- and middle-income countries (Van Walbeek, 2005 
                                                 
4
 This chapter is an updated version of work previously published as a working paper by the 
Bloomberg Imitative to Reduce Tobacco Use (Blecher and van Walbeek, 2008) and in the journal 
Tobacco Control (Blecher and van Walbeek, 2009). I would like to thank Kelly Henning and Jan 
Schmidt-Whitley for their assistance, Emmanuel Guindon, Steven Birch, Susan Cleary, Stephan 
Rabimov, Emil Sunley and three anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions, Thembi 
Dladla for research assistance, and Angela McClean of the Economist Intelligence Unit for providing 
some of the data. I would like to acknowledge the financial support of Bloomberg Initiative to Reduce 
Tobacco Use. 
5
 For comprehensive reviews see Chaloupka and Warner (2000), Van Walbeek (2005) and IARC 
(2011). 
6
 Although excise tax increases are the policy tool that governments use it does not necessarily mean 
that prices rise as a result. Manufacturers determine prices and can elect to pass on the tax increase to 
consumers or to absorb it. 
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and IARC, 2011). As their incomes increase, people find that many things, including 
cigarettes, become more affordable. 
 
This chapter focuses on the affordability of cigarettes. Affordability considers the 
simultaneous effect of income and cigarette price on a consumer’s decision. Most 
studies to date considered price and income effects in isolation.
7
 One can investigate 
the level of affordability (usually in a comparative context at a particular point in 
time), or changes in affordability over time. Both are analysed in this chapter. A 
number of definitions of affordability have been developed in the recent past, but 
essentially affordability refers to the quantity of resources required to buy a pack of 
cigarettes (in terms of time, money or other products). 
 
I have two aims with this chapter: firstly, I wish to present the latest cigarette 
affordability statistics and trends in affordability for as many countries as the data 
allows. Secondly, I wish to address certain methodological issues--especially with  
regard to the measurement of income--when calculating affordability measures. The 
chapter consists of six sections: section 2.2 provides a brief overview of the existing 
affordability literature. Section 2.3 describes the data and the derivation of the various 
affordability measures. Section 2.4 presents the results, which are discussed in more 
detail in section 2.5. Section 2.6 concludes the chapter. 
 
 
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A limited number of published studies have explicitly investigated the affordability of 
cigarettes. Scollo (1996) and Lal and Scollo (2002) compared the price of cigarettes to 
that of a Big Mac hamburger. They found that between 1995 and 2002 cigarettes had 
become relatively more expensive than Big Mac hamburgers in 15 of the 16 (high- 
income) countries included in their two surveys. While this is encouraging from a 
tobacco control perspective, the conclusion is limited to high-income countries. 
Another criticism is that these studies use the price of the Big Mac hamburger as the 
                                                 
7
 The typical demand study includes both price and income as independent variables in a regression 
equation predicting consumption. However, one interprets the estimated coefficients in isolation, i.e. 
the effect of price on consumption holding income constant.  
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reference point. As such, they did not investigate affordability per se, but simply the 
price of cigarettes relative to an internationally standardised product (i.e. the Big 
Mac). This measure says as much about the affordability of Big Mac hamburgers as it 
says about the affordability of cigarettes. 
 
Guindon et al. (2002) used an explicit measure of income by considering the time 
worked to purchase a pack of cigarettes. Based on the weighted average hourly 
earnings of twelve occupations monitored by the Union Bank of Switzerland’s survey 
of earnings,
8
 they calculated the average number of working minutes required to 
purchase a pack of local brand or Marlboro (or equivalent) cigarettes. They found that 
between 1990 and 2000 cigarettes became more affordable in 6 of the 25 (24%) high-
income countries and in 4 of the 11 (36%) low- and middle-income countries in the 
sample. However, for the majority of both high-income and low- and middle-income 
countries, cigarettes became less affordable. From a tobacco control perspective, this 
is again an encouraging outcome. 
 
Earlier studies focused primarily on high-income countries and used cross-sectional 
data at discrete points in time. Blecher and Van Walbeek (2004) considered a larger 
sample of 70 countries, of which 28 were high-income countries and 42 were low- 
and middle-income countries. They defined affordability in terms of per capita gross 
domestic product (GDP), which is a more encompassing definition of income than 
average earnings of a number of occupations. Despite being more expensive when 
expressed in a common currency, Blecher and Van Walbeek found that cigarettes 
were generally more affordable, in absolute terms, in high-income countries. Of the 
28 high-income countries considered, cigarettes became more affordable in 11 (39%) 
and less affordable in 17 (61%) countries during the 1990s. Of the 42 low- and 
middle-income countries considered, cigarettes become more affordable in 24 (57%) 
and less affordable in 18 (43%) countries. For high-income countries these results 
corresponded with previous studies. However, the finding that cigarettes became more 
affordable in a majority of low- and middle-income countries is disappointing from a 
tobacco control perspective. 
                                                 
8
 Gross wages are adjusted for differences in working time, holidays and vacations. The twelve 
occupations are primary school teachers, bus drivers, automobile mechanics, building labourers, skilled 
industrial workers, cooks, department managers, electrical or mechanical engineers, bank clerks, 
secretaries, saleswomen, and female industrial workers. 
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Kan (2007) investigated the affordability of cigarettes in 60 cities in 2006. Using a 
similar methodology to that used by Guindon et al. (2002), Kan calculated the 
percentage of daily income required to purchase a pack of cigarettes. Rather than 
using the average earnings of all fourteen occupations monitored by the Union Bank 
of Switzerland,
9
 Kan considered the seven occupations with the lowest earnings, on 
the grounds that (1) the average wage is not distorted by the inclusion of highly paid 
occupations, and (2) it better reflects the income patterns of the poor (who, in many 
countries, are more prone to smoke, and typically spend a larger proportion of their 
income on cigarettes than the rich). Kan (2007: 429) found that cigarette affordability 
“remained high” in most cities surveyed, and concluded that there is scope for further 
tax increases. Kan also warned that cigarettes would become more affordable in the 
fast-growing emerging economies if cigarette prices do not keep pace with rate of 
economic growth.  
 
The previous literature is not without its problems; the goal here is to learn from these 
problems in order to refine the methodology used in this chapter. Affordability is a 
relative, not absolute, concept. One cannot, as Kan does, claim that cigarettes are 
affordable or not affordable. One can only say that cigarettes are more or less 
affordable relative to another country or point in time. The choice of income measure 
is potentially important since some measures of income are more representative than 
others. Particularly narrow measures of income, like the use of a single product, are 
potentially misleading, since it may say more about the affordability of the underlying 
product than the affordability of cigarettes. This chapter will analyse this choice of 
income measure in detail to understand what each one means in the context of 
affordability.  
 
 
2.3 METHODOLOGY 
 
Since affordability incorporates price and income components, the challenge is to 
obtain data that accurately reflect these two magnitudes.  
 
                                                 
9
 Guindon et al. (2002) used all twelve occupations surveyed by the Union Bank of Switzerland at the 
time although the sample was subsequently increased to fourteen occupations. 
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2.3.1 Price data 
 
Price data are drawn from the “Worldwide Cost of Living Survey” of the Economist 
Intelligence Unit. This survey is conducted every six months in order to assess the 
prices of goods and services in 120 of the world’s major cities. The prices used in this 
study were collected in the first week of September in the earlier years of the sample 
and in December of the later years; it covers each year for the period of 1990 to 2009. 
For most countries, a single city is monitored. In countries where multiple cities are 
monitored,
10
 an unweighted average price is calculated. In 1990 the survey included 
103 cities in 69 countries. By 2009 this number had risen to 120 cities in 77 countries. 
Over the period of investigation, the Economist Intelligence Unit expanded the 
coverage of their survey to include cities in countries that were already represented in 
the survey in 1990.
11
 Such cities were excluded from the analysis because they bias 
the average price when the average cost of living differs significantly between the city 
(or cities) in the original survey and the newly included city.
12
  
 
The survey considers the prices of two cigarette brands: Marlboro (or nearest 
international equivalent) and a popular local brand, sold at two types of outlets: high 
volume supermarket, and mid-price retail outlet. Since the emphasis is on 
                                                 
10
 Namely Australia (5), Brazil (2), Canada (4), China (5), France (2), Germany (5), India (2), Italy (2), 
Japan (2), New Zealand (2), Russia (2), Saudi Arabia (3), Spain (2), the United Arab Emirates (2), the 
United Kingdom (2), the United States (16) and Vietnam (2). The number of cities is shown in 
parenthesis. 
11
 Namely China, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and Vietnam. See the appendix for a 
list of the cities that are included in the analysis. 
12
 The example of China is useful here. In 1990 only Beijing was included in the survey. In 1993 two 
further cities, Guangzhou and Shanghai, were added, and in 1999 Shenzhen and Tianjin were added to 
the survey. Compared to the previous period (which included only Beijing), the average price in 1993 
would be artificially lowered, because the cost of living (and the price of cigarettes) was substantially 
lower in Guangzhou and Shanghai compared to Beijing. It is quite conceivable that, in 1993, the 
average price of cigarettes including Guangzhou and Shanghai increased despite the decrease in price 
in the whole sample. This would clearly be a misrepresentation of the true underlying price trend. The 
same is possible for the inclusion of Shenzhen and Tianjin in 1999. 
Having said this, including or excluding cities that were included in the survey after 1990 from the 
analysis does not have a large quantitative impact on the price and affordability indicators. For most 
countries the issue is moot, because no new cities were included in the sample after 1990. Even for 
countries for which it would matter, the correlation coefficient between the prices based on the average 
of the original and the expanded pool of cities is in excess of 0.95. 
For the five affected countries the affordability measures for 2008 and 2009 (presented in Figure 2.1 
through 2.5 and Table 2.2) are based on the expanded sample of cities while the measures investigating 
the trends in affordability over time (presented in Figures 2.6 and 2.7 and Tables 2.3 and 2.4) use only 
the cities included in the survey in 1990. The differences in the trend in affordability in these five 
countries is so small that it had no material impact on the summary tables. 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
of
 C
ap
e 
To
w
n
34 
 
affordability, the lowest of the four prices was selected for each year. In practically all 
cases this was the local brand, sold at the supermarket.
13
 
 
The Economist Intelligence Unit collects price data in local currency. Calculating 
affordability measures does not require that the price data be converted to a common 
currency, because income data are also collected in local currency. To compare 
cigarette prices between countries, all prices were converted to United States dollars 
using two exchange rates: (1) market exchange rates on the day of the survey from the 
Economist Intelligence Unit,
14
 and (2) purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion 
factors from the World Bank’s “World Development Indicators” online database. 
 
 
2.3.2 Income data 
 
While price is conceptually quite easy to comprehend, income is more complex. 
Firstly, how does one define income? Should one use a broad definition (e.g. per 
capita GDP) or a narrow definition (e.g. after-tax income)? While a broad definition 
of income is less sensitive to differences in tax regimes and government’s role in 
providing goods, services and grants, a narrow definition is typically better 
understood by the public. For example: “A London teacher’s net hourly earnings in 
2006 was £ 8.65” versus “Per capita GDP in the United Kingdom in 2006 was £ 21 
084”. Secondly, there is the issue of income distribution. Two countries may have a 
similar average level of income, but if the income distributions are dissimilar, 
affordability measures in such countries would not be comparable. Given the same 
cigarette price, cigarettes are likely to be more affordable in a middle-income country 
with a relatively equal income distribution than in a country with a similar average 
level of income, but where a large proportion of the population may be desperately 
poor. 
 
                                                 
13
 In 2008 the local brand was cheapest in 69 countries; Marlboro was cheapest in 3 countries; and the 
local brand and Marlboro were equally priced in 5 countries.  
14
 The data are provided by the Economist Intelligence Unit in both local currencies and United States 
dollars. They indicate that the conversion is made using the market exchange rate on the day of the 
survey. 
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I use two income measures. Per capita GDP is a broad measure of income and has the 
advantage of being calculated using a consistent methodology. It is generally regarded 
as a good indicator of average living standards, despite the fact that it does not take 
differences in the distribution of income into account. GDP data were drawn from the 
World Bank’s “World Development Indicators” online database. Local currency 
aggregate GDP was converted into per capita terms using population statistics from 
the same database. All countries who are members of the World Bank are reported in 
the database.
15
 
 
The second income measure is the Union Bank of Switzerland survey of earnings, 
also used by Guindon et al. (2002) and Kan (2007). The survey calculates gross and 
net hourly earnings in a number of occupations in the most important commercial 
cities around the world.
16
 I used five surveys (1997, 2000, 2003, 2006 and 2009) to 
construct a discrete time series of median earnings. The surveys were based on twelve 
occupations in 1997 and 2000, thirteen in 2003 and fourteen in 2006 and 2009.
17
  
 
 
2.3.3 Measures of affordability 
 
The relative income price is a broad measure of affordability developed by Blecher 
and Van Walbeek (2004). This measure has received significant attention in the 
literature and has featured in country level studies (Guindon et al., 2010) and global 
publications like the Cancer Atlas (Mackay et al., 2006a: 56-57). The relative income 
price calculates the percentage of per capita GDP required to purchase the 100 
cheapest packs of cigarettes. The higher the relative income price, the less affordable 
cigarettes are, and vice versa. 
 
                                                 
15
 Taiwan is a notable exclusion since it is not considered an independent country by the World Bank. 
16
 This included 55 cities in 48 countries in 1997, 58 cities in 50 countries in 2000, 70 cities in 59 
countries in 2003 and 70 cities in 58 countries in 2006 and 2009. 
17
 The occupations were primary school teachers, bus drivers, automobile mechanics, building 
labourers, skilled industrial workers, cooks, department managers, engineers, bank credit clerks, 
secretaries, saleswomen, and female industrial workers. The additional occupation in 2003 was a 
product manager and the additional occupation in 2006 was a call centre agent. 
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The relative income price was calculated for each year in the period 1990 to 2008, for 
as many countries as the data allowed.
18
 During the period under investigation some 
countries experienced hyperinflation, which complicated the data analysis. In some 
cases manual adjustments were required to make the GDP data and the price data 
comparable. These are indicated in the appendix. Furthermore, the observation for 
Poland in 1992 was excluded due to an extreme value (one tenth the value of the 
preceding year and one sixth the value in the following year).  
 
The minutes of labour method was developed by the World Health Organisation 
(World Health Organisation, 1998) but popularised by Guindon et al. (2002). It has 
also gained a significant amount of attention in the literature including in publications 
like the Tobacco Atlas (Mackey et al., 2006b). It is defined as the minutes of labour 
required to purchase the cheapest pack of cigarettes (as surveyed by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit), based on net earnings.
19
 There are a number of variations of this 
methodology. Guindon et al. (2002) use the weighted average of all occupations as 
calculated by the Union Bank of Switzerland. Alternatively one may choose to use the 
simple average or the median. In this chapter I use the median for calculating the 
minutes of labour method because it is not affected by outliers of earnings in specific 
occupations.
20
 
 
Kan (2007) defines affordability as the percentage of daily income required to buy a 
pack of cigarettes. I did not use Kan’s measure in this chapter because it is essentially 
the reciprocal of Guindon et al.’s minutes of labour method. However, Kan’s focus on 
the lower paying jobs is useful in the context of affordability of cigarettes among the 
poor. Therefore, I specify an additional affordability measure as the number of 
minutes required to buy a pack of cigarettes by a person earning a relatively low 
                                                 
18
 The relative income price is calculated until 2008 since income data from the World Bank is not 
available for 2009. Price data from the Economist Intelligence Unit and income data from the Union 
Bank of Switzerland are available in 2009 and thus these measures are calculated for 2009. 
19
 Although Guindon et al. calculate the measure using the international and local brand of cigarette I 
use the cheapest pack of cigarettes for all measures to ensure consistency. 
20
 The minutes of labour method can be distorted by differences across countries at a point in time in 
average hours as well as for a given country over time as hours change – the former is likely to be 
particularly important in understanding differences in measures between countries based on income 
levels, and the latter in understanding trends in affordability, particularly in rapidly developing 
countries where the benefit of development has been a reduction in average hours at the same time as 
wages are rising. I am indebted to an examiner for raising this. 
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wage. Following Kan’s lead, I did this by calculating the median net wage of the 
lowest paid half of the occupations surveyed by Union Bank of Switzerland.
21
 
 
 
2.3.4 Other issues 
 
The typical way to determine whether cigarettes have become more or less affordable 
in the years since 1990 would be to compare the most recent value to a past value. 
Using only the starting and ending values the average annual growth rate is computed 
using the standard formula: (Yt/Yt-1)
1/n
 – 1. If no information on prices is available for 
the period between the starting and ending years, this is the appropriate procedure. 
However, if the intermediate values are known and the starting and/or ending values 
are outliers, i.e. significantly different from the underlying trend, the calculated 
growth rate will be unrepresentative of the true trend. To prevent such distortions, a 
constant growth regression line was fitted to all observations (see Gujarati, 2003: 178-
181). This entails fitting the regression line ln(Yt) = α + βt + εt where t = 0, 1, 2, …. 
The estimated value of β is the estimated constant growth rate of the variable Y. An 
advantage of this approach is that even if some values are missing (even at the 
extremities), one can still estimate the value of β. 
 
Although the statistics are interpreted in the same manner, they will provide differing 
results. Although the constant growth regression is the most accurate measure, it is 
not always appropriate given that of some of the data used in this chapter (i.e. the 
Union Bank of Switzerland earnings data) are not available on an annual basis. Both 
measures were reported where possible. 
 
Although all reasonable measures have been taken to ensure that the data are correct, 
a variety of factors--including changes in currencies, hyperinflation, temporary spikes 
in cigarette prices, errors in collection, volatile exchange rates, etc.--could result in 
incorrect and possibly outlier values. Of the two measures of central tendency (mean 
and median), I typically used the median, because it is not susceptible to the influence 
                                                 
21
 The lowest six occupations were used in 1997, 2000 and 2003 while the lowest seven occupations 
were used in 2006 and 2009. What this means in practice is that the fourth lowest wage is used in 2006 
and 2009 and the average of the third and fourth lowest in 1997, 2000 and 2003. 
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of outliers, whereas the mean is. When calculating correlations, I typically used 
Spearman rank correlations, rather than simple (Pearson) correlations, for two 
reasons: firstly, Spearman correlations do not assume a linear relationship, whereas 
the Pearson correlations do. Secondly, Spearman correlations are not affected by 
outliers, whereas Pearson correlations are. Zar’s (1972) tables were used to test the 
significance of the Spearman coefficients.  
 
The sample consists of 78 countries where GDP was used as the measure of income 
(based on 123 cities for which price data were available), and 53 countries (68 cities) 
where the Union Bank of Switzerland data were used. The World Bank’s 
classification in July 2009 (World Bank, 2009) was used to divide the countries into 
four income categories: high (34 [30] countries), upper-middle (19 [14] countries), 
lower-middle (20 [8] countries) and low (5 [1] countries).
22
   
 
 
2.4 RESULTS 
 
 
2.4.1 The situation in 2008 and 2009 
 
Conventional wisdom tells us that cigarette prices, expressed in a common currency, 
are much higher in high-income countries than in low- and middle-income countries 
(World Bank, 1999 and Jha and Chaloupka, 2000). This is illustrated by Figure 2.1, 
which first ranks countries according to their income status (high-income, upper-
middle-income, lower-middle-income and low-income) and then according to the 
United States dollar price per pack of cigarettes in 2008. Cigarettes are, on average, 
between three to four times more expensive in high-income countries than in middle-
income countries and almost seven times more expensive in high-income countries 
than in low-income countries. However, among the low- and middle-income countries 
in the sample, I find that average prices in upper-middle and lower-middle countries 
are similar and slightly higher than low-income countries.  
 
                                                 
22
 The first number refers to GDP data, and the second number to Union Bank of Switzerland data.  
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Figure 2.1: Price per pack of cigarettes expressed in US dollars, 2008 
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Note: The figure does not include countries which have no observation for 2008. High-income countries are in blue, upper-middle-income countries in red, lower-middle-
income countries in green and low-income countries in pink. This convention is followed throughout. 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit 
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A second feature of Figure 2.1 is the very large variability in the US dollar prices 
among countries with a similar level of development. For high-income countries, with 
a mean price of $5.55 (median $5.57) and standard deviation of $2.61, the coefficient 
of variation is 0.47. Among low- and middle-income countries the coefficient of 
variation is 0.59 (=$0.80/$1.36). Countries with high costs of living (e.g. Norway) 
and those that have taken strong tobacco control action (e.g. Australia, Canada, 
Ireland, New Zealand and the United Kingdom) have the most expensive cigarettes. 
Middle Eastern countries tend to have the cheapest cigarettes among the high-income 
countries. 
 
Purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion rates quantify price differences between 
countries based on a large basket of goods and services. PPP-adjusted cigarette prices 
account for the fact that average price levels differ between countries, and as such it is 
an alternative price measure. PPP-adjusted United States dollar prices per pack of 
cigarettes in 2008 are presented in Figure 2.2, sorted according to their income status 
and according to price. The average PPP-adjusted United States dollar price among 
high-income countries is more than double that of low- and middle-income countries. 
Average PPP-adjusted US dollar prices are similar in upper-middle-income and 
lower-middle-income countries, and slightly higher than they are in low-income 
countries. Differences in average cigarette prices between high-income and other 
countries are compressed when one uses PPP-adjusted prices vis-à-vis prices 
calculated with current exchange rates.
23
 
 
                                                 
23
 Summary statistics for both price and affordability measures are presented in Table 2.2. 
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Figure 2.2: Price per pack of cigarettes expressed in PPP adjusted US dollars, 2008 
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Note: The figure does not include countries which have no observation for 2008. 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit and the World Bank 
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Do excise tax rate differences adequately explain the differences in retail prices? 
Based on data published in a recent World Health Organisation report (World Health 
Organisation, 2008), I calculated a Spearman ranked correlation coefficient of 0.40 (n 
= 120, P < 0.001) between US dollar-denominated retail prices (calculated using the 
current exchange rate) and the national excise tax incidence (i.e. excise tax as 
percentage of the retail price, but excluding provincial/state, local and general sales 
taxes).
24
 While the correlation is significantly positive, most of the variation in retail 
prices is explained by other factors. These factors include market structure, trade 
restrictions and manufacturer pricing strategies. However, this does not mean that 
excise taxes are not the single most important factor affecting prices. 
 
Figure 2.1 is certainly useful in some circumstances. To know that cigarettes are very 
expensive in Norway is useful information for a smoker travelling to that country. 
Similarly, multinational cigarette companies would be interested to know the after-tax 
prices, expressed in a common currency. (The prices shown in Figure 2.1 are the tax-
inclusive prices). However, one cannot infer anything about the affordability of 
cigarettes from Figure 2.1, because it does not incorporate the level of income. This is 
also true for Figure 2.2, which only tells us about the price of cigarettes in relation to 
the prices of a basket of other goods and services.   
 
The relative income price of cigarettes – the percentage of per capita GDP required to 
buy 100 packs of cigarettes – is shown in Figure 2.3. The lower this percentage, the 
more affordable the cigarettes are. The countries are again sorted, first by income 
status, and then by relative income price.  
 
                                                 
24
 The United States and Canada levy cigarette excise taxes primarily at the state/provincial level. Since 
national excise tax burdens severely understate the true tax burden, these two countries are excluded 
from the calculation. 
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Figure 2.3: Relative income price of cigarettes, 2008 
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Note: The figure does not include countries which have no observation for 2008. 
Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit and the World Bank 
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Using this measure of affordability, cigarettes are not significantly more affordable in 
high-income countries than they are in upper-middle-income countries. However, 
they are significantly more affordable in high-income countries than they are in 
lower-middle-income and low-income countries. This is despite the fact that they are 
typically more expensive in absolute terms in high-income countries. This is 
explained by the fact that, although cigarettes in high-income countries are about 
three to four times more expensive in absolute terms than they are in low- and middle-
income countries, per capita GDP in high-income countries exceeds per capita GDP 
in low- and middle-income countries by a much greater factor. 
 
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 indicate the number of minutes of work required to buy a pack of 
cigarettes in 2009, based on the Union Bank of Switzerland survey. The greater the 
number of minutes of labour required to purchase a pack of cigarettes, the less 
affordable the product. For both figures, the countries are sorted first according to 
income status, and then according to the minutes of labour required to buy a pack of 
cigarettes. Figure 2.4 approximates Guindon et al.’s (2002) method and aims to 
estimate affordability of cigarettes for the median employed person.
25
 Figure 2.5 is 
derived from Kan’s (2007) method and is based on the median wage earned by the 
seven lowest-earning occupations surveyed by the Union Bank of Switzerland (i.e. the 
25
th
 percentile of jobs surveyed). Figure 2.5 thus specifically focuses on the 
affordability of cigarettes among poorer employed people. By construction the 
numbers in Figure 2.5 are always higher than the numbers in Figure 2.4.
26
 
 
 
                                                 
25
 Guindon et al. use the weighted average while I use the median since it is less prone to outliers. 
26
 The scales on the vertical axes in Figures 2.4 and 2.5 are standardized to make comparing the two 
easier. 
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Figure 2.4: Number of minutes of labour required to purchase a pack of cigarettes (median of all occupations), 2009 
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Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit and the Union Bank of Switzerland 
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Figure 2.5: Number of minutes worked to purchase a pack of cigarettes (median of seven lowest paid occupations), 2009 
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Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit and the Union Bank of Switzerland 
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The relatively few observations for middle-income, and low-income countries, 
prevent us from making strong conclusions. Nevertheless, what Figure 2.4 does 
suggest is that the level of cigarette affordability, using the minutes of labour method, 
does not vary significantly between high-income and middle-income countries. While 
there is a high degree of variation in cigarette affordability within groups of countries 
with a similar level of development, there is not much variation between the averages 
(and medians) of the different groups. The statistical moments (mean, median and 
standard deviation) of high-income, upper-middle-income and lower-middle-income 
countries are very similar. 
 
Figure 2.4 stands in stark contrast to Figure 2.3, which found that cigarette 
affordability decreases sharply as we move from high-income to low-income 
countries.  
 
In Figure 2.5, as with Figure 2.4, the degree of variation within the same group is 
high. However, as one moves from high-income to low-income countries, there is a 
suggestion that cigarettes, on average, become relatively less affordable (at least more 
so than Figure 2.4). What is implied is that poorly remunerated occupations in 
middle-income and low-income countries yield comparatively lower earnings in such 
countries than similarly remunerated occupations in high-income countries. This issue 
is discussed in more detail in Section 2.5. 
 
Spearman rank correlation coefficients were calculated for the three different 
affordability indices for the comparable years (1997, 2000, 2003 and 2006 for those 
involving the relative income price, and additionally 2009 for the minutes of labour 
measures), and are shown in Table 2.1. The purpose of this is to show how similar or 
different the measures are. All the calculated test statistics are statistically significant 
indicating that they are different from zero. The correlations are consistently higher 
between the Guindon and Kan minutes of labour methods than for the comparisons 
between the minutes of labour methods and relative income price – presumably 
because they are based on the same earnings data. Correlations are also higher in 
high-income countries than in low- and middle-income countries for all three 
comparisons, meaning that the choice of measure makes less difference in high-
income countries than it does in low- and middle-income countries. With few 
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exceptions the correlation coefficients are high, meaning that although conceptually 
different, these measures indicate similar things. The Kan minutes of labour method 
shows slightly higher correlations to the relative income price (between 0.74 to 0.82 
for all countries) than the Guindon minutes of labour method to the relative income 
price (0.62 to 0.68 for all countries). Possible explanations for the divergence of these 
affordability measures, especially in low- and middle-income countries, are provided 
in section 2.5, together with a discussion of the implications of the result. 
 
Table 2.1: Spearman rank correlation coefficients between the different 
affordability measures 
Year All countries High-income 
countries 
Low- and middle-
income countries 
 Relative income price – Guindon’s minutes of labour 
1997 0.656
**
 (44) 0.852
**
 (28) 0.662
**
 (16) 
2000 0.682
**
 (45) 0.849
**
 (28) 0.564
*
 (17) 
2003 0.661
**
 (49) 0.922
**
 (29) 0.714
**
 (20) 
2006 0.622
**
 (47) 0.865
**
 (28) 0.596
**
 (19) 
 Relative income price – Kan’s minutes of labour 
1997 0.784
**
 (44) 0.846
**
 (28) 0.756
**
 (16) 
2000 0.811
**
 (45) 0.843
**
 (28) 0.605
**
 (17) 
2003 0.824
**
 (49) 0.944
**
 (29) 0.672
**
 (20) 
2006 0.743
**
 (47) 0.920
**
 (28) 0.437
*
 (19) 
 Guindon’s minutes of labour – Kan’s minutes of labour 
1997 0.934
**
 (44) 0.983
**
 (28) 0.888
**
 (16) 
2000 0.917
**
 (45) 0.987
**
 (28) 0.858
**
 (17) 
2003 0.875
**
 (49) 0.917
**
 (29)  0.853
**
 (20) 
2006 0.844
**
 (47) 0.892
**
 (28) 0.763
**
 (19) 
2009 0.842
**
 (49) 0.948
**
 (29) 0.728
**
 (20) 
Note: Number of observations are shown in parentheses. It is not possible to calculate Spearman rank 
correlation coefficients between the relative income price and the minutes of labour in 2009 since the 
relative income price is only calculated until 2008 and the minutes of labour are not calculated for 
2009. * Significantly different from zero at 5 per cent level. ** Significantly different from zero at 1 
per cent level.  
Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit, the Union Bank of Switzerland and the World Bank 
 
Table 2.2 is a summary of the three affordability measures and the price expressed in 
a common currency. Four statistics are shown in each case: the mean, median, 
standard deviation and the coefficient of variation (standard deviation/mean). As 
mentioned previously, this chapter regards the median as the better measure of central 
tendency, as it is not affected by extreme values.  
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Table 2.2: Summary of affordability indices in 2008/2009 
Indicator Unit Measure High-income 
countries 
Upper-middle-
income 
countries 
Lower-middle-
income 
countries 
Low-income 
countries 
Price  
(2008) 
USD per pack 
(nominal, converted 
with market exchange 
rates) 
Observations 33 18 20 5 
Mean $5.35 $1.82 $1.49 $0.78 
Median $5.57 $1.79 $1.45 $0.74 
Std. dev. $2.61 $0.81 $0.76 $0.39 
CV 0.47 0.45 0.52 0.53 
Price  
(2008) 
USD per pack 
(nominal, converted 
using PPP conversion 
factors) 
Observations 31 18 19 4 
Mean $5.67 $2.79 $2.69 $1.64 
Median $4.60 $2.85 $2.35 $1.69 
Std. dev. $3.02 $1.07 $1.59 $0.92 
CV 0.41 0.38 0.68 0.54 
Relative income price 
(Blecher & Van Walbeek’s 
measure)  
(2008) 
Percentage of per 
capita GDP to buy 100 
packs  
Observations 31 18 18 3 
Mean 1.34% 2.11% 8.73% 12.98% 
Median 1.27% 1.96% 5.40% 13.19% 
Std. dev. 0.53% 0.86% 7.17% 4.66% 
CV 0.41 0.44 1.32 0.35 
Median minutes of labour 
(14 occupations)    
(Guindon’s measure) 
(2009) 
No. of working 
minutes to buy one 
pack of cigarettes 
Observations 30 13 6 1 
Mean 27.3 min 32.3 min 25.7 min 57.7 min 
Median 28.1 min 32.5 min 24.8 min 57.7 min 
Std. dev. 12.1 min 15.8 min 14.4 min n/a 
CV 0.43 0.49 0.58 n/a 
Median minutes of labour  
(7 lowest paid occupations) 
(Kan’s measure) 
(2009) 
No. of working 
minutes to buy one 
pack of cigarettes 
Observations 30 13 6 1 
Mean 34.1 min 47.6 min 57.2 min 82.6 min 
Median 32.2 min 42.6 min 50.1 min 82.6 min 
Std. dev. 15.3 min 26.1 min 31.5 min n/a 
CV 0.48 0.61 0.61 n/a 
Note: Nominal prices are presented in 2008 in order to make them comparable to the PPP prices which are not available in 2009. 
Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit, the Union Bank of Switzerland and the World Bank 
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A number of features in this table stand out. Price, by itself, is a misleading indicator 
of affordability, since it does not take income into account. In fact, based on this 
sample of countries, price, expressed in a common currency, is unrelated, or even 
negatively related, to affordability.
27
 This is not meant to suggest that price is 
altogether not important, but it is to say that level of income is equally important in 
determining affordability. The data confirm the notion that cigarettes are more 
expensive in absolute terms in richer countries than they are in poorer countries. The 
median price in high-income countries is approximately seven times higher than in it 
is in low-income countries, and between three and four times higher than it is in 
middle-income countries. 
 
The relative income price provides strong support for the hypothesis that cigarettes 
are significantly less affordable in middle-income and especially low-income 
countries than they are in high-income countries. The median relative income price 
increases tenfold as we move from high-income to low-income countries. Kan’s 
(2007) minutes of labour measure of affordability, which focuses on relatively poorly 
remunerated workers, comes to a similar conclusion, although it is not nearly as 
strong. Median cigarette affordability decreases by a factor of 2.6 (32 minutes vs. 83 
minutes) as one moves from high-income to low-income countries. For upper-middle 
and lower-middle income countries the factors are 1.3 and 1.6, respectively. On the 
other hand, Guindon et al.’s (2002) minutes of labour approach, which focuses on the 
affordability of cigarettes for the median worker, finds little evidence to suggest that 
cigarette affordability varies significantly between groups of countries. In high-
income countries, the minutes of labour required to purchase a pack of cigarettes is 
2.1 times greater than in low-income countries, and 1.2 and 0.9 times higher (lower if 
the ratio is less than one) than in upper-middle and lower-middle-income countries, 
respectively.  
                                                 
27
 Spearman’s correlation coefficient between the United States dollar price and the relative income 
price is -0.48, between United States dollar price and Guindon et al.’s minutes of labour affordability 
measure it is 0.24 and between United States dollar price and Kan’s minutes of labour affordability 
measure it is -0.22. The last two coefficients are not significant at the 5% level. 
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2.4.2 Trends in affordability between 1990 and 2008/9 
 
The previous discussion considered the situation in the most recent year for which 
data were available, i.e. 2008/9. An equally, if not more important issue, concerns 
trends in affordability. One would expect that, given the increased awareness of the 
dangers of smoking and the increased activism of tobacco control lobby groups 
around the world, a majority of governments would have heeded their call and 
implemented strategies to make cigarettes less affordable. Furthermore, the entry into 
force of the World Health Organisation’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
has improved the policy environment in which tobacco control operates. However, the 
market power of the global tobacco industry has also greatly increased over time, 
given globalization and merger and acquisition activity has likely offset some of the 
strength of tobacco control (see Gilmore et al, 2010). 
 
 
The aim of this section is to investigate briefly trends in cigarette affordability since 
1990. Two approaches are used. I first consider growth rates in cigarette prices and 
the three affordability measures for the period 1997 to 2008/9. I am limited to this 
period because the minutes of labour affordability measures are available only for the 
years 1997, 2000, 2003, 2006 and 2009. Subsequently, I use the relative income price 
to consider trends in cigarette affordability for a longer period (1990-2008) and some 
sub-periods. 
 
Table 2.3 shows the average annual growth rates in the real United States dollar price 
of cigarettes and the three affordability measures for the periods 1997-2000, 2000-
2003, 2003-2006, 2006-2009 and 1997-2008/9.
28
 Countries were divided into two 
groups: high-income countries and low- and middle-income countries. The growth 
rates are based on the median values for the appropriate groups of countries for the 
relevant years. A positive value implies that cigarettes have become less affordable, 
while a negative value implies that cigarettes have become more affordable. 
 
                                                 
28
 These growth rates were calculated according to the standard formula: [(Yt/Yt-n)
1/n
 – 1] x 100. It was 
impossible to calculate growth rates with a constant growth regression model, because in-between 
values for the minutes of labour affordability measure do not exist.  
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Table 2.3: Growth rates in cigarette price and affordability measures for 1997-2006, based on the median for the country categories 
Indicator Unit Country 
category 
Median annual growth rate Percentage of countries with growth rates > 0 
   1997-
2000 
2000-
2003 
2003-
2006 
2006-
2008/9 
1997-
2008/9 
1997-
2000 
2000-
2003 
2003-
2006 
2006-
2008/9 
1997-
2008/9 
Real price Constant 2000 
USD per pack 
High-income 
counties 
-3.8% 
(32) 
8.8% 
(33) 
3.7% 
(33) 
6.5% 
(33) 
4.0% 
(32) 
31% 88% 66% 79% 84% 
Low- and middle-
income countries 
-3.9% 
(43) 
0.7% 
(40) 
1.6% 
(36) 
4.1 
(38) 
1.4% 
(42) 
37% 53% 58% 66% 62% 
Relative income price  Percentage of per 
capita GDP to buy 
100 packs 
High-income 
counties 
-0.2% 
(32) 
1.9% 
(33) 
-1.9% 
(33) 
0.7% 
(31) 
0.3% 
(30) 
47% 67% 30% 55% 53% 
Low- and middle-
income countries 
-0.3% 
(43) 
-0.7% 
(42) 
-7.1% 
(38) 
-3.8% 
(35) 
-1.7% 
(38) 
49% 48% 11% 23% 26% 
Median minutes of labour  
(14 occupations)  
(Guindon’s measure) 
Number of 
working minutes 
to buy one pack of 
cigarettes 
High-income 
counties 
3.0% 
(28) 
0.8% 
(29) 
1.6% 
(29) 
1.3% 
(29) 
1.7% 
(29) 
71% 55% 59% 69% 76% 
Low- and middle-
income countries 
5.1% 
(16) 
-1.5% 
(16) 
-0.6% 
(18) 
5.0% 
(19) 
0.0% 
(15) 
75% 44% 44% 58% 53% 
Median minutes of labour  
(7 lowest paid occupations) 
(Kan’s measure) 
Number of 
working minutes 
to buy one pack of 
cigarettes 
High-income 
counties 
1.3% 
(28) 
4.6% 
(29) 
2.6% 
(29) 
2.8% 
(29) 
1.3% 
(29) 
64% 72% 69% 62% 86% 
Low- and middle-
income countries 
3.4% 
(16) 
1.0% 
(16) 
-4.4% 
(18) 
1.8% 
(19) 
1.4% 
(15) 
63% 50% 33% 63% 53% 
Note: Number of observations is shown in parentheses. The periods until 2008 are used for the real price and relative income price and 2009 for the minutes of labour. 
Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit, the Union Bank of Switzerland and the World Bank 
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Table 2.3 reveals a fairly consistent picture regarding trends in cigarette affordability 
over the period 1997-2008/9. There is strong evidence that high-income countries, as 
a group, have been able consistently to reduce the affordability of cigarettes. All three 
measures indicate a decrease in cigarette affordability over the longest sample and 
through most sub-samples. Throughout the period, cigarettes have become less 
affordable at the rate between 0.3% to 1.7% per annum depending on the measure 
used. The most significant change is found when using Kan’s measure while the 
smallest change is found using the relative income price. From a tobacco control 
perspective this is an encouraging result, indeed. 
 
The picture for low- and middle-income countries is less optimistic. Despite minor 
inconsistencies between the three affordability measures, Table 2.3 suggests that 
cigarettes have become more affordable between 1997 and 2008/9. The relative 
income price measure certainly indicates this. In the period 2003 to 2006 all three 
measures indicate that cigarettes have become significantly more affordable in low- 
and middle-income countries. For two measures, the relative income price (-7.1% per 
year) and Kan’s minutes of labour measure (-4.4% per year), the decreases were 
substantial, while Guindon et al.’s minutes of labour suggests a less dramatic decrease 
(-0.6% per year). These years (2003-2006) saw rapid economic growth in many low- 
and middle-income countries. The evidence clearly indicates that the price of 
cigarettes did not keep pace with the growth in income and that, as a result, cigarettes 
became more affordable. 
 
Table 2.4 considers trends in cigarette affordability over a longer period (1990-2008) 
using only the relative income price as a measure of affordability. The growth rates 
are calculated using both the constant growth regression method as well as the 
average annual growth rate method. The two methods show relatively similar results, 
in terms of direction and magnitude, for both the shorter and longer sub-periods. 
 
Among high-income countries there has been an increase of 1.1% per annum over the 
entire sample in the relative income price using the average annual growth rate 
method; much of it occurred between 2000 and 2003. However, when using the 
constant growth regression method, growth in the relative income price is unchanged. 
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However, the most recent years, 2006 to 2008, indicate that cigarettes have become 
less affordable in high-income countries, independent of the method used.  
 
Table 2.4: Median of the average annual percentage change in relative income 
price, 1990-2008 
Period High-income 
countries 
Upper-
middle-
income 
countries 
Lower-
middle-
income 
countries 
Low-income 
countries 
Low- and 
middle-
income 
countries 
 Average annual growth rate method 
1990-1995 0.4% 
(31) 
-3.9% 
(15) 
-3.3% 
(18) 
4.5% 
(4) 
-2.6% 
(37) 
1995-2000 -0.6% 
(32) 
0.8% 
(19) 
-1.5% 
(19) 
-4.3% 
(5) 
-0.8% 
(43) 
2000-2003 1.9% 
(33) 
-0.7% 
(17) 
0.3% 
(20) 
-1.8% 
(5) 
-0.7% 
(42) 
2003-2006 -1.9% 
(33) 
-5.0% 
(16) 
-7.0% 
(19) 
-7.9% 
(3) 
-7.1% 
(38) 
2006-2008 0.7% 
(31) 
-3.5% 
(16) 
-3.8% 
(17) 
-7.6% 
(2) 
-3.8% 
(35) 
2000-2008 0.4% 
(31) 
-2.9% 
(18) 
-3.6% 
(18) 
-2.9% 
(3) 
-3.2% 
(39) 
1990-2008 1.1% 
(34) 
-1.5% 
(15) 
-3.2% 
(16) 
-1.2% 
(3) 
-1.6% 
(34) 
 Constant growth regression method 
1990-1995 0.4% 
(32) 
-2.6% 
(19) 
-4.5% 
(19) 
4.6% 
(5) 
-3.2% 
(43) 
1995-2000 0.2% 
(34) 
1.1% 
(19) 
-1.0% 
(20) 
-4.7% 
(5) 
-0.1% 
(44) 
2000-2003 2.2% 
(34) 
-1.1% 
(19) 
0.2% 
(20) 
-2.6% 
(5) 
-0.9% 
(44) 
2003-2006 -1.7% 
(33) 
-6.3% 
(18) 
-7.7% 
(20) 
-7.8% 
(5) 
-7.1% 
(43) 
2006-2008 0.7% 
(33) 
-4.5% 
(18) 
-3.1% 
(18) 
-6.5% 
(3) 
-4.1% 
(39) 
2000-2008 -0.5% 
(34) 
-3.4% 
(19) 
-6.5% 
(20) 
-2.9% 
(5) 
-4.6% 
(44) 
1990-2008 0.0% 
(34) 
-0.6% 
(19) 
-1.6% 
(20) 
-2.2% 
(5) 
-1.6% 
(44) 
Note: Number of observations is shown in parentheses.  
Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit and the World Bank 
 
When considering low- and middle-income countries, the two methods show a 
consistent picture. The relative income price has declined in lower- and middle-
income countries between 1990 and 2008 meaning cigarettes became more 
affordable. This is consistent for all three subgroups (upper-middle, lower-middle and 
low-income countries). The decrease in the relative income price was sharpest 
between 2003 and 2006, and remained significant between 2006 and 2008, indicating 
that the decline in the relative income price accelerated in the most recent years.  
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Figure 2.6 indicates the growth in cigarette affordability for individual countries for 
the period of 1990 to 2008. The countries are sorted in the usual way, first by income 
status, and then by growth in affordability. Note that an increase in the affordability 
measure implies that cigarettes have become less affordable. From a tobacco control 
perspective, the picture is disappointing. Of the 78 countries represented in Figure 2.6, 
cigarettes became more affordable in 48 (62%) and less affordable in 30 (38%) 
countries. As mentioned previously, among high-income countries, where cigarette 
affordability declined in 20 of the 34 countries (59%), the situation is somewhat more 
encouraging. However, among low- and middle-income countries, cigarettes became 
more affordable among 34 of the 44 countries (77%), while they became less 
affordable in the remaining 10 (23%) countries. Within the context of the mortality 
impact of tobacco, especially on the low- and middle-income countries (World Bank, 
1999: 13-15), and the many empirical studies that have shown tax and price increases 
to be particularly powerful in discouraging tobacco consumption, this is a 
disconcerting finding. 
 
Figure 2.6, together with Table 2.4, indicates a clear dichotomy between high-income 
and low- and middle-income countries. Cigarettes are becoming significantly more 
affordable in low- and middle-income countries, while becoming less affordable in 
high-income countries, although not necessarily by large magnitudes. 
 
 
Changes in affordability can be broken down into changes in prices and incomes. 
Income can be considered exogenous since one should not expect tobacco control 
policies to have any significant impact on changes in income, at least in the short run. 
Furthermore, one cannot advocate reducing incomes as a means of reducing the 
affordability of cigarettes. Figure 2.7 shows the breakdown of the changes in the 
relative income price into its two components. Income has been inverted (i.e. a 
positive value on the figure implies a decline in income, and vice versa) in order for 
the aggregated change in price and income to represent the change in affordability.
29
 
                                                 
29
 This may not seem immediately obvious but consider a decrease in the price (negative magnitude) 
combined with an increase in income (positive magnitude), which will both result in an increase in 
affordability (negative magnitude in terms of the relative income price). By inverting the magnitude of 
the change in income, both a decrease in the price and an increase in income will be represented by 
negative magnitudes and will aggregate, graphically, to the change in affordability. 
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Figure 2.6: Average annual percentage change in the relative income price, 1990-2008 
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Note: Some time periods are not 1990-2008, they are: (a) 1995-2008, (b) 1999-2008, (c) 1990-2007, (d) 1998-2002, (e) 1994-2008, (f) 1991-2008, (g) 1991-2002, (h) 1990-
2006, (i) 1998-2008, (j) 1993-2006 and (k) 1990-2005. 
Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit and the World Bank 
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Figure 2.7: Breakdown of the average annual percentage change in the relative income price into income and price components, 1990-
2008 
-25%
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
R
u
s
s
ia
 (
a
)
C
h
in
a
L
ib
y
a
V
ie
tn
a
m
 (
b
)
Ir
a
n
 (
c
)
S
e
rb
ia
 (
d
)
K
u
w
a
it
 (
d
)
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
s
h
B
a
h
ra
in
B
ra
z
il 
(e
)
R
o
m
a
n
ia
 (
e
)
P
a
k
is
ta
n
C
o
lo
m
b
ia
P
a
n
a
m
a
P
h
ili
p
p
in
e
s
T
u
n
is
ia
E
g
y
p
t
M
o
ro
c
c
o
S
ri
 L
a
n
k
a
P
e
ru
 (
f)
In
d
ia
U
ru
g
u
a
y
E
c
u
a
d
o
r 
(g
)
A
rg
e
n
ti
n
a
G
re
e
c
e
In
d
o
n
e
s
ia
 (
c
)
D
e
n
m
a
rk
C
z
e
c
h
 R
e
p
.
C
o
s
ta
 R
ic
a
Ic
e
la
n
d
 (
i)
N
o
rw
a
y
J
o
rd
a
n
F
in
la
n
d
S
a
u
d
i 
A
ra
b
ia
M
a
la
y
s
ia
C
h
ile
Ir
e
la
n
d
P
a
ra
g
u
a
y
S
e
n
e
g
a
l
C
ro
a
ti
a
 (
j)
T
u
rk
e
y
N
ig
e
ri
a
L
u
x
e
m
b
o
u
rg
C
o
te
 d
'Iv
o
ir
e
K
e
n
y
a
K
o
re
a
 R
e
p
.
A
u
s
tr
ia
S
p
a
in
G
u
a
te
m
a
la
S
w
e
d
e
n
C
a
n
a
d
a
U
K
T
h
a
ila
n
d
P
o
la
n
d
M
e
x
ic
o
J
a
p
a
n
N
e
w
 Z
e
a
la
n
d
H
o
n
g
 K
o
n
g
P
o
rt
u
g
a
l
H
u
n
g
a
ry
It
a
ly
G
e
rm
a
n
y
 (
f)
N
e
th
e
rl
a
n
d
s
U
S
A
S
in
g
a
p
o
re
Is
ra
e
l
B
e
lg
iu
m
G
a
b
o
n
 (
l)
V
e
n
e
z
u
e
la
A
u
s
tr
a
lia
S
w
it
z
e
rl
a
n
d
P
a
p
u
a
 N
G
S
o
u
th
 A
fr
ic
a
Z
im
b
a
b
w
e
C
a
m
e
ro
o
n
 (
f)
F
ra
n
c
e
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 a
n
n
u
a
l 
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 c
h
a
n
g
e
 i
n
 t
h
e
 R
IP
Income Price
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Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit and the World Bank 
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For 76 countries it was possible to attribute the changes in affordability to changes in 
price and income. For 29 of the 30 countries that have experienced decreases in 
cigarette affordability between 1990 and 2008, larger increases in the real cigarette 
price offset increases in real per capita GDP. In Cameroon, however, decreases in real 
per capita GDP reinforced increases in the real price.  
 
Of the 46 countries which experienced an increase in cigarette affordability, 21 saw 
increases in real prices. In all 21, the growth in real income exceeded the growth in 
real prices. Of the 25 countries which saw declines in real prices, 23 saw increases in 
real income. However, two countries—(Cote de’Ivoire and Kenya) had declines in 
real income. In these countries, cigarettes become more affordable despite the 
decrease in real income because price declined more than income.  
 
In all countries where cigarettes become more affordable the growth in real income 
exceeded the growth in real prices. Only in two cases have declines in real price 
primarily contributed to the increase in affordability. This clearly indicates the danger 
that rapid economic growth poses to affordability and public health. This analysis 
indicates that countries that have experienced increases in cigarette affordability 
cannot attribute this to economic growth alone. In most cases, a decrease in the real 
retail prices has exacerbated the impact of rapid increases in GDP growth.  
 
 
2.5 DISCUSSION 
 
Economists have consistently advocated for excise tax increases as an appropriate and 
effective tobacco control strategy (World Bank, 1999 and Jha and Chaloupka, 2000). 
Higher taxes increase the retail price and thereby decrease the demand for cigarettes. 
The focus of economic studies in tobacco control are often on the implications  of an 
increase in the excise tax and/or price of cigarettes—for example, in the form of 
reduced demand, reduced smoking prevalence, or increased government revenue, etc. 
(Guindon et al., 2003 and Chaloupka et al., 2000). Usually, changes in income play a 
comparatively minor role in simulations and analysis (see, for instance, Van Walbeek, 
1996). 
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In recent decades some countries, mainly low- and middle-income countries-- 
specifically those in Asia--have achieved unprecedented high economic growth rates. 
China and India are growing at approximately 10% per year, followed by other 
populous countries like Indonesia, Vietnam and Bangladesh at only slightly lower 
rates. In such countries, even if the real price increases by, say, 5% per year, cigarettes 
are increasingly affordable.  
 
Tax and price increases, together with other policy interventions (i.e. advertising bans, 
smokefree areas, etc.), are two tobacco control levers that policy makers have control 
over. Tobacco control policy makers have no direct control over the level of or 
growth in average incomes. But the growth in average income does have a large and 
significant impact on the affordability of cigarettes. What this chapter argues is that 
policy makers should not only focus on price and tax, but on affordability as well.  
 
This means the recommendation put forth by the World Health Organisation and the 
World Bank (Guindon et al., 2003: 19)--to increase tax rates so that the prices of all 
tobacco products increase by at least 5% in real terms every year--is not appropriate in 
all contexts, and especially not for rapidly growing countries. A more useful and more 
general guiding policy would be to recommend that the tax (or price) be increased 
such that cigarettes become increasingly less affordable. This recommendation 
implies that the nominal price of cigarettes should increase by at least the growth rate 
of nominal income (i.e. the sum of the inflation rate and the real per capita income 
growth rate). For China, with inflation of about 8% and a per capita income growth 
rate of about 10% , nominal cigarette prices would have to increase by 18% each year 
to prevent cigarettes from becoming more affordable. In South Africa, the per capita 
growth is more modest at a rate of about 4%, but the inflation rate is similar to 
China’s; nominal cigarette prices would therefore have to increase by 12% to prevent 
cigarettes from becoming more affordable. 
 
The recommendation that the real price should increase by 5% per year would have 
been appropriate for South Africa, since cigarettes would have become less affordable 
by about 1% per year. However, it would have been inappropriate for China, because, 
even though cigarettes would have become more expensive in nominal and real terms, 
they would have become more affordable at the rate of about 5% per year. 
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This chapter introduced and analysed a variety of affordability measures. These 
affordability measures were based on the same price data, but on different income 
data. It was found that the choice of income variable has a significant impact on the 
affordability measure. This requires explanation. The debate about methodology is a 
technical issue, and should not take our attention away from the central message of 
this chapter, which is that policy makers should not focus on cigarette taxes and prices 
only, but equally on the concept of cigarette affordability. The policy prescriptions 
that derive from the affordability concept are more general than the policy 
prescriptions that derive solely from a focus on (real) price, because of the fact that it 
takes differences in income growth rates into account. 
 
For 2008 and 2009 it was shown that, if GDP is used as the income measure (i.e. the 
relative income price), cigarette affordability decreases sharply as we move from 
high-income to middle-income and low-income countries. When implementing the 
minutes of labour approach used by Kan (which focused on the poorly paid 
occupations surveyed by the Union Bank of Switzerland), a similar trend was seen, 
although it was not nearly as dramatic as for the relative income price. When 
implementing Guindon et al.’s minutes of labour approach, there was less evidence 
that affordability decreases as we move from high-income to low-income countries. 
Why is this? 
 
The explanation has to do with representativeness of the income data. GDP measures 
total output, and thus income, of the country. By dividing aggregate GDP by the total 
population, one gets an indication of the average income of the people living in that 
country. While there are many criticisms against per capita GDP as a measure of 
income (see Sloman, 2006: 376-377 or McConnell and Brue, 2005: 125-126), it is 
designed to be the most encompassing measure of economic activity in a country. 
The Union Bank of Switzerland survey of earnings is not designed to be 
representative of average earnings in the country as a whole. Firstly, within a 
particular country, it focuses only on one or two cities, usually the commercial 
centres. Typically earnings in commercial centres are higher than in other cities, and 
urban earnings are usually higher than rural earnings, especially in low- and middle-
income countries. Secondly, even though the Union Bank of Switzerland aims to 
survey earnings among a representative cross-section of occupations, most 
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occupations surveyed require some or even substantial training (see earlier footnote 
for a list of occupations covered). Menial jobs, for example, gardeners, 
rubbish/garbage collectors, cleaners and domestic servants are not included in the 
Union Bank of Switzerland survey. Thirdly, the Union Bank of Switzerland surveys 
formal sector employers only. Wages in the informal sector are typically much lower 
than in the formal sector, and these are not covered in the Union Bank of Switzerland 
survey. Fourthly, the Union Bank of Switzerland considers only employed persons. 
An unemployed person, who may or may not receive a government grant, would not 
feature in the Union Bank of Switzerland survey at all. Fifthly, the Union Bank of 
Switzerland does not take into consideration the average size of the family that 
depends on the wage of the breadwinner(s). For example, the average standard of 
living--and thus the disposable income--for a family with two breadwinners and only 
one or two children is likely to be much higher than that of a family with one 
breadwinner and four or five children. 
 
In terms of these five issues, low- and middle-income countries differ notably from 
high-income countries. In low- and middle-income countries, the urban/rural wage 
differential is larger; the unemployment rate is higher; the labour participation rate 
(especially among women) is lower (Hill, 1986); the average number of dependents is 
higher; and the proportion of people working in the informal sector is higher than in 
high-income countries (Todaro and Smith, 2003). All these factors suggest that the 
Union Bank of Switzerland survey incorporates only a small portion of the labour 
market in low- and middle-income countries. 
 
These arguments against the use of the Union Bank of Switzerland data are equally 
valid against GDP. Although GDP data are collected using a standardised 
methodology many of the measurement issues are exacerbated in low- and middle-
income countries. Particularly, GDP is unable to account for inequalities in income 
which I was able to do, to some extent, with the Union Bank of Switzerland data by 
using Kan’s method. It may also understate economic activity by excluding non-
market transactions, the black market and the non-monetary economy, especially in 
low- and middle-income countries.  
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In Table 2.1 Spearman ranked correlations between the different affordability 
measures are shown separately for high-income and low- and middle-income 
countries. It is immediately obvious that the correlations between the relative income 
price and the minutes of labour measures are much higher for high-income countries 
than they are for low- and middle-income countries. Most Spearman correlation 
coefficients for high-income countries are between 0.85 and 0.98, while for low- and 
middle-income countries they lie between 0.44 and 0.89. This means that the choice 
of measure is less important in high-income countries than it is in low- and middle-
income countries. The high correlation between the two minutes of labour approaches 
for both high-income and low- and middle-income countries reflects the fact that 
measures are derived from the same sources.  Kan’s minutes of labour method shows 
higher correlations to the relative income price than does Guindon’s.  
 
The high correlation between the affordability measures for high-income countries is 
an encouraging finding, because it suggests that the choice of income does not matter 
much for these countries. However, one cannot say this about low- and middle-
income countries. For low- and middle-income countries, cigarettes seem much more 
affordable using Union Bank of Switzerland data rather than GDP data for the 
measure of income. Given that the Union Bank of Switzerland survey covers only a 
small and typically unrepresentative portion of the labour markets in low- and middle-
income countries, caution is recommended in the interpretation of affordability 
measures based on Union Bank of Switzerland survey data for these countries. 
One cannot pass objective judgment on the level of cigarette affordability for any 
individual country at any particular point in time.
30
 The fact that the “median person” 
in Australia has to work 29 minutes to buy a pack of cigarettes does not objectively 
indicate whether cigarettes are affordable or not. Similarly, if it requires 4.3% of 
annual per capita GDP to buy 100 packs of cigarettes in South Africa, that in itself 
does not say whether cigarettes are affordable or not. The level of cigarette 
affordability is only useful in a comparative context. This can either be in comparison 
                                                 
30
 In this regard the following statement from Kan (2007: 429) is problematic: “cigarette affordability 
for most of the sampled cities, especially those in high income countries, is high”. Kan considered 
cigarettes to be highly affordable in cities where a pack of cigarettes cost less than 10% of the average 
daily wage of the seven lowest paid occupations. Why 10%? Why not 12%, or 8%? The point is that 
one cannot make normative statements based on an arbitrary cut-off point. 
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to other countries, or in comparison with past levels of affordability in the same 
country.  
 
Considering changes in cigarette affordability over time, there is a wide divergence 
between the experiences of high-income and low- and middle-income countries. 
Cigarettes have become less affordable in a majority of high-income countries since 
1990. The trend towards less affordable cigarettes has been remarkably consistent in 
most countries throughout this period. This suggests that, at least at an aggregated 
level, high-income countries are actively trying to discourage smoking by making 
cigarettes less affordable through fiscal and possibly other means (e.g. imposing an 
“implicit” tax in the form of the “Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement” in the 
United States).
31
 
 
Since 1990, cigarettes have become much more affordable in many low- and middle-
income countries. In many large, populous countries in Asia, particularly China, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh and Vietnam, cigarettes have become more affordable at the 
rate of 5% or more each year.  
 
While one could possibly argue that the 1990s was a “period of ignorance” for many 
low- and middle-income countries and that governments turned a blind eye to 
tobacco, this is not true for the current decade. Negotiations for the Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control started in the late 1990s, and most low- and middle-
income countries signed and subsequently ratified the treaty. The Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control, as well as much academic and policy research, 
indicates that increasing the price and reducing the affordability of cigarettes is 
critical in a comprehensive tobacco control strategy. In the context of such awareness 
and commitment (as indicated by the number of countries ratifying the treaty), it is a 
major tobacco control failure that cigarettes have continued to become more 
affordable in the 2000s. 
  
                                                 
31
 It is also possible that tobacco companies have increased the retail price by increasing the real net-of-
tax price. This has happened in Jamaica (Van Walbeek et al., 2005), South Africa (Van Walbeek, 
2005) and the United States (Keeler et al., 1996). 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
 64 
Nowadays, one regularly hears of tobacco control “victories”: countries ratifying the 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, legislation successfully passed or 
implemented, research indicating that people are happy with the changes, etc. More 
and more countries have implemented non-price measures such as advertising bans to 
reduce tobacco consumption, including many low- and middle-income countries.
32
 
While there have been great strides in certain aspects of tobacco control, this chapter 
suggests that the single most important tool, i.e. decreasing the affordability of 
cigarettes, has been neglected.  
 
Many countries have experienced unprecedented economic growth in the past decade 
or two. While this creates great opportunities (e.g. reducing poverty and increasing 
standards of living) it creates tobacco control challenges as well. We saw in Figure 
2.6 that countries which experience rapid economic growth are more likely to find 
that cigarettes become more affordable. Furthermore, as seen in Figure 2.7, those 
countries which have found that cigarettes have become less affordable have seen this 
occur through increases in prices while those which have seen cigarettes become more 
affordable have seen incomes outgrow prices. 
 
This chapter does not argue against economic growth on the grounds that it is bad for 
tobacco control. What is does argue is that countries experiencing rapid economic 
growth face tobacco control challenges that slower growing countries do not face. To 
the extent that tobacco control is a priority area for government and policy makers, 
tobacco taxes and prices should be adjusted against some standard of affordability, 
not only against a standard of a real tax or price. 
 
One may also speculate about what may happen in the future with respect to 
affordability. In most high-income countries one should expect the trend of declining 
affordability to continue, maybe even at a more aggressive pace as governments look 
to exploit tobacco taxes as a revenue source in light of falling revenue from income, 
corporate and consumption taxes and increased fiscal deficits as a result of the global 
economic slowdown. This is compounded by slower growth and even declines in 
incomes. In low- and middle-income countries incomes will continue to grow, albeit 
                                                 
32
 See Chapter 5 for evidence of this. 
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at a slower pace. Thus in low- and middle-income countries the current trend of 
increasing affordability is likely to persist unless specific and deliberate attempts to 
reduce affordability are advanced. The next chapter investigates the possibility of 
linking tax and price policies explicitly to growing incomes by explicitly targeting the 
affordability of cigarettes. 
 
However, there are some limitations to this study that should be considered. Firstly, 
the quality of the price data should be evaluated. The data are not collected for the 
purposes of rigorous economic analysis but rather for business travellers to make city-
by-city comparisons. Although every effort has been taken to ensure the accuracy of 
the data there are some cases where individual data points raise significant questions 
about the quality and accuracy of the data. Also, price data may not be particularly 
representative of local purchasing trends; however, this risk is mitigated by using the 
cheapest cigarettes. Furthermore, these risks have also been mitigated by using the 
median as a measure of central tendency, the use of constant growth regressions for 
the analysis of percentage changes, and the use of the Spearman ranked correlation 
coefficients. Also, price data are collected by the Economist Intelligence Unit on a 
city level and are aggregated to the country level. In most cases a single city is used to 
represent the country but in some cases multiple cities are averaged to find the 
country level. This is necessary since GDP data are presented on a country level, as it 
is not possible to disaggregate GDP to city level.  The policy interventions, including 
tax and price policy, tend to occur on a country level and we therefore need to 
consider affordability at the country rather than city level. 
 
 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this chapter was to present a synthesised update of cigarette affordability 
for as many countries as possible. Three different affordability measures, for the 
period 1990 to 2009 (and sub-periods thereof), were calculated. Affordability is 
determined by price and income. Price is uncontroversial in its interpretation and 
measurement. Finding the appropriate measure of income is far more complex. What 
this chapter has shown is that the choice of “income variable” can have a significant 
impact on the affordability measure. 
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The chapter confirmed the conventional wisdom that cigarettes, expressed in a 
common currency, are substantially more expensive in high-income countries than in 
low- and middle-income countries. However, despite being more expensive in 
absolute terms, cigarettes are more affordable in high-income countries. The 
magnitude of the difference in affordability depends greatly on the choice of income 
measure, especially for low- and middle-income countries. Of the two income 
measures used--per capita GDP and the Union Bank of Switzerland’s survey of 
earnings--I argued that affordability measures based on per capita GDP are preferable. 
This is because GDP is the most encompassing measure of income, while the Union 
Bank of Switzerland’s survey tends to be unrepresentative of the labour market in 
low- and middle-income countries. For high-income countries the choice of the 
income measure used in the affordability measure matters less. Secondly, the GDP-
based measure of affordability allows for a comparison amongst a greater number of 
countries, particularly low- and middle-income countries, and over a longer period of 
time. 
 
This chapter’s central message is that, despite methodological and data issues, policy 
makers should focus more on the affordability of cigarettes and less on the (real) price 
in isolation of income, especially in low- and middle-income countries. A price-based 
policy prescription (“The real price should increase by X%”) may not be sufficient to 
reduce the affordability of cigarettes in fast-growing countries. An affordability-based 
policy prescription (“The excise tax (or price) should be adjusted so that cigarettes 
become less affordable by X% per year”) is more general, and possibly more useful as 
a tobacco control target, especially in rapidly growing countries. The next chapter 
moves the concept of affordability into the realm of taxation policy. It looks at the 
current global best practice, and at how the understandings of affordability developed 
in this chapter can be used to improve taxation policy, especially in the context of 
rapidly growing countries. It uses the case study of South Africa as an example of a 
middle-income country which has experienced relatively rapid economic growth 
(more rapid than most high-income countries but less rapid than other low- and 
middle-income countries such as China and India). Furthermore, it is an example of a 
progressive tobacco control policy regime which has embraced taxation as a tobacco 
control and fiscal policy tool. 
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APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL DATA 
 
 
Table A1: Countries included in the Economist Intelligence Unit price database 
and World Bank income group classification 
Country Cities included Cities excluded World Bank 
Classification 
Argentina Buenos Aires  Upper-middle-income 
Australia Adelaide, Brisbane, 
Melbourne, Perth, Sydney 
 High-income 
Austria Vienna  High-income 
Azerbaijan Baku*  Lower-middle-income 
Bahrain Bahrain  High-income 
Bangladesh Dhaka  Low-income 
Belgium Brussels  High-income 
Brazil Sao Paulo, Rio De Janeiro  Upper-middle-income 
Cameroon Douala*  Lower-middle-income 
Canada Calgary, Montreal, 
Toronto, Vancouver 
 High-income 
Chile Santiago  Upper-middle-income 
China Beijing Guangzhou*, Shanghai*, 
Shenzen*, Tianjin* 
Lower-middle-income 
Colombia Bogota  Upper-middle-income 
Costa Rica San Jose  Upper-middle-income 
Cote d'Ivoire Abidjan  Lower-middle-income 
Croatia Zagreb*  High-income 
Czech Republic Prague  High-income 
Denmark Copenhagen  High-income 
Ecuador Quito  Lower-middle-income 
Egypt Cairo  Lower-middle-income 
Finland Helsinki  High-income 
France Lyon, Paris  High-income 
Gabon Libreville*  Upper-middle-income 
Germany Berlin, Düsseldorf, 
Frankfurt, Hamburg, 
Munich 
 High-income 
Greece Athens  High-income 
Guatemala Guatemala City  Lower-middle-income 
Hong Kong Hong Kong  High-income 
Hungary Budapest  High-income 
Iceland Reykjavik*  High-income 
India Mumbai, New Delhi  Lower-middle-income 
Indonesia Jakarta  Lower-middle-income 
Iran Tehran  Lower-middle-income 
Ireland Dublin  High-income 
Israel Tel Aviv  High-income 
Italy Milan, Rome  High-income 
Japan Osaka/Kobe, Tokyo  High-income 
Jordan Amman  Lower-middle-income 
Kenya Nairobi  Low-income 
Korea Seoul  High-income 
Kuwait Kuwait*  High-income 
Libya Tripoli  Upper-middle-income 
Luxembourg Luxembourg  High-income 
Malaysia Kuala Lumpur  Upper-middle-income 
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Country Cities included Cities excluded World Bank 
Classification 
Mexico Mexico City  Upper-middle-income 
Morocco Casablanca  Lower-middle-income 
Netherlands Amsterdam  High-income 
New Zealand Auckland, Wellington  High-income 
Nigeria Lagos  Lower-middle-income 
Norway Oslo  High-income 
Pakistan Karachi  Lower-middle-income 
Panama Panama City  Upper-middle-income 
Papua New Guinea Port Moresby  Lower-middle-income 
Paraguay Asuncion  Lower-middle-income 
Peru Lima*  Upper-middle-income 
Philippines Manila  Lower-middle-income 
Poland Warsaw  Upper-middle-income 
Portugal Lisbon  High-income 
Romania Bucharest*  Upper-middle-income 
Russia Moscow St Petersburg* Upper-middle-income 
Saudi Arabia Al Khobar, Jeddah, Riyadh  High-income 
Senegal Dakar  Low-income 
Serbia (Montenegro) Belgrade  Upper-middle-income 
Singapore Singapore  High-income 
South Africa Johannesburg  Upper-middle-income 
Spain Barcelona, Madrid  High-income 
Sri Lanka Colombo  Lower-middle-income 
Sweden Stockholm  High-income 
Switzerland Zurich  High-income 
Thailand Bangkok  Lower-middle-income 
Tunisia Tunis  Lower-middle-income 
Turkey Istanbul  Upper-middle-income 
United Arab Emirates Abu Dhabi, Dubai  High-income 
United Kingdom London Manchester* High-income 
United States Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, 
Cleveland, Detroit, 
Houston,  Los Angeles, 
Miami, New York, 
Pittsburgh, San Francisco, 
Seattle, Washington DC 
Honolulu*, Lexington*, 
Minneapolis* 
High-income 
Uruguay Montevideo  Upper-middle-income 
Venezuela Caracas  Upper-middle-income 
Vietnam Ho Chi Minh City* Hanoi* Low-income 
Zimbabwe Harare  Low-income 
Note: Most cities were surveyed annually by the EIU since 1990.  * indicates that the city was included 
in the survey after 1990. 
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Table A2: Adjustments made to relative income price dataset adjusting for 
hyperinflation 
Country Years Adjustment 
Argentina 1990, 1991 Divided by 10 000 
Azerbaijan 1998 to 2005 Divided by 10 000 
Brazil 1990 to 1993 Copied USD series 
Ecuador 1990 to 1999 Copied USD series 
Jordan 2001 to 2003 Divided by 1 000 
Mexico 1990 to 1992 Divided by 1 000 
Poland 1990 to 1994 Divided by 10 000 
Romania 1994 to 2002 Divided by 10 000 
Russia 1990  to 1997 Copied USD series 
Turkey 2003 to 2006 Multiplied by 1 000 000 
Uruguay 1990 to 1992 Divided by 1 000 
Venezuela 2007 Divided by 1 000 
Notes: This table indicates adjustments made to the relative income price series. Often in countries 
where there have been problems with hyperinflation a number of decimal places are removed from the 
currency. This takes place formally when the state or central bank makes an official announcement. 
Alternatively this takes place informally when the public just ignore a number of decimal places. I use 
a different series for prices and incomes and under hyperinflationary conditions; one series may make 
an adjustment while the other does not. This results in extreme values for the relative income price 
which are not in line with the values prior to or after the hyperinflationary problem. I make adjustments 
to the relative income price to account for this by either by manually adjusting the decimals places by 
dividing or multiplying by a factor of 1 000, 10 000 or 1 000 000; where this does not solve the 
problem I replace the relative income price by that calculated using prices and incomes in United States 
Dollars instead of the local currency. 
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Table A3: Relative income price 
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Argentina 2.41 2.28 1.85 1.79 1.67 1.69 1.62 1.65 1.63 1.74 1.75 2.29 1.93 2.12 2.40 2.19 1.79 1.51 1.35 
Australia 0.97 0.99 1.09 1.32 1.30 1.40 1.41 1.48 1.52 1.52 1.57 1.67 1.60 1.61 1.63 1.72 1.67 1.63 1.56 
Austria 1.12 1.10 1.09 1.18 1.17 1.24 1.27 1.21 1.19 1.22 1.20 1.20 1.23 1.27 1.26 1.27 1.12 1.09 1.15 
Azerbaijan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.30 2.11 2.56 2.29 4.72 4.03 3.41 2.34 3.34 1.82 1.60 
Bahrain 1.55 1.24 1.24 1.03 1.03 0.96 0.97 1.17 1.38 1.45 1.23 1.15 1.10 1.06 0.95 0.82 0.68 0.60 0.52 
Bangladesh 41.48 38.53 32.80 35.55 33.66 30.54 28.61 26.88 26.00 24.16 24.47 23.33 23.55 21.82 16.72 15.30 17.34 13.36 13.19 
Belgium 0.93 0.87 0.91 1.10 1.17 1.22 1.23 1.17 1.16 1.16 1.15 1.16 1.14 1.27 1.22 1.32 1.26 1.35 1.37 
Brazil 2.47 2.11 3.53 4.82 4.51 2.74 2.91 2.70 2.67 2.57 2.36 2.13 2.18 2.37 2.13 2.26 2.07 2.05 1.91 
Cameroon n.a. 7.17 7.71 7.04 12.96 11.75 13.95 15.70 14.74 14.15 12.36 15.03 14.27 19.89 23.09 22.19 20.90 22.59 21.86 
Canada 1.62 1.91 2.00 2.00 1.32 1.34 1.27 1.30 1.33 1.24 1.27 1.29 1.88 1.91 1.88 1.80 1.76 1.76 1.80 
Chile 2.74 2.32 2.54 2.74 2.38 2.24 2.48 2.26 2.47 2.46 3.23 3.04 2.89 3.12 2.76 2.45 2.13 2.14 2.09 
China 27.54 53.23 43.73 20.01 29.67 29.73 27.37 25.70 26.49 25.17 15.27 11.60 10.64 9.49 8.11 7.09 7.52 2.56 3.08 
Colombia 4.83 5.13 5.29 4.26 2.24 2.40 2.40 2.10 2.53 2.82 2.98 4.36 3.38 3.10 2.97 2.99 2.71 1.78 1.79 
Costa Rica 3.04 4.13 3.31 2.17 2.56 2.31 2.38 2.01 1.91 1.57 1.56 2.63 2.37 3.99 3.48 3.02 n.a. 2.05 1.95 
Cote d'Ivoire 17.22 17.68 13.72 13.35 15.53 13.44 12.22 11.39 10.61 10.38 11.27 11.02 11.91 11.03 15.30 12.86 12.12 16.97 15.71 
Croatia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.78 3.21 3.25 2.95 2.70 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Czech Republic 2.73 2.37 2.68 2.68 2.27 1.90 1.72 2.16 1.80 1.98 1.83 1.91 1.66 1.62 1.72 1.69 1.59 1.87 1.84 
Denmark 1.65 1.58 1.53 1.56 1.49 1.46 1.43 1.41 1.39 1.34 1.28 1.28 1.31 1.28 1.10 1.03 1.03 1.04 1.01 
Ecuador 8.58 7.43 5.67 7.47 7.03 5.80 4.46 3.64 2.80 3.89 6.18 8.81 7.63 6.73 5.99 5.44 4.93 3.93 4.81 
Egypt 17.37 16.85 14.78 13.88 13.22 11.55 10.47 9.56 9.02 8.58 7.91 8.60 10.15 12.38 11.23 9.97 8.85 7.79 7.76 
Finland 1.60 1.80 1.54 1.43 1.57 1.50 1.51 1.42 1.42 1.47 1.41 1.36 1.37 1.40 1.34 1.35 1.26 1.24 1.20 
France 0.49 0.47 0.53 0.66 0.86 0.85 1.12 1.09 1.04 1.11 1.12 1.15 1.19 1.32 1.64 1.60 1.60 1.65 1.64 
Gabon n.a. 2.53 2.69 2.68 2.33 3.89 3.40 3.27 3.95 3.73 3.03 3.23 3.30 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Germany 1.15 1.12 1.08 1.15 1.12 1.12 1.11 1.03 1.03 1.06 1.07 1.14 1.18 1.20 1.25 1.43 1.46 1.52 1.47 
Greece 1.98 2.18 2.05 1.79 1.78 1.63 1.81 1.57 1.57 1.64 1.28 1.55 1.53 1.59 1.48 1.38 1.42 1.23 1.16 
Guatemala 5.57 6.93 5.17 8.16 7.18 6.56 5.77 5.80 5.16 5.40 5.59 5.55 6.43 6.68 6.80 6.26 5.77 6.60 5.99 
Hong Kong 0.76 1.50 1.33 1.43 1.33 1.27 1.20 1.19 1.52 1.56 1.52 1.81 1.70 1.76 1.71 1.51 1.43 1.24 0.96 
Hungary 1.59 1.29 1.41 1.75 1.47 1.67 1.44 1.49 2.19 1.93 1.70 1.58 1.45 1.52 1.85 2.01 1.99 2.01 2.04 
Iceland n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.59 1.53 1.52 1.58 1.70 1.62 1.66 1.52 1.24 1.30 
India 25.40 22.55 23.59 23.03 21.25 18.83 17.68 22.19 21.16 20.22 19.57 23.99 22.61 21.17 15.89 15.80 14.48 14.53 14.14 
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Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Indonesia 7.75 8.46 7.61 7.81 7.21 6.79 6.61 4.10 9.46 9.26 8.90 7.93 7.27 8.00 6.26 5.70 5.01 n.a. n.a. 
Iran 7.70 5.55 6.34 5.71 5.11 6.02 4.82 4.16 4.13 3.30 4.17 3.65 2.69 2.36 1.89 1.58 1.34 n.a. n.a. 
Ireland 2.38 2.45 2.51 2.41 2.41 2.27 2.25 2.13 1.79 1.64 1.72 1.59 1.55 1.65 1.64 1.59 1.45 1.60 1.83 
Israel 0.89 0.92 0.95 1.07 0.96 1.03 0.99 1.06 1.03 1.05 1.02 1.37 1.60 1.46 1.43 1.50 1.42 1.31 1.26 
Italy 1.07 1.06 0.94 1.12 1.04 0.89 1.14 1.03 1.01 1.03 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.97 1.17 1.20 1.27 1.35 1.39 
Japan 0.62 0.59 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.57 0.58 0.64 0.65 0.64 0.66 0.70 0.70 0.69 0.68 0.74 0.75 
Jordan 5.94 6.21 5.69 6.84 6.34 6.05 6.16 4.34 4.34 4.46 5.60 5.41 5.19 5.00 4.58 4.80 5.28 5.22 4.31 
Kenya 17.89 18.35 18.88 27.77 26.45 23.41 18.28 18.59 17.24 19.85 22.20 18.45 25.21 23.56 20.95 18.90 18.41 18.61 17.54 
Korea 1.15 1.53 1.70 1.52 1.31 1.13 0.91 0.94 0.96 1.76 1.62 1.22 1.04 1.12 0.99 1.19 1.31 1.14 n.a. 
Kuwait n.a. 1.18 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.78 0.70 0.75 0.87 0.78 0.64 0.72 0.91 0.79 0.66 0.51 0.41 0.38 0.34 
Libya 3.97 3.70 8.30 12.38 14.19 19.13 18.12 10.60 4.00 7.36 3.00 2.98 2.26 n.a. 1.44 1.07 n.a. 0.70 0.55 
Luxembourg 0.49 0.43 0.45 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.45 0.44 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.41 0.42 0.40 0.41 0.45 
Malaysia 3.60 3.39 3.37 3.03 1.83 1.61 1.45 1.75 2.09 2.17 2.75 2.88 2.72 2.54 2.65 2.51 2.78 2.69 2.74 
Mexico 1.46 1.52 2.19 2.38 2.48 3.22 3.11 2.22 1.73 1.68 2.14 2.04 2.39 1.90 2.25 1.97 1.82 1.60 1.76 
Morocco 9.08 4.07 15.50 15.38 13.96 20.64 21.03 21.43 11.51 11.62 11.65 10.91 10.64 10.20 9.75 4.94 n.a. 3.80 4.36 
Netherlands 0.82 0.79 0.96 1.11 1.08 1.06 1.05 0.93 0.96 0.99 0.98 1.10 1.11 1.12 1.10 1.07 1.05 0.97 1.15 
New Zealand 1.99 2.44 2.39 2.31 2.22 2.15 2.19 2.19 2.49 2.38 2.72 2.74 2.72 2.66 2.54 2.53 2.51 2.35 2.47 
Nigeria 12.68 6.22 16.14 21.30 42.84 27.56 19.84 31.35 33.47 30.28 21.35 31.18 30.31 23.24 20.40 22.20 19.32 12.74 11.09 
Norway 1.83 1.88 1.90 1.86 1.93 1.86 1.81 1.82 1.92 2.06 1.71 1.64 1.85 1.79 1.66 1.55 1.51 1.36 1.27 
Pakistan 26.49 22.87 19.79 20.09 18.36 15.74 14.79 12.70 12.78 11.47 9.10 11.89 12.51 12.93 12.13 11.36 9.90 9.00 9.69 
Panama 4.54 3.79 3.78 3.53 3.38 3.72 3.51 2.76 2.85 2.78 3.05 3.06 2.99 2.89 2.69 2.50 2.31 2.06 1.77 
Papua New Guinea 13.77 13.93 14.57 18.28 14.43 15.52 17.75 16.13 17.20 n.a. 25.90 31.28 28.51 27.00 27.37 26.87 24.30 30.89 26.61 
Paraguay 2.93 2.36 2.77 2.86 3.37 3.68 4.94 5.06 4.75 5.99 7.37 7.42 6.95 5.89 4.18 3.91 3.52 2.49 2.24 
Peru n.a. 5.40 6.03 5.32 4.28 3.65 3.63 3.13 3.32 4.39 4.60 6.69 6.67 5.46 5.80 4.92 4.18 4.24 3.05 
Philippines 5.96 6.01 6.15 6.66 4.74 7.00 6.11 5.29 6.01 6.11 5.53 5.21 4.86 4.55 4.20 3.99 3.67 3.47 2.56 
Poland 1.70 3.22 n.a. 1.85 2.32 1.77 1.92 2.14 2.09 2.31 2.12 2.21 2.22 2.04 1.86 1.91 1.89 1.91 1.96 
Portugal 1.66 1.65 1.88 1.77 1.67 1.65 1.83 1.62 1.65 1.66 1.61 1.57 0.15 1.59 1.62 1.72 1.76 1.95 2.11 
Romania n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 5.02 4.09 5.81 8.03 6.02 5.35 6.70 4.74 2.73 2.53 2.29 2.33 2.02 2.09 2.31 
Russia 0.97 4.10 4.53 4.45 3.75 3.75 4.91 5.17 6.42 5.46 3.60 2.94 2.41 2.84 2.28 1.79 1.28 1.03 0.85 
Saudi Arabia 1.05 1.33 1.22 1.39 1.41 1.38 1.31 1.47 1.80 1.65 1.30 1.36 1.40 1.40 1.32 1.06 0.95 0.95 0.79 
Senegal 10.28 10.58 10.57 11.26 13.18 12.25 11.84 7.52 7.17 6.90 6.64 6.34 9.38 8.95 8.48 8.05 n.a. 8.77 8.22 
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Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Serbia (and Montenegro) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 5.58 4.54 4.24 3.99 3.27 15.44 13.22 2.11 1.79 1.70 1.42 1.16 1.36 1.79 1.45 
Singapore 1.41 1.56 1.48 1.55 1.46 1.42 1.35 1.28 1.48 1.47 1.48 1.67 1.56 1.98 2.03 2.15 2.01 1.86 1.99 
South Africa 2.11 2.00 2.20 2.23 2.26 2.32 2.56 3.37 3.36 4.38 4.46 4.56 4.49 4.36 4.92 4.42 4.31 4.19 4.05 
Spain 0.97 1.00 0.92 0.99 1.01 1.03 1.07 1.02 0.98 0.81 0.76 0.80 0.79 0.97 0.92 0.96 0.98 1.03 1.04 
Sri Lanka 27.29 25.60 24.17 21.19 20.08 20.37 20.29 18.77 18.44 18.94 20.01 18.63 18.02 18.58 16.30 15.76 14.82 13.42 13.71 
Sweden 1.27 1.13 1.24 1.54 1.48 1.51 1.50 2.07 1.54 1.46 1.42 1.42 1.41 1.37 1.31 1.32 1.24 1.34 1.40 
Switzerland 0.55 0.54 0.52 0.54 0.58 0.67 0.64 0.65 0.72 0.79 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.83 0.86 0.90 0.89 0.93 0.90 
Thailand 3.25 4.42 3.97 2.70 3.02 2.65 2.43 2.52 3.78 3.81 3.74 4.59 4.36 4.05 3.73 3.44 3.81 3.61 3.64 
Tunisia 7.54 4.15 3.72 3.90 4.24 3.68 12.87 11.91 11.17 10.35 9.69 9.08 5.88 4.58 4.25 4.31 4.02 3.65 3.33 
Turkey 3.57 4.09 3.04 3.60 4.70 2.78 3.40 4.44 3.43 3.85 3.52 4.80 4.39 5.11 4.96 4.44 4.75 3.46 3.11 
United Arab Emirates 0.36 0.56 0.58 0.58 0.63 0.61 0.57 0.56 0.72 0.64 0.59 0.68 0.72 0.66 0.59 0.45 0.18 0.31 n.a. 
United Kingdom 1.86 2.01 2.09 2.18 1.98 2.22 2.12 2.11 2.23 2.52 2.65 2.54 2.57 2.33 2.36 2.41 2.30 2.23 2.08 
United States 0.73 0.83 0.82 0.81 0.76 0.74 0.74 0.70 0.74 0.90 1.00 1.09 1.13 1.09 1.03 1.00 0.96 0.98 1.03 
Uruguay 4.00 3.87 3.39 3.11 2.90 2.84 2.67 2.38 2.38 2.50 2.44 2.41 2.66 2.62 2.18 2.44 2.49 2.63 2.23 
Venezuela 1.97 2.68 2.33 2.36 2.96 2.75 3.08 2.57 3.23 3.22 2.75 2.51 2.92 3.44 2.46 2.20 1.94 1.96 3.11 
Vietnam n.a. n.a. n.a. 41.13 36.94 28.70 24.04 20.45 20.14 18.41 16.70 16.35 14.88 15.83 13.80 10.10 8.64 n.a. n.a. 
Zimbabwe 4.92 4.54 6.80 6.03 5.79 6.62 7.01 6.51 5.33 6.83 8.24 10.68 9.02 7.81 18.96 11.91 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
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Table A4: Minutes of work required to purchase a packet of cigarettes 
Country Median of all occupations Median of lowest half 
1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 
Argentina 19.8 20.1 20.3 16.2 19.9 23.6 21.2 42.2 29.3 28.2 
Australia 25.7 28.8 33.4 29.7 28.3 27.8 29.8 35.1 38.8 33.0 
Austria 19.3 20.2 23.2 21.1 21.3 24.7 25.5 28.2 23.9 28.2 
Belgium 19.9 21.4 19.3 24.6 27.8 26.2 27.2 28.2 26.6 29.7 
Brazil 21.6 19.4 18.6 17.5 22.8 28.1 27.0 33.0 28.5 35.6 
Canada 15.8 19.1 29.3 28.6 29.0 19.5 22.9 38.0 42.9 37.4 
Chile n.a. 27.5 29.3 30.7 36.5 n.a. 48.4 48.2 40.5 42.6 
China 117.6 67.5 41.9 52.1 22.9 186.6 79.2 48.7 91.7 31.9 
Colombia 12.1 17.2 18.7 20.4 13.7 20.4 27.1 28.9 34.7 17.4 
Czech Republic 37.4 n.a. 39.8 33.3 34.7 41.8 n.a. 45.6 35.2 45.3 
Denmark 24.8 24.7 22.3 20.8 21.2 27.5 27.4 23.3 22.3 24.8 
Egypt n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 29.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 68.3 
Finland 28.3 29.7 24.4 23.0 22.2 33.9 34.4 28.6 27.3 26.9 
France 19.3 19.2 23.0 31.9 31.5 25.2 23.8 32.2 42.1 36.9 
Germany 17.7 19.5 19.9 23.2 27.5 21.8 22.3 25.5 28.4 33.9 
Greece 17.6 16.7 21.4 24.2 23.8 22.3 20.9 30.1 32.5 29.8 
Hong Kong 28.0 29.1 34.2 47.5 34.2 32.3 33.6 46.8 56.9 37.0 
Hungary 45.3 52.2 25.0 45.0 48.3 57.6 69.0 38.3 57.0 62.9 
India 64.8 69.1 104.8 40.2 48.9 87.0 96.7 127.2 74.5 107.0 
Indonesia 15.7 44.9 36.9 31.2 4.2 28.7 114.2 101.8 51.0 74.4 
Ireland 36.1 33.2 30.7 30.1 33.8 42.1 37.3 36.2 35.2 42.7 
Israel 17.7 15.7 21.7 n.a. 21.9 22.8 21.5 29.3 n.a. 26.3 
Italy 18.0 21.1 20.5 28.6 28.6 20.7 24.3 25.8 32.2 38.4 
Japan 7.9 9.3 9.5 11.7 11.3 10.9 10.7 12.7 15.3 14.2 
Kenya 83.5 105.9 67.7 31.8 57.7 168.5 188.9 137.5 38.8 82.6 
Korea 9.8 16.5 11.9 13.6 14.8 12.8 21.4 27.8 37.3 28.6 
Luxembourg 8.7 10.0 12.1 14.3 14.4 13.6 15.5 16.3 20.0 19.5 
Malaysia 10.8 20.7 19.8 28.4 37.3 25.8 50.6 30.6 42.6 59.7 
Mexico 31.2 40.9 32.0 22.8 34.0 41.7 45.9 52.7 57.1 80.5 
Netherlands 14.9 18.2 21.8 20.8 31.0 19.9 22.7 24.2 27.0 36.4 
New Zealand n.a. 38.8 43.6 34.8 43.6 n.a. 43.5 58.5 39.7 53.2 
Nigeria n.a. n.a. 66.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 96.7 n.a. n.a. 
Norway 40.1 44.8 37.1 38.9 45.8 42.6 46.5 38.6 40.5 48.9 
Pakistan n.a. n.a. 59.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 137.8 n.a. n.a. 
Panama 20.6 21.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. 30.2 37.7 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Peru n.a. n.a. 37.0 30.6 35.5 n.a. n.a. 55.2 41.3 41.3 
Philippines 30.8 35.8 21.0 23.2 21.9 46.5 47.4 38.7 34.2 30.1 
Poland 37.2 43.3 32.9 37.2 32.5 45.3 55.0 41.3 39.7 40.8 
Portugal 24.3 27.0 25.9 33.6 29.0 31.4 33.9 36.8 43.3 38.8 
Romania n.a. n.a. 3.4 33.1 47.5 n.a. n.a. 5.3 46.8 59.1 
Russia 64.2 47.1 34.6 16.9 9.8 155.9 114.4 39.1 20.3 12.5 
Singapore 39.2 40.4 45.1 58.2 61.9 55.4 49.8 61.4 76.4 86.5 
South Africa 18.3 21.9 24.4 24.2 27.7 29.0 28.1 34.9 32.1 42.6 
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Country Median of all occupations Median of lowest half 
1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 
Sweden 41.3 29.5 27.8 28.3 30.0 45.1 31.8 29.3 30.6 31.3 
Switzerland 8.8 12.8 11.9 14.1 16.3 11.4 15.9 15.9 17.9 19.5 
Taiwan 7.1 6.8 5.6 6.2 6.5 8.3 8.0 10.6 8.2 8.5 
Thailand 12.4 18.7 27.8 45.6 26.8 31.5 39.9 62.3 65.4 31.1 
Turkey n.a. n.a. n.a. 36.5 31.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. 52.9 47.5 
United Arab Emirates 10.0 10.8 11.8 6.6 6.5 13.5 14.1 18.0 12.0 14.8 
United Kingdom 31.3 45.3 35.6 35.8 32.5 42.3 55.8 45.4 45.8 39.7 
United States 9.1 15.6 17.4 17.0 19.4 11.2 17.9 21.1 22.4 24.4 
Venezuela 29.7 27.3 29.4 30.4 71.9 41.8 39.1 63.1 44.8 110.8 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
TARGETING THE AFFORDABILTY OF CIGARETTES: A NEW BENCHMARK 
FOR TAXATION POLICY IN LOW- AND MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES
33
 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous chapter provided a thorough analysis of the methods for analysing the 
affordability of cigarettes. Furthermore, it provided a thorough analysis of global trends in the 
affordability of cigarettes. In doing so, it proposed the use of affordability as a tool for 
understanding and analysing tax and price policy in the context of tobacco control. 
Furthermore, it highlighted the differences in affordability between high-income and low- 
and middle-income countries and changes in affordability over time and particularly the risks 
that robust economic growth and development pose to tobacco use and thus public health. 
This chapter takes the previous chapter one step further by investigating how this concept of 
affordability can be used in the context of establishing a policy rule for taxation in a rapidly 
growing low- and middle-income country. 
 
In order to do so, this chapter outlines two approaches to tobacco taxation policy: (1) tax 
burden
34
 benchmarking and (2) affordability benchmarking. Firstly, it outlines problems with 
tax burden benchmarking, identifying particular issues in the context of low- and middle-
income countries that have experienced rapid economic growth, particularly where growth in 
real income exceeds the growth in real prices. It then proposes an alternative policy 
benchmarking the affordability of cigarettes, exploring some methodological issues 
surrounding the measurement of affordability and the construction of an affordability policy 
                                                 
33
 This chapter was previously published in the journal Tobacco Control (Blecher, 2010a) and has 
improvements in a number of areas including data and simulation assumptions. I would like to acknowledge 
Corné van Walbeek, Hana Ross, Anna Gilmore, Frank Chaloupka, Emmanuel Guindon and an anonymous 
reviewer for their useful comments and suggestions, as well as Erik Nesson for research assistance. All other 
errors and omissions remain mine exclusively. 
34
 The published version of this chapter (Blecher, 2010a) used the term incidence instead of burden. Some 
advocates prefer incidence to burden since it does not have a negative connotation (i.e. that a tax is a burden on 
the consumer). However, the term incidence is misleading since it is used by economists to describe the 
different portions of tax born by the consumer and producer; it is therefore misleading to use it in this context. In 
the absence of a better term, I use burden. 
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rule. Finally, it uses South Africa as a case study of a low- and middle-income country to 
simulate future tobacco assumption applying the affordability policy rule, as well as other 
policy options. 
 
 
3.2 BACKGROUND – APPROACHES TO TOBACCO TAXATION 
 
Tobacco control advocates have long promoted higher excise taxes on cigarettes as a means 
of reducing cigarette consumption. This proposal has been supported by a large body of 
research that has cemented the negative relationship between cigarette prices and 
consumption. Governments are motivated to increase taxes since they are able to raise 
significant revenue and because lower consumption has important public health benefits. 
South Africa is a good example of this; between 1993 and 2009, real excise taxes rose by 
419%, resulting in real retail prices increasing by 237%. As a result, per capita consumption 
of cigarettes fell by 51% and real excise revenue increased by 245%.
35
  
 
Since the World Bank publication Curbing the Epidemic (Jha and Chaloupka, 1999), tobacco 
control advocates have promoted benchmarking the percentage of the retail price occupied by 
tax. Based on tax rates used in countries with comprehensive tobacco control policies, the 
World Bank recommended that tax account for two-thirds to four-fifths of the retail price of 
cigarettes (Jha and Chaloupka, 1999). Sometimes also referred to as the tax burden, the 
percentage of the retail price occupied by tax can refer to excise and sales taxes combined 
(the total tax burden), or just excise taxes (the excise tax burden). This approach has created 
an easily understandable method by which countries can “benchmark” their tax burden 
against global best practice.  
 
A number of notable examples of this practice exist. The European Union has, since 1993, 
required member states to meet a minimum excise tax burden of 57% (Commission for the 
European Communities, 1992; Sunley et al., 2000; Gilmore and McKee, 2004). The 
European Union has a minimum Value Added Tax rate of 15% (which is 13% on a tax-
inclusive basis) that cannot be levied at a reduced rate on cigarettes. The minimum total tax 
burden is therefore effectively 70%. However some countries, like the United Kingdom, with 
                                                 
35
 See the appendix for a detailed discussion on the data. 
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an excise tax burden of 63% and a total tax burden of 76%, set their taxes above the 
European Union benchmark but within the World Bank range (World Health Organisation, 
2008). Another example is South Africa where a total tax burden of 50% was targeted 
between 1994 and 2004 and 52% since 2004 (Van Walbeek, 2005). However, South Africa 
does not meet the target set by the World Bank range.  
 
As is evident from Chapter 2, a growing literature considers the affordability of cigarettes 
(Guindon et al., 2002; Blecher and Van Walbeek, 2004; Kan, 2007; Blecher and Van 
Walbeek, 2009;;;). The concept of affordability is useful since it considers the simultaneous 
influence of price and income on cigarette demand. Generally, demand is considered ceterus 
paribus (all else held constant) with the impact of prices and incomes considered in isolation. 
Affordability is becoming increasingly important as consumption shifts from the slow 
growing high-income countries to rapidly growing low- and middle-income countries. In 
high-income countries, slower economic growth allows advocates to focus on raising prices 
in order to reduce consumption. This “price benchmarking” is appropriate in contexts where 
growth in prices will exceed the growth in income. However, in low- and middle-income 
countries, many of which are experiencing rapid economic growth, focusing on price alone 
ignores rising incomes. Thus even increasing real prices may not reduce consumption since 
the growth in income may outweigh the growth in real prices.  
 
 
3.3 A CRITIQUE OF TAX BURDEN BENCHMARKING 
 
Using tax burden as a benchmark brings about a number of problems. Political will is 
required to raise cigarette taxes, especially in low- and middle-income countries where the 
tobacco industry may be particularly influential and a tax burden benchmark may therefore 
be difficult to change once attained or established. Furthermore, recent World Health 
Organisation data show that the two-thirds to four-fifths total tax burden target is rarely 
reached with the median excise tax burden of 57% in high-income countries (Max 69%, S.D. 
20%, n=37) and of 35% in low- and middle-income countries (Max 79%, S.D. 19%, n=99) in 
2007 (World Health Organisation, 2008).  
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Benchmarking the tax burden raises the question of whether one should target simply the 
excise tax or the total tax burden. This one-size-fits-all approach does pose difficulties since 
different countries have vastly different tax regimes and uses for those taxes.  
 
The setting of tax burden benchmarks ultimately provides greater ability for the tobacco 
industry to set retail prices. Once a target is set, excise taxes need to be reviewed on a regular 
basis to ensure that the target continues to be met.
36
 If the tobacco industry chooses to raise 
industry/base/net-of-tax prices, excise taxes would have to be increased to ensure the tax 
burden benchmark is maintained. Conversely, if the tobacco industry chooses to reduce 
industry/base/net-of-tax prices, the excise tax may, depending on whether the excise tax is 
specific or ad valorem, have to be reduced in order to maintain the tax burden benchmark.
37
 
The tobacco industry’s pricing decision is likely to be based on a number of factors, including 
the market structure of the sector, the maturity of the market, the affordability of the product 
and the structure of excise taxes (i.e. specific versus ad valorem). Thus, once the tax burden 
benchmark is attained, the tobacco industry’s pricing strategy will become the deciding factor 
in influencing retail prices, since even specific taxes can then be treated as ad valorem taxes. 
This leads to the removal of tax as a public health tool and grants the tobacco industry the de 
facto ability to set the public health agenda.
38
  
 
Finally, a high tax burden benchmark does not necessarily result in high prices. Some 
countries already have a high tax burden but still have cheap and affordable cigarettes. Figure 
3.1 depicts the total tax burden and retail price of cigarettes (in United States dollars) for a 
number of countries. 
 
 
                                                 
36
 This is especially so if specific excise taxes are used. 
37
 This point may seem trivial since most regimes set a tax burden benchmark as a floor, so a decline in the 
industry/base/net-of-tax price would not require specific excise taxes to be reduced to maintain the benchmark; 
rather it would leave the actual tax incidence/burden above the benchmark. However, if an ad valorem tax is 
used, a decline in the industry/base/net-of-tax price may result in a decline in the absolute amount of excise tax 
while tax burden remains unchanged. 
38
 However, very few countries meet the benchmark and moving towards meeting the benchmark in some 
reasonable period of time would require substantial tax increases that are almost certainly going to outpace 
income growth. 
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Figure 3.1: Total tax burden and prices in a cross section of countries   
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Source: Blecher and Van Walbeek (2009) and World Health Organisation (2008) 
 
Figure 3.2: Total tax burden and affordability in a cross section of countries 
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Source: Blecher and Van Walbeek (2009) and World Health Organisation (2008) 
 
Using a Spearman rank correlation statistic, the correlation between total tax burden and price 
is -0.04 (n=25) for high-income countries and 0.26 (n=38) for low- and middle-income 
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countries (neither of which are statistically significant at the 5% level). This indicates no 
statistical relationship between price and total tax burden. Figure 3.1 shows that high-income 
countries generally have a high total tax burden while prices vary significantly, and low- and 
middle-income countries have large variation in total tax burden with relatively low prices. 
Figure 3.2 depicts the total tax burden and the affordability of cigarettes as measured by the 
relative income price for the same group of countries. The Spearman rank correlation 
between total tax burden and affordability is 0.25 (n=25) in high-income countries and -0.14 
(n=38) in low- and middle-income countries (neither of which are statistically significant at 
the 5% level). Again, this indicates no statistical relationship between total tax burden and 
affordability. 
 
 
3.4 THE AFFORDABILTY BENCHMARK 
 
The literature, discussed in detail in Chapter 2, suggests two measures of affordability using 
narrow (Guindon et al., 2002; Kan, 2007) and broad measures of income (Blecher and Van 
Walbeek, 2004 and 2009). A broad measure of income differs from a narrow measure in that 
it values non-money income, like the provision of public goods and services. I will use a 
broad measure of income (per capita GDP) as the base for affordability since such a measure 
is more practical in the context of low- and middle-income countries. In low- and middle-
income countries large portions of the population are dependent on the state provision of 
goods, services and grants. Narrow measures of income such as money income or wages do 
not adequately consider the provision of public goods such as education, medical and security 
services. Furthermore, the broad measure of income can be used in almost all countries on an 
annual basis, while the narrow measures are only available in smaller isolated samples and 
often in a low-frequency series (Blecher and Van Walbeek, 2009).  
 
I use the relative income price measure of affordability developed by Blecher and van 
Walbeek which is defined as the percentage of annual per capita GDP required to purchase 
100 packs of cigarettes. Affordability is expressed as a percentage, where higher percentages 
indicate less affordable cigarettes. An increase in the relative income price means that a 
greater proportion of income is required to purchase cigarettes, and hence cigarettes have 
become less affordable. A decrease in the relative income price means that a smaller 
proportion of income is required to purchase cigarettes, and hence cigarettes have become 
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more affordable. An increase in the price decreases affordability, as does a decrease in 
income.  
 
A country may benchmark affordability in one of two ways, firstly by committing to 
maintaining the level of affordability, or secondly by committing to decrease the level of 
affordability over time. The first would involve increasing the excise tax in such a way that 
ensures prices rise by the combination of inflation and growth in per capita GDP. The second 
would involve increasing the excise tax in such a way that ensures the price increases by a 
greater magnitude than the combination of inflation and growth in per capita GDP. Given the 
effects of compounding, a small premium can result in a significant change in affordability 
over several years. Tax increases have a small inflationary impact since cigarettes are almost 
always part of the basket of goods and services used to calculate inflation.
39
  
 
 
3.5 SOUTH AFRICA – THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
 
Prior to 1993 South Africa had no tobacco control strategy as a result of particularly close 
links between the state and the tobacco industry. Inflation was allowed to erode the value of 
the specific excise tax in real terms over a number of years. The total tax burden fell from a 
peak of over 52% in 1972 to a low of 29% in 1992 (see Figure 3.3).  In 1994, the government 
of national unity, led by the African National Congress, proposed that excise taxes should 
amount to 50% of the retail price of cigarettes, implying a total tax burden of nearly 63% 
(Van Walbeek, 2005).
40
 Consistent increases in excise taxes, above the rate of inflation over a 
number of years were required in order to achieve the target (Malan and Leaver, 2003). 
 
The higher excise taxes resulted in significantly higher real prices which, in turn, led to sharp 
declines in aggregate and per capita consumption. Even though the benchmark was originally 
set as an excise tax burden benchmark, the National Treasury (Ministry of Finance) has since 
interpreted the benchmark as 50% total tax burden (Van Walbeek, 2005).
41
 In 2004 the 
benchmark was adjusted upwards to 52% total tax burden for a three year period, and in 2008 
                                                 
39
 For example, tobacco contributes 2.3% to the total Consumer Price Index in South Africa (Statistics South 
Africa, 2009). 
40
 VAT of 14% is applied on the sum of the industry/base/net-of-tax price as well as the excise tax and is levied 
on most goods and services in South Africa. 
41
 Representing an excise tax incidence/burden of 38% when VAT is excluded. 
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excise taxes rose by their smallest amount since the introduction of the tax burden 
benchmark.
42
 The actual tax burden is found to be lower than the target, but this is a result of 
the different price data used by the National Treasury and this paper (see Appendix for a 
detailed discussion). 
 
Figure 3.3: Total tax burden and excise tax of cigarettes in South Africa, 1961-2009 
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Note: Tax burden is read off the secondary Y axis.  
Source: Van Walbeek (2005), National Treasury and Statistics South Africa 
 
Higher prices also resulted in a sharply higher relative income price until 1999, indicating a 
sharp decline in the affordability of cigarettes (Figure 3.4) as economic growth was slow. 
Since 1999, however, the affordability of cigarettes has declined at a much slower pace and, 
unsurprisingly, per capita consumption has remained flat (see Figure 3.4). The small decline 
in affordability is attributable both to stronger economic growth and less aggressive tax 
increases.
43
 However, for the last year of data (2009), a significant increase in the retail price 
by the tobacco industry and a decline in income due to a recession resulted in a sharp decline 
in both affordability and consumption. 
 
                                                 
42
 The nominal increase was smaller than inflation resulting in a real decline in excise in 2008. 
43
 Per capita GDP growth averaged 0.5% between 1994 and 1999 and 2.7% between 2000 and 2008. In 2009 per 
capita GDP declined by 2.8% as a result of the recession (South African Reserve Bank, 2010). 
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Figure 3.4: Affordability and per capita consumption of cigarettes in South Africa, 
1986-2009 
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Note: The relative income price is defined as the percentage of per capita GDP required to purchase 100 packs 
of cigarettes. An increase in the relative income price means that a greater proportion of income is required to 
purchase cigarettes and hence cigarettes have become less affordable. A decrease in the relative income price 
means that a smaller proportion of income is required to purchase cigarettes and hence cigarettes have become 
more affordable. The normal convention of using the adult population of 15 years and older in calculating per 
capita consumption is followed. I use the Actuarial Society of South Africa population estimates since they also 
provide a population forecast which is used later on. The source only provides estimates from 1985 onwards.    
Source: Van Walbeek (2005), South African Reserve Bank (2008) and Actuarial Society of South Africa 
 
Van Walbeek (2005) notes that the National Treasury claimed to have reached the total tax 
burden target of 50% in 1997 although he indicates this to be “more illusory than real”. 
Disagreement over whether or not the target has been met most likely results from a timing 
issue. National Treasury does not set excise taxes in a forward-looking manner; they do not 
forecast the impact of inflation and tobacco industry reaction when setting the excise tax for 
the year to come. As a result of the tax increase, prices rise as the tobacco industry passes the 
tax onto consumers, thereby reducing the excise tax burden. Furthermore, the tobacco 
industry decision of how much of the tax to shift onto consumers also influences the excise 
tax burden. Historically, this has involved shifting the entire tax onto consumers as well as 
raising the industry/base/net-of-tax price (over-shifting) resulting in a lower than expected 
total tax burden (Van Walbeek, 2005). The net result is that the actual/current total tax burden 
is lower than the target. 
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3.6 SOUTH AFRICA – SIMULATING ALTERNATIVES 
 
From a tobacco control perspective there are several options that South Africa can pursue in 
order to see continuing declines in tobacco consumption. Either the tax burden benchmark 
needs to be increased, or an alternative strategy needs to be proposed.
44
 The proposal of a 
higher tax burden benchmark will only be a temporary solution, since at some point it will be 
achieved, after which the same stagnation will likely be seen again. The particular concern is 
the lag between the reaching of the target and the implementation of an alternative strategy.  
 
The last increase in the tax burden benchmark in South Africa occurred in 2004, when the 
total tax burden benchmark was raised to 52%, initially for a three year period; since 2007 
there has been no change in the benchmark. During this period the decline in consumption 
has ended. An alternative benchmark based on affordability will see a dynamic solution that 
results in an affordability target being met on an ongoing basis, and where the affordability 
target adjusts dynamically to ensure declining consumption. The principle of an affordability 
benchmark is that excise taxes should be increased on an annual basis to ensure that 
affordability is always at least being maintained or reduced. 
 
The important consideration is what will occur in the future if the tax burden benchmark is 
maintained at 52% total tax burden (or its current level). This chapter simulates the effect on 
per capita consumption of maintaining the current tax burden benchmark (“a”) as well as 
four alternative proposals.
45
 First, it simulates maintaining affordability (“b”) by increasing 
excise in such a way as to maintain the current level of affordability. Second, it simulates 
reducing affordability (“c”) by promoting a continuously rising relative income price (i.e. 
making cigarettes continuously less affordable) by increasing excise by 2 percentage points 
more each year. Third, it simulates annually increasing the total tax benchmark (“d”) by 10 
percentage points over the next ten years (i.e. on average 1 percentage point per year). This 
examines the impact of regularly adjusting the benchmark upwards. Fourth, it simulates 
benchmarking real excise taxes (“e”), following the example of the United Kingdom in the 
late 1990s when excise taxes increased by 5% in real terms annually (Secretary of State for 
                                                 
44
 Simply meeting the current rule may also be a short term possibility. However, the fact that the current tax 
burden is below the target is not a result of a policy failure but simply a data issue. If resolved, once the target is 
met the same stagnation issues will occur again. 
45
 Given the previously discussed data issues I do not assume that the tax burden to be maintained is 52% but 
rather that the current tax burden is maintained. 
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Health and Secretary of State for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, 1998; Excise Social 
Policy Group, HM Customs and Excise, year unknown).
46
  
 
For the purposes of the simulation a price elasticity of demand of -0.46 and an income 
elasticity of demand of 0.78 are assumed. These estimates are calibrated using a dynamic in-
sample forecasting model from 2004 to 2009 (a more detailed discussion of how these 
estimates were achieved is included in the appendix). Furthermore, an annual rate of per 
capita GDP growth of 2.5% is assumed, which is consistent with the recent past.
47
 A 
secondary, high economic growth scenario of 5% is also used. This is specifically included to 
show how more rapid economic growth undermines public health and why a rule that 
dynamically adjusts to economic growth is useful, especially in low- and middle-income 
countries.  
 
Further assumptions about how the tobacco industry shifts the tax to the consumer need to be 
made. Historically, the tobacco industry has over-shifted the tax to the consumer by 
increasing the industry/base/net-of-tax price by more than the increase in tax (Van Walbeek, 
2005). However, we make three assumptions regarding how tax changes influence prices in 
order to illustrate the power that the tobacco industry has in using prices to manipulate 
various tax policy rules. Firstly, the price can increase by the same amount as the excise tax
48
 
(labelled price factor 1), meaning that the tax increase is passed onto the consumer. Secondly, 
the price can increase by half the increase in tax (price factor 0.5), meaning that the price 
increases by less than the increase in tax and that a portion of the tax increase is absorbed by 
the tobacco industry (under-shifting).  Thirdly, the price can increase by one and a half the 
increase in tax (price factor 1.5), meaning that the price increases by more than the increase 
in tax and that the tobacco industry increases their retail margin in addition to passing on the 
entire tax increase to the consumer (over-shifting). 
 
The simulation is run on an annual basis and estimates for ten years are displayed (until 
2019). The historical series since 2000 is also displayed. Figure 3.5 shows the simulated 
impact of the five scenarios on per capita cigarette consumption for price factor 0.5. Figures 
3.6 and 3.7 show the simulated impacts of the five scenarios on per capita cigarette 
                                                 
46
 This option is analogous to the price benchmarking discussed earlier. 
47
 Per capita GDP growth averaged 2.7% between 2000 and 2008 (South African Reserve Bank, 2010). 
48
 As well as to the VAT attributable to the increase in excise tax. 
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consumption for price factors of 1.0 and 1.5, respectively. Figures 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7 show the 
simulations of results for the low economic growth scenario of 2.5% per annum only. Table 
3.1 summarises the percentage changes in consumption over the 10 year forecast and the 
annual percentage change in excise for each scenario.  
 
Maintaining the current tax burden benchmark (“a”) will result in an increase of per capita 
consumption by 12.2% over the ten years under all three pricing scenarios. All three pricing 
scenarios result in the same outcome for per capita consumption, since no real excise tax 
increase will be necessary in order to maintain the tax burden. Maintaining the current level 
of affordability (“b”) will result in slightly declining per capita consumption under all three 
scenarios, between 0.4% and 1.2% over the ten years. Decreasing affordability (“c”) will 
result in declining per capita consumption between 4.6% and 6.4% over the ten years. 
Increasing the tax burden benchmark (“d”) will result in an increase in per capita 
consumption between 2.1% and 8.5% over the ten years for price factors 0.5 and 1.0. 
However, if the tobacco industry over-shifts the tax (i.e. price factor 1.5) per capita 
consumption will decline by 12.1% over the ten years. Under the final scenario of 
benchmarking the tax directly (“e”), per capita consumption will decline by between 2.8% 
over the ten years for the price factor of 1.5. However, per capita consumption would 
increase by between 1.6% and 6.5% if the price factors were 0.5 and 1.0. 
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Figure 3.5: Simulated per capita consumption in South Africa, 2009-2019 (Economic 
growth of 2.5% per annum and price factor 0.5) 
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Figure 3.6: Simulated per capita consumption in South Africa, 2009-2019 (Economic 
growth of 2.5% per annum and price factor 1) 
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Figure 3.7: Simulated per capita consumption in South Africa, 2009-2019 (Economic 
growth of 2.5% per annum and price factor 1.5) 
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The simulation is then rerun on an annual basis with an assumed economic growth rate of 5% 
and estimates for ten years (until 2019), as well as the historical series since 2000, are 
displayed. Figure 3.8 shows the simulated impact of the five scenarios on per capita cigarette 
consumption for price factor 0.5. Figures 3.9 and 3.10 show the simulated impacts of the five 
scenarios on per capita cigarette consumption for price factors of 1.0 and 1.5, respectively. 
Table 3.2 summarises the percentage changes in per capita consumption over the 10 year 
forecast and the annual percentage change in excise for each scenario.  
 
Maintaining the current tax burden benchmark (“a”) will result in an increase in per capita 
consumption of 35.6% over the ten years under all three pricing scenarios. Again, all three 
pricing scenarios result in the same outcome for per capita consumption since no real excise 
tax increase will be necessary in order to maintain the tax burden. Maintaining the current 
level of affordability (“b”) will result in higher per capita consumption under all three 
scenarios, between 3.9% and 7.4% higher over the ten years. Decreasing affordability (“c”) 
will result in marginally higher per capita consumption over the ten years with a price factor 
of 1 and 1.5, but marginally lower per capita consumption with a price factor of 0.5. 
Increasing the tax burden benchmark (“d”) will result in an increase in per capita 
consumption of 6.7% and 31.2% over the ten years for all pricing scenarios. Under the final 
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scenario of benchmarking the tax directly (“e”), per capita consumption will increase by 
between 17.8% and 28.8% over the ten years. 
 
Figure 3.8: Simulated per capita consumption in South Africa, 2009-2019 (Economic 
growth of 5% per annum and price factor 0.5) 
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Figure 3.9: Simulated per capita consumption in South Africa, 2009-2019 (Economic 
growth of 5% per annum and price factor 1) 
34
36
38
40
42
44
46
48
50
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
P
e
r 
c
a
p
it
a
 c
o
n
u
m
s
p
ti
o
n
 (
p
a
c
k
s
 p
e
r 
a
d
u
lt
 p
e
r 
a
n
n
u
m
)
Historic (a) Maintain benchmark (b) Maintain affordability (c) Reduce affordability (d) Increase benchmark (e) Increase excise 5%
 
 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
  90 
Figure 3.10: Simulated per capita consumption in South Africa, 2009-2019 (Economic 
growth of 5% per annum and price factor 1.5) 
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Note: “(b) Maintain affordability” and “(d) Increase benchmark” have the same outcomes and thus share the 
same line on the graph. As a result only four lines are visible. 
 
Maintenance of the current tax burden benchmark (“a”) in South Africa will clearly result in 
a large public health failure since per capita consumption will increase under both economic 
scenarios. Even maintaining the current level of affordability may not be sufficient from a 
tobacco control perspective. In a high economic growth environment, per capita consumption 
will rise, and in a low economic growth environment, the decline in per capita consumption is 
negligible. Reducing affordability (“c”) will result in declining per capita consumption under 
the low economic growth scenario and no significant change in per capita consumption under 
the high economic growth scenario. Importantly, the two affordability-based rules are not as 
sensitive to the choice of price factor, meaning that under such a rule, the tobacco industry 
pricing decision does not significantly impact the outcome of the simulation. A new policy to 
upwardly adjust the current tax burden benchmark (“d”) has volatile results. Under this 
scenario, the tobacco industry pricing strategy significantly impacts the outcome of the 
simulation.  
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Table 3.1: Summary of simulated changes in per capita consumption and excise taxes for an economic growth rate of 2.5% per annum, 
2009-2019 
Price factor Maintain bemchmark Maintain affordability Decrease affordability Increase benchmark Increase excise 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
 
Total 
change in 
consumption 
Annual 
change in 
excise tax 
Total 
change in 
consumption 
Annual 
change in 
excise tax 
Total 
change in 
consumption 
Annual 
change in 
excise tax 
Total 
change in 
consumption 
Annual 
change in 
excise tax 
Total 
change in 
consumption 
Annual 
change in 
excise tax 
0.5 (under 
shifting) 12.2% 0.0% -1.2% 10.2% -4.6% 12.2% 8.5% 3.4% 6.5% 5.0% 
1 12.2% 0.0% -0.5% 5.9% -5.3% 7.9% 2.1% 4.8% 1.6% 5.0% 
1.5 (over 
shifting) 12.2% 0.0% -0.4% 4.2% -6.4% 6.2% -12.1% 8.1% -2.8% 5.0% 
 
Table 3.2: Summary of simulated changes in per capita consumption and excise taxes for an economic growth rate of 5% per annum, 
2009-2019 
Price factor Maintain benchmark Maintain affordability Decrease affordability Increase benchmark Increase excise 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
 
Total 
change in 
consumption 
Annual 
change in 
excise tax 
Total 
change in 
consumption 
Annual 
change in 
excise tax 
Total 
change in 
consumption 
Annual 
change in 
excise tax 
Total 
change in 
consumption 
Annual 
change in 
excise tax 
Total 
change in 
consumption 
Annual 
change in 
excise tax 
0.5 (under 
shifting) 35.6% 0.0% 3.9% 17.5% -0.8% 19.5% 31.2% 3.4% 28.8% 5.0% 
1 35.6% 0.0% 6.2% 10.9% 0.3% 12.9% 23.5% 4.8% 23.0% 5.0% 
1.5 (over 
shifting) 35.6% 0.0% 7.4% 8.0% 0.4% 10.0% 6.7% 8.0% 17.8% 5.0% 
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As previously argued, tax burden benchmarks turn specific excise taxes into ad valorem taxes 
because and the tobacco industry becomes the de facto owner of tax policy; their pricing 
decision sets the specific tax. The final method of increasing the excise tax annually by 5% 
per year is also sensitive to the pricing strategy of the tobacco industry. Aggressive price 
increases (over-shifting) will water down tax increases and, although it will result in 
significant declines in consumption, it will nevertheless result in the tobacco industry 
claiming most of the “rents”.  
 
 
3.7 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The simulations indicate the sensitivity of tobacco consumption to economic conditions. If 
South Africa were to achieve strong economic growth, it is likely that consumption would 
rise aggressively. Clearly, maintaining the current rule is not in the interest of public health, 
while a rule that targets excise tax increases independent of prices allows the tobacco industry 
to earn most of the rents of the tax policy. Adjusting the current rule to increase the tax 
burden benchmark incrementally is not optimal since it provides the tobacco industry with 
almost all the power to set tax, and thus public health policy. Additionally, this strategy is not 
able to adjust to changing economic conditions.  
 
The affordability policy rule provides policy makers with an interesting alternative. Firstly, it 
automatically adjusts to changing economic conditions, allowing lower tax increases in times 
of slower economic growth and higher taxes increases in times of faster economic growth. 
This is important given the role that income growth has played in influencing tobacco 
consumption in recent years. Secondly, it removes the strategic power from the tobacco 
industry to use its pricing strategy to influence tax policy by over-shifting, allowing the 
public to gain more of the rents of increased taxes. Critically, the simulations show that 
committing to a policy of decreasing affordability provides declining consumption (or at least 
no increase) under most scenarios. None of the alternatives simulated shows declining 
consumption under all economic and tobacco industry pricing decisions. 
 
The benefits of an affordability benchmark are clear and easy to understand in this context. 
The affordability benchmark is promoted not because tax burden benchmarking does not 
work, but because the affordability benchmark provides a clear and easy to understand 
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dynamic benchmark. This is particularly important in many low- and middle-income 
countries that are experiencing rapid economic growth, where following a tax burden 
benchmark may result in cigarettes becoming rapidly more affordable.  
 
The case of South Africa--where maintenance of the current tax burden benchmark will result 
in a public health failure--has been used to argue in favour of an affordability benchmark. An 
affordability benchmark may not only consolidate the public health gains made since 1994 
but may also provide a lasting legacy of declining tobacco consumption. The affordability 
benchmark is not proposed to replace a tax burden benchmark in all cases, but rather in those 
cases where tax burden benchmarking is struggling in the face of rapidly growing incomes. 
 
A further consideration is that if an affordability benchmark becomes established and the 
tobacco industry has significant market power, they could increase the retail price in such a 
way as to take all the “rents”. This would occur if the tobacco industry pre-empted an excise 
tax increase by raising the retail price in such a way that the excise tax increase would no 
longer be required to meet the affordability rule. In such a case, the state’s excise revenue 
from cigarettes would decline, since consumption would decline as a result of the price 
increase, and the specific excise tax would remain unchanged. Although this is not explicitly 
a public health concern, much of the popularity of excise tax policy comes about from its 
revenue generating ability, and any policy rule should ensure that excise revenue remains 
stable and predictable, at least in the short term.  
 
However, as the simulations showed, alternative tax rules also allowed the tobacco industry 
to take significant portions of the rents. In a competitive market the ability of the tobacco 
industry to take the rents is undermined, since manufacturers would want to keep prices as 
low as possible in order to maintain market share. Also, in a monopolistic market, the threat 
of entry may curtail the firm’s pricing power. If a government chooses to impose an 
affordability policy rule and wishes to remove the possibility of the tobacco industry pre-
empting a tax increase, they would need a credible threat that the tax increase will occur 
independent of tobacco industry behaviour. Furthermore, affordability could be targeted in a 
backward-looking manner so that the excise tax increased relative to the prevailing price 
(similarly to the way in which taxes are currently set, although with a different rule); they 
could also be targeted in such a way that the affordability policy rule is met on an ongoing 
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basis, so that excise taxes are increased as and when prices rise, in addition to regular annual 
changes at the time of the budget.   
 
There are however some caveats to this approach. The current global economic crisis exposes 
a weakness of the concept since declining incomes could require cuts in excise taxes in order 
to maintain affordability. This is clearly unsustainable and not in the interests of public health 
or fiscal policy. Cigarette excise taxes are an especially important source of revenue in times 
when other tax sources are declining. Evidence of this is the large number of state 
governments in the United States that have raised excise taxes during the current economic 
crisis. Thus I propose that the rule seeks only to raise excise taxes and not to allow them to 
decline in nominal or real terms – even if incomes are falling. Secondly, this rule is designed 
specifically for countries which are experiencing rapid economic growth and where growth in 
incomes is making cigarettes more affordable. This rule may not be relevant or appropriate in 
countries that have mature markets and in which income growth does not undermine tobacco 
control efforts.  
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APPENDIX B: CALIBRATION OF THE MODEL 
 
 
In order to simulate future consumption several critical assumptions are required. One of the 
most important assumptions is the values of the price and income elasticities of demand. 
Equation 1 below shows the importance of the price and income elasticities of demand in 
computing future consumption. The formula computes future consumption as a function of 
past consumption and changes in price and income, which are applied to the price and income 
elastities of demand, respectively. 
 
Y
t
tt
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t
tt
ttt
Y
YY
C
P
PP
CCC 100111       [1] 
 
Where C is consumption, P real price, Y real income, ηP the price elasticity of demand, and ηY 
the income elasitcities of demand. The subscript t refers to the current time period and t-1 the 
previous time period. 
 
Several estimates of price and income elasticities are available in the econometric literature; 
however, each has advantages and disadvantages. Most of the studies are not recent, and thus 
estimated elasticities are based on data that is not representative of recent trends and do not 
cover the period during which significant tax and price increases occurred (i.e. since 1993) 
(see Van Walbeek, 1996; Reekie, 1994; Economics of Tobacco Control in South Africa 
Project, 1998). The more recent estimates estimate constant elasticities (i.e. those that do not 
change over time) over long periods of time (Van Walbeek, 2005) while others estimate long 
run elasticities only (Boshoff, 2008). Rather than relying on one of these estimates or 
estimating models using several different elasticities, I compute a price and income elasticity 
of demand using a dynamic in-sample forecasting model. 
 
In-sample forecasting allows one to compare the forecasts of the model with the actual 
values. The actual and forecast values of the model are compared using the RMSE method. 
The combinations of price and income elasticities which result in the minimum RMSE are 
used to simulate future consumption in this chapter. The RMSE is the root mean square error 
which is estimated with the following formula: 
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n
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,         [2] 
 
I used a dynamic forecast in that the forecasted data point for consumption in the previous 
year is used to forecast the consumption data point for the next year, rather than the actual 
data point (static forecast). However, the actual data point is used in the first year. The 
primary difference between dynamic and static forecasting techniques is that under a static 
forecast, the errors are not cumulative and thus are a less stringent test of the performance of 
the model. 
 
Using consumption, real price and real income data for the years 2004 to 2009, with a price 
elasticity of -0.46 and an income elasticity of 0.78, results in the lowest RMSE of 3.18. This 
is found through an iterative search starting with a price elasticity of -0.50 and an income 
elasticity of 0.70 (which resulted in a RMSE of 22.49). The starting value was based on a 
review of the previous literature. Figure B1 shows the actual and simulated consumption 
between 2004 and 2009. The simulated values are very close to the actual values and the 
trends are almost identical. The estimated elasticities perform well in predicting consumption 
in-sample. A five year forecast is used.  
 
Figure B1: Actual and simulated consumption for ηP = -0.46 and ηY = 0.78 
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APPENDIX C: DATA ISSUES 
 
 
Van Walbeek (2005) has developed the most used series on consumption in South Africa, 
presenting data between 1961 and 2004. I follow a similar method. Consumption data is 
derived from data on excise taxes. Excise taxes are levied at a specific rate which allows 
consumption to be implied by dividing total excise revenue by the specific excise tax to find 
aggregate consumption data. However, South African fiscal data is presented on a fiscal year 
which runs from the start of March to the end of February.
49
 Thus, consumption data is 
converted from the fiscal year to the calendar year using a weighted average of the fiscal 
years by taking two twelfths of the previous year and ten twelfths of the next year, the 
following example shows this conversion: 
 
97/199696/19951996
12
10
12
2
exciseexciseexcise       [3] 
 
The data comes from various sources. The raw data is sourced from Van Walbeek (2005), 
although the underlying data is sourced from the Auditor-General (selected years), the 
Tobacco Board (selected years) and National Treasury (selected years). Data since the 
publication of Van Walbeek (2005) has been sourced from more recent Estimates of National 
Revenue (National Treasury, selected years). Table C1 describes the revenue and excise tax 
data for the fiscal years and the consumption data for the fiscal and calendar years. 
 
As with consumption data, Van Walbeek (2005) provides the most complete annual time 
series of price data in South Africa between 1961 and 2004. Van Walbeek (2005) uses 
official sources from the then Central Statistical Services’ Yearbook on Prices50 and the 
subsequent Statistical News Release P1041.3: Retail Prices Until 1995. Between 1996 and 
2001, monthly prices were purchased from Statistics South Africa, and then converted to 
annual data using the simple average of the months. Between 2000 and 2005, the Statistics 
South Africa “Report on Prices” in July of each year was used. Since 2006, prices were 
updated using the tobacco sub-index of the Consumer Price Index (see Blecher, 2010a for an 
example of this).  
                                                 
49
 Tax changes (specifically increases) coincide with the fiscal year. 
50
 The Central Statistical Services has been renamed Statistics South Africa. 
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Table C1: Summary of excise revenue, tax and implied consumption in South Africa, 
1961-2009 
Fiscal 
years 
Excise 
revenue 
Excise tax Aggregate 
consumption 
Calendar 
years 
Aggregate 
consumption 
 Thousands 
of Rands 
Cents per 
pack 
Millions of 
packs 
 Millions of 
packs 
1960/61 46993 9.1 516   
1961/62 47085 9.1 517 1961 517 
1962/63 48717 9.1 535 1962 532 
1963/64 53587 9.1 589 1963 580 
1964/65 55372 9.1 608 1964 605 
1965/66 55023 9.1 605 1965 605 
1966/67 65312 9.1 718 1966 699 
1967/68 72386 9.1 795 1967 782 
1968/69 78532 9.1 863 1968 852 
1969/70 85711 11.1 772 1969 787 
1970/71 90573 11.1 816 1970 809 
1971/72 109465 13.1 836 1971 832 
1972/73 111145 13.1 848 1972 846 
1973/74 136713 14.1 970 1973 949 
1974/75 144642 14.1 1026 1974 1016 
1975/76 178032 16.1 1106 1975 1092 
1976/77 206519 18.1 1141 1976 1135 
1977/78 216672 20.1 1078 1977 1088 
1978/79 227218 20.1 1130 1978 1122 
1979/80 252234 20.1 1255 1979 1234 
1980/81 274960 20.1 1368 1980 1349 
1981/82 335139 20.1 1667 1981 1617 
1982/83 372183 24.1 1544 1982 1565 
1983/84 378484 24.1 1570 1983 1566 
1984/85 409489 26.1 1569 1984 1569 
1985/86 411834 26.1 1578 1985 1576 
1986/87 425301 26.1 1630 1986 1621 
1987/88 468647 26.1 1796 1987 1768 
1988/89 540156 30.1 1795 1988 1795 
1989/90 593233 32.1 1848 1989 1839 
1990/91 693965 36.1 1922 1990 1910 
1991/92 816434 42.1 1939 1991 1936 
1992/93 938072 52.0 1804 1992 1827 
1993/94 1022176 56.9 1796 1993 1798 
1994/95 1210433 71.1 1702 1994 1718 
1995/96 1515268 88.0 1722 1995 1719 
1996/97 1672227 104.0 1608 1996 1627 
1997/98 2393286 158.0 1515 1997 1530 
1998/99 2957204 204.0 1450 1998 1460 
1999/00 3313841 245.0 1353 1999 1369 
2000/01 3641547 283.0 1287 2000 1298 
2001/02 3949575 316.8 1247 2001 1253 
2002/03 4213328 350.8 1201 2002 1209 
2003/04 4698781 388.5 1209 2003 1208 
2004/05 5348515 452.8 1181 2004 1186 
2005/06 6024031 504.4 1194 2005 1192 
2006/07 6783519 556.1 1220 2006 1216 
2007/08 7665368 615.7 1245 2007 1241 
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Fiscal 
years 
Excise 
revenue 
Excise tax Aggregate 
consumption 
Calendar 
years 
Aggregate 
consumption 
 Thousands 
of Rands 
Cents per 
pack 
Millions of 
packs 
 Millions of 
packs 
2008/09 8659210 682.0 1270 2008 1266 
2009/10 9100000 770.0 1182 2009 1196 
 
However, a recent report for prepared for the National Council Against Smoking (Van 
Walbeek, 2010) has developed a more accurate method for updating price data. Van Walbeek 
(2010) sourced monthly prices from Statistics South Africa from December 2001 to February 
2010. The data was not aggregated and included the actual data points that are used to 
compile the Consumer Price Index. The average monthly price of mid-priced cigarettes was 
calculated to represent the total market. This was deemed appropriate since mid-priced 
cigarettes account for about 70% of the market (Euronomonitor, 2007). Data was then 
annualized by taking the average monthly price.  
 
Figure C1 below shows the real prices of cigarettes using the old and new methods. There is a 
noticeable difference between the methods since 2001; the results using the new method are 
significantly higher than the old method, and the gap between the two series is growing. This 
has a number of implications for the simulations in this chapter, particularly in terms of the 
elasticitiy assumptions. Too low a price may result in an overstatement (in absolute terms) of 
the price elasticity of demand. Furthermore, since the current policy rule used to set the 
specific excise tax is defined in terms of retail prices, the understatement of prices may be 
resulting in a lower excise tax than that actually desired. Figure C2 shows the total tax burden 
using the old and new methods. Data is also summarized in Table C2.  
 
From the data shown it seems that the price data used to set the specific excise tax are based 
on a price series similar to that used in the “old method”, since a total tax burden of 
approximately 52% has been maintained since 2004. However, if these prices are understated 
and the “new method” is used, the tax burden target has not been achieved and the total tax 
burden has remained at approximately 47% since 2000. Since the purpose of this chapter is 
not to test whether the target is being met, but rather to understand what policy rule is most 
likely to be optimal to public health, I will leave this debate open. However, I will use the 
new method for the price data since this data better represents the prices that smokers are 
paying in the market. A more thorough analysis of the implications of this discovery--by Van 
Walbeek--is warranted, and may have significant policy relevance. 
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Figure C1: Real prices of cigarettes in South Africa, 1961-2009 
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Figure C2: Total tax burden of cigarettes in South Africa, 1961-2009 
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Table C2: Summary of nominal prices and tax burden in South Africa, 1961-2009 
Calendar 
years 
Price per 
pack 
Price per 
pack 
Excise tax 
burden 
Excise tax 
burden 
Total tax 
burden 
Total tax 
burden 
 
New 
method 
Old 
method 
New 
method 
Old 
method 
New 
method 
Old 
method 
1961 19 19 47.6% 47.6% 47.6% 47.6% 
1962 19 19 47.6% 47.6% 47.6% 47.6% 
1963 19 19 47.6% 47.6% 47.6% 47.6% 
1964 19 19 46.9% 46.9% 46.9% 46.9% 
1965 19 19 46.9% 46.9% 46.9% 46.9% 
1966 20 20 44.6% 44.6% 44.6% 44.6% 
1967 21 21 42.5% 42.5% 42.5% 42.5% 
1968 22 22 41.6% 41.6% 41.6% 41.6% 
1969 22 22 49.4% 49.4% 49.4% 49.4% 
1970 22 22 50.2% 50.2% 50.2% 50.2% 
1971 24 24 53.2% 53.2% 53.2% 53.2% 
1972 25 25 52.2% 52.2% 52.2% 52.2% 
1973 27 27 52.6% 52.6% 52.6% 52.6% 
1974 28 28 50.2% 50.2% 50.2% 50.2% 
1975 32 32 49.6% 49.6% 49.6% 49.6% 
1976 35 35 50.5% 50.5% 50.5% 50.5% 
1977 40 40 49.8% 49.8% 49.8% 49.8% 
1978 44 44 45.4% 45.4% 47.3% 47.3% 
1979 47 47 42.8% 42.8% 46.6% 46.6% 
1980 49 49 41.0% 41.0% 44.9% 44.9% 
1981 53 53 37.9% 37.9% 41.8% 41.8% 
1982 62 62 37.8% 37.8% 42.6% 42.6% 
1983 66 66 36.5% 36.5% 42.2% 42.2% 
1984 74 74 34.8% 34.8% 42.2% 42.2% 
1985 84 84 31.1% 31.1% 41.8% 41.8% 
1986 94 94 27.8% 27.8% 38.5% 38.5% 
1987 109 109 23.9% 23.9% 34.7% 34.7% 
1988 122 122 24.1% 24.1% 34.8% 34.8% 
1989 138 138 23.0% 23.0% 34.5% 34.5% 
1990 165 165 21.5% 21.5% 33.0% 33.0% 
1991 171 171 24.0% 24.0% 34.7% 34.7% 
1992 222 222 22.7% 22.7% 31.8% 31.8% 
1993 255 255 22.0% 22.0% 33.5% 33.5% 
1994 284 284 24.2% 24.2% 36.5% 36.5% 
1995 348 348 24.5% 24.5% 36.8% 36.8% 
1996 387 387 26.2% 26.2% 38.5% 38.5% 
1997 497 497 30.0% 30.0% 42.3% 42.3% 
1998 608 608 32.3% 32.3% 44.6% 44.6% 
1999 730 730 32.6% 32.6% 44.9% 44.9% 
2000 802 802 34.5% 34.5% 46.8% 46.8% 
2001 879 879 35.4% 35.4% 47.7% 47.7% 
2002 1023 974 33.7% 35.4% 46.0% 47.7% 
2003 1160 1067 33.0% 35.8% 45.2% 48.1% 
2004 1288 1112 34.3% 39.8% 46.6% 52.0% 
2005 1405 1253 35.3% 39.6% 47.6% 51.9% 
2006 1539 1350 35.6% 40.5% 47.8% 52.8% 
2007 1728 1484 35.1% 40.8% 47.3% 53.1% 
2008 1917 1641 35.0% 40.9% 47.3% 53.2% 
2009 2229 1905 33.9% 39.6% 46.2% 51.9% 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
A MOUNTAIN OR A MOLEHILL: IS THE ILLICIT TRADE IN CIGARETTES 
UNDERMINING TOBACCO CONTROL POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA?
51
 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Illicit trade is a significant problem for tobacco control and potentially for the legal market 
for tobacco products.
52
 The aim of tobacco control is to reduce smoking prevalence and 
cigarette consumption; illicit trade in cigarettes undermines tobacco control by allowing 
consumers and producers to evade tax, sometimes entirely, at other times only partially, thus 
lowering cigarette prices. As previous chapters have noted, prices and affordability are very 
important, if not the most important, determinants of the demand for cigarettes. Illicit 
cigarette trade is able to undermine significantly the use of taxation as a tobacco control 
policy tool.
53
 
 
Higher taxes and prices create greater incentives for traders to enter the illicit market since 
the higher taxes and prices increase the “rents” they can achieve by avoiding or evading 
taxes. However, many other commodities that are not specially taxed also suffer from a large 
                                                 
51
 This chapter was previously published in the journal Trends in Organized Crime (Blecher, 2010b) and has 
some minor improvements in a number of areas. I would like to thank Corné van Walbeek, Hana Ross, Luk 
Joosens, Jonny Steinberg, Antony Altbeker, David Merrimam, Klaus von Lampe and Georgios Antonopoulos 
for their comments and suggestions and Claire Milne from the South African Advertising Research Foundation 
for providing some of the All Media and Product Survey data. 
52
 The illicit trade in cigarettes can be broken down into two main categories: legally manufactured products on 
which excise taxes have not been paid (i.e. duty not paid) and illegally manufactured products. Smuggling is a 
feature of the illicit trade, as both legal and illegal products can be smuggled. Smuggling refers to the trade in 
illegally imported cigarettes and is often referred to as contraband. Illicit manufacturing refers to the 
manufacture of tobacco products which are not in compliance with local laws. Such laws may include taxation, 
licensing, or regulations which restrict the manufacture of tobacco products. Illicit manufacturing includes 
counterfeit production where products bear a trademark without the consent of the owner of the trademark. 
Some authors use the terms tax avoidance and evasion instead of illicit trade. 
53
 Conceptually, there are different interpretations of how illicit trade undermines tobacco control. One may 
consider any amount of illicit trade to undermine tobacco control. However, if illicit trade occurs as a result of 
tobacco control policy (i.e. tax increases) one might interpret illicit trade to undermine tobacco control efforts 
only if the net effect of the policy is counterproductive. This would occur if tax increases result in such a large 
volume of illicit trade that revenue collections decline and total consumption and smoking prevalence increase. 
A compromise interpretation of something in between would be quite nuanced and difficult to define. Since the 
goal of tax policy and tobacco control is to increase revenue and reduce consumption and prevalence I consider 
illicit trade to undermine tobacco control if and only if the goals in terms of revenue and 
consumption/prevalence are not achieved. 
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illicit market (e.g. music, films and, to a lesser extent, clothing and medicines). Thus, factors 
other than taxes also contribute to the illicit trade in commodities, including cigarettes. Other 
factors include the value to weight/size ratio of the commodity, border and customs 
enforcement, the existence of organised crime syndicates and corruption. Furthermore, tax 
increases do not necessarily result in price increases or price increases of the same magnitude 
and thus it is important to consider that it is also the tobacco industry’s pricing policies that 
influence the “rents” achieved by avoiding or evading taxes. 
 
Generally, the focus of illicit trade has been in high-income countries, primarily because 
taxes and prices are considerably higher in high-income countries, relative to low- and 
middle-income countries, as seen in Chapter 2. Furthermore, the problem of illicit trade has 
been more thoroughly documented in high-income countries, most probably owing to data 
availability and the existence of large databases of tobacco industry documents released 
through litigation, particularly in the United States and United Kingdom.
54
 Additionally, 
higher per unit taxes in high-income countries mean that government revenue losses are 
significantly higher, creating a greater incentive for governments to investigate and reduce 
illicit trade.  
 
Upon further inspection, the more well-known cases have unique narratives. For example, in 
the United States, illicit trade has been made easier by state level taxation, where each of the 
fifty states (and the District of Columbia) apply their own, often unique, tax regimes 
complicated by open state borders. Additionally, some city and country authorities apply their 
own taxes on top of the state taxes. Thus consumers and even commercial bootleggers have 
incentives to cross state borders to purchase cigarettes for their own consumption or for 
resale. Making matters more complicated is the availability of tax free cigarettes from Native 
American Reservations.
55
 Research by Stehr (2005), Lovenheim (2008), and Chiou and 
Muehlegger (2008) all consider cigarette smuggling and tax avoidance in the United States. 
More recently the purchasing of cigarettes across state lines via the internet has also become 
prevalent (see Goolsbee et al., 2010).  
 
                                                 
54
 In the United States, the primary problem is individual level tax avoidance and evasion as a result of 
differences in tax between state and local jurisdictions. Most of the research has focused on this problem. 
55
 This problem is unique to the United States and Canada. 
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In Canada, cross-border smuggling from the United States was common in the early 1990s. 
Cigarettes were legally manufactured in Canada and then exported to the United States with 
no Canadian taxes applied. The cigarettes were then smuggled back into Canada by organised 
crime syndicates with no tax paid. The Canadian cigarette manufacturers were complicit in 
organising the smuggling and recently paid significant fines to the Canadian government in 
out of court settlements and admission of guilt fines (see Joossens and Raw, 2008). The 
purpose of the smuggling operations was to undermine the tax regime and force the Canadian 
government to reconsider their tax increases, which they did.  
 
In Europe the experience was very different. Although cross-border shopping has existed for 
some time, the larger problem was of untaxed smuggled cigarettes entering Western Europe 
from Eastern Europe. The fall of communism and the prevalence of organised crime 
syndicates drove the trade. Joosens and Raw (1998) attribute cigarette smuggling in Europe 
to fraud, while Von Lampe (2005: 226) attributes the rise of the cigarette black market in 
Germany to the development of “ethnically defined supply and distribution networks”. 
However, several European countries, namely the United Kingdom, Spain and Italy, have 
seen a dramatic reduction in illicit trade without lowering taxes (see Joossens and Raw, 
2008). Methods used to reduce illicit trade included the use of improved technology to scan 
shipping containers, fiscal markings (tax stamps), tracking and tracing systems, increased 
punishment, more customs officers, and campaigns to increase public awareness. In all cases 
significant tobacco industry involvement has been alleged and legal proceedings and 
agreements with the industry have also played a role in reducing illicit trade. 
 
In low- and middle-income countries the illicit trade problem is different. Taxes and prices 
are generally lower, in both relative and absolute terms, than in high-income countries 
thereby creating fewer direct financial incentives to enter the illicit market (i.e. lower profit). 
However, the non-tax/price incentives are greater--including more corruption, fewer customs 
and border controls, and lower penalties--imply lower risk. Furthermore, organised crime 
syndicates are more prevalent. Recent evidence suggests that the prevalence of illicit 
cigarettes in many low- and middle-income countries is higher than the prevalence in many 
high-income countries (Joossens et al., 2010). Thus, the expected payoff in low- and middle-
income countries (with low profit but low risk) is equal to or greater than the expected payoff 
in high-income countries (with high profit but high risk). 
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The tobacco industry’s role in some forms of illicit trade is often unclear.56 Interestingly, the 
incentive often exists for the tobacco industry to inflate the size of the illicit market since 
their recommended remedy is to lower taxes. They also argue against future tax increases on 
the grounds that it will encourage illicit trade. In some cases the industry has been actively 
involved in illicit trade in order to undermine the tax system and to help promote new brands 
in markets in which they are not yet present. In addition to Canada and Europe there have 
been other cases where the tobacco industry has been directly or indirectly involved in illicit 
trade including in Asia (Collin et al., 2004), China (Lee and Collin, 2006), Africa (LeGresley 
et al., 2008) and Lebanon (Nakkash and Lee, 2008).  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider illicit trade in a low- and middle-income country. I 
use the case study of South Africa since it is a middle-income country which has undertaken 
an ambitious program to increase the taxes on cigarettes. Between 1993 and 2009 excise 
taxes have increased by 372% in real terms resulting in prices rising by 163% in real terms. 
In the upcoming analysis I will look at whether illicit trade has undermined tobacco control 
and fiscal policy. Although the results will not necessarily be generalisable to other low- and 
middle-income countries, they will nevertheless provide an insight into what is probably the 
most quoted success story of taxation policy as a tobacco control tool in a low- and middle-
income country. 
 
The market for cigarettes in South African has changed remarkably over the last 20 years. 
Since the early 1990s South Africa has embarked upon a deliberate tobacco control program. 
Legislation in 1993, which became effective by 1995, allowed the restriction of smoking in 
public places, introduced warning labels on packaging and advertising and banned the sale of 
tobacco products to minors (Republic of South Africa, 1993). Further legislation in 1999--
mostly implemented in 2001--banned smoking in most public places. It also banned 
advertising and sponsorship and the distribution of free product (Republic of South Africa, 
1999). Further regulation is currently in the legislative process and is expected to become law 
in 2011. Consistent and large increases in excise taxes and the retail price of cigarettes have 
been coupled with the legislation. Van Walbeek (2005) considers these tax and price 
increases to be the overwhelming reason tobacco consumption and smoking prevalence fell 
                                                 
56
 With the exception of counterfeit cigarettes which they are often interested in reducing. 
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so dramatically in the late 1990s and early 2000s (see Table 4.1). The previous chapter has 
described these tax increases in detail. 
 
Table 4.1: Percentage changes in smoking indicators in South Africa, 1993 to 2009 
Indicator Change 
Real price per pack 162.8% 
Aggregate consumption -30.9% 
Per capita consumption -49.3% 
Smoking prevalence -27.3% 
Number of smokers -0.7% 
Average consumption per smoker -30.3% 
Source: Van Walbeek (2005), National Treasury, All Media and Product Survey and Statistics South Africa 
 
The tobacco industry has long argued that high taxes are responsible for the growth in illicit 
cigarettes. The Tobacco Institute of South Africa, a body which represent the majority of 
tobacco growers and cigarette manufacturers, claims the size of the illicit market to be 20% 
of the total (legal and illicit) market (Tobacco Institute of South Africa, 2008). They had 
previously claimed it to be between 5.5% and 11% in 2004 and 15% in 2006 (Tobacco 
Institute of South Africa, 2004 and 2006). However, Sahawi, a low price producer, claimed in 
2007 that the illicit market was only between 5% and 10% of the total market (Sunday Times, 
2007). No research has been published to substantiate these claims, which are used to lobby 
against tax increases. Tobacco industry estimates of illicit trade rely on surveys of the 
proportion of cigarettes that are illicit.
57
 Data on the confiscation of illicit cigarettes is also 
presented, although there is no evidence of correlation between confiscations and illicit trade. 
Increases in confiscations might imply better enforcement rather than an increase in illicit 
trade. It is believed that almost all illicit cigarettes in South Africa are sold in the informal 
sector. 
 
In order to assess whether illicit trade has undermined tobacco control and fiscal policy I will 
attempt to estimate the size of the illicit market to allow a more constructive and accurate 
debate of tobacco taxation policy in South Africa. I will then use these estimates to consider 
whether illicit trade is undermining tobacco control efforts in South Africa. Tobacco control 
efforts would be undermined if total consumption (i.e. both legal and illegal) did not decline 
in response to a tax/price increase. Furthermore, tax policy would be undermined if an excise 
                                                 
57
 Although the results of these surveys have not been made public, personal communications with senior British 
American Tobacco South Africa staff have confirmed this. 
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tax increase resulted in a decline in tax collections. This could occur if the increase in tax 
resulted in a significant enough decline in legal consumption.  
 
This chapter proposes an alternative model of estimating the scale of the illicit trade market.  
It calculates the total consumption of cigarettes and then adjusts these data for the known 
“legal” market to estimate the unknown “illicit” market. It does so by using data on smoking 
prevalence and smoking intensity similar to that used to measure indirect tax losses in the 
United Kingdom (HM Revenue and Customs, 2007).  
 
Section 4.2 describes a model which formalises the market for cigarettes and the relationship 
between the various smoking indicators (prevalence, intensity and consumption). Section 4.3 
describes the data sources used, as well as some other estimates of illicit trade and smoking 
intensity. Section 4.4 provides estimates of illicit trade and analyses the results while Section 
4.5 discusses these results. Section 4.6 concludes the chapter. A postscript follows the 
conclusion to discuss some recent developments. 
 
 
4.2 THE MODEL 
 
In order to estimate the size of the illicit market some relationships need to be formalised. 
The total market for cigarettes can be defined as follows: 
 
Q = QL + QI           [1] 
 
Where Q represents quantity consumed; and the subscripts L denotes legal, and I illicit. The 
number of people in the population who smoke, i.e. the smoking population, (PS) can be 
calculated by multiplying the population (P) by smoking prevalence (R) (proportion of the 
population who smoke): 
 
PS = P x R           [2] 
 
The smoking population (PS) multiplied by the average consumption per smoker or smoking 
intensity (A) gives us the size of the total market. 
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Q = PS x A           [3] 
 
Substituting equation 3 into equation 1 and making QI the subject of the formula gives us: 
 
QI = (PS x A) - QL          [4]  
 
Thus if one knows the quantity consumed in the legal market (QL), the smoking population 
(PS) and the smoking intensity (A) one can calculate the size of the illicit market (QI). I will 
attempt to estimate consumption in the illicit market by using available data of the three right 
hand side variables. I will use the usual convention of considering only the adult population.
58
 
 
 
4.3 DATA 
 
Data on legal cigarette consumption are drawn from Van Walbeek (2005) from 1993 until 
2003 and directly from the author’s sources for the subsequent periods (up to 2009). Van 
Walbeek’s method calculates consumption by taking the total excise tax revenue and dividing 
it by the specific excise tax. Data on smoking prevalence are sourced from the “All Media 
and Product Survey” conducted by the South African Advertising Research Foundation and 
represents adult smoking prevalence.
59
 Smokers are defined as those adults who smoked the 
day prior to the survey. Population data are sourced from mid-year estimates put out by 
Statistics South Africa. The number of smokers is calculated by applying smoking prevalence 
to the adult population. The data are shown in Table 4.2 below. 
 
The data exhibit some interesting trends. Legal consumption declined consistently until the 
early 2000s; Van Walbeek (2005) attributed this decline to higher excise taxes on cigarettes.  
After this initial decline, consumption stabilises at about 25 billion sticks per annum. 
Smoking prevalence also declines consistently until 2002, after which it stabilises at about 
24%. Declining smoking prevalence, combined with a growing population, has resulted in a 
relatively constant smoking population throughout the period under consideration. 
                                                 
58
  Thus smoking prevalence and intensity will only refer to the adult population. Adult population is defined as 
the population 15 years and older. 
59
 The definition of adult in this survey is 16 years and older until 2008 and 15 years and older since 2009. 
Although this definition is not precisely the same as the population measure there are alternatives which are 
more precise. However, the difference is not considered substantial enough to undermine the results. 
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Table 4.2: Summary of consumption, prevalence and population data in South Africa, 
1992-2009 
Years Legal consumption Smoking Population Smokers 
 Sticks (billions) Prevalence (millions) ( millions) 
 QL R P PS 
1993 36.04 32.6% 24.83 8.09 
1994 35.38 28.8% 25.42 7.32 
1995 34.16 30.2% 26.03 7.86 
1996 33.80 30.3% 26.66 8.08 
1997 31.54 28.4% 27.40 7.78 
1998 29.90 28.5% 28.15 8.02 
1999 28.44 27.9% 28.93 8.07 
2000 26.68 27.1% 29.52 8.00 
2001 25.52 24.5% 30.12 7.38 
2002 24.68 24.8% 30.56 7.58 
2003 24.06 23.8% 30.89 7.35 
2004 24.04 24.1% 31.24 7.53 
2005 23.70 23.2% 31.69 7.35 
2006 24.02 23.3% 32.12 7.48 
2007 24.56 24.3% 32.59 7.92 
2008 25.02 23.4% 33.28 7.79 
2009 24.92 23.7% 33.89 8.03 
Source: Van Walbeek (2005), All Media and Product Survey and Statistics South Africa 
 
This is not the first research to consider the size of the illicit market in South Africa. Other 
research conducted by corporate research firms as well as by cigarette manufacturers exists.
60
 
Boshoff (2008) gained access to some quarterly estimates by British American Tobacco 
South Africa between the third quarter of 2005 and fourth quarter of 2006. Presented 
graphically they suggest that the illicit market may account for more than 20% of the total 
market.
61
 Euromonitor is a private sector research firm that conducts research on various 
markets of consumer goods. They have conducted research on the market for cigarettes in 
South Africa for a number of years and have estimated the size of the illicit market. 
Euromonitor has declined to release the raw data and methodology used in its calculations. Its 
sources are listed as “official statistics, trade associations, trade press, trade interviews and 
Euromonitor estimates”. These data are of a proprietary nature and thus not in the public 
domain. However, one set of estimates attributed to Euromonitor in 2002 was published in a 
trade publication (International Tobacco Growers Association, 2005). This provides annual 
estimates of the size of the illicit market, and by implication, a ratio that measures the illicit 
cigarette proportion, that is, the percentage of the total market which is illicit, from 1997 to 
                                                 
60
 The Tobacco Institute of South Africa and British American Tobacco South Africa claim that they have 
research on illicit trade although nothing has been published. Numerous requests for these data from them have 
been denied or ignored. 
61
 A request was made to the author for the underlying data but the request was denied on the grounds that the 
data were provided by British American Tobacco South Africa, who did not want to make the data available for 
this study. 
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2001.
62
 Two more recent estimates were purchased directly from Euromonitor and cover the 
same indicators from 2000 to 2005 and from 1997 to 2007. The three series are shown 
together in Figure 4.1 below. 
 
Figure 4.1: Euromonitor estimates of illicit market in South Africa 
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The data in Figure 4.1 suggests that illicit trade is a significant problem in South Africa, 
although the three estimates differ significantly. The 2002 estimates indicate that illicit trade 
grew aggressively from 1997 to 1999. The penetration and absolute size of the illicit cigarette 
market peaked in 1999 and declined slightly thereafter. These estimates suggest that, at its 
peak, the illicit market may have accounted for 30% of all cigarettes consumed. The size of 
the total market is estimated, by Euromonitor, to have shrunk by 4.9% from 1997 to 2001. 
Yet, at the same time, smoking prevalence declined from 28.4% to 24.5% and the smoking 
population declined from 7.6 to 7.4 million. The implication is that smoking intensity 
remained almost unchanged between 1997 and 2001. It is possible that the construction of the 
total market series could have been based on this assumption. Data I will present later 
indicate that smoking intensity was actually declining during this period, and hence brings the 
reliability of these estimates into question. This would be consistent with Evans and Farrelly 
                                                 
62
 Euromonitor does not provide the ratio itself, but the level of illicit cigarettes and the level of the legal market; 
thus the ratio can be calculated. The level of the legal market it provides is similar to but not the same as the 
Van Walbeek estimates. The Euromonitor data are presented in tables in the appendix. 
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(1998), who suggest an increase in price leads to a reduction in both smoking intensity and 
smoking prevalence. 
 
The 2005 estimates are in stark contrast to the 2002 estimates, suggesting that illicit trade 
occupied only 1.9% of the total market in 2000, compared to 28.4% of the 2002 estimate. 
However, the estimates indicate consistent growth in all years with illicit trade reaching 5.3% 
of the total market in 2005. The more recent 2007 estimates suggest that illicit trade was 
nearly non-existent in 1997 and that it has grown consistently since. The illicit market 
penetration peaked at 13.7% of the total market in 2006, a far cry from the 30% presented in 
the first estimate. The 2005 and 2007 estimates suggest that the size of the total market 
declined slowly between 1997 and 2007, which is consistent with our expectations from the 
declining smoking prevalence during this time. However, given that the size of the smoking 
population has remained relatively unchanged during this period (population growth has 
cancelled out the declining smoking prevalence), the implication is that smoking intensity 
declined steadily between 1997 and 2007. The credibility of all three Euromonitor estimates 
is questionable, due to both the lack of detail surrounding the methodology used and the 
variance in the estimates during overlapping years. This underscores the need for independent 
estimates using a transparent methodology. 
 
Smoking intensity refers to the amount that each smoker smokes in a specific period of time 
(usually a day, month or year). We can calculate smoking intensity from the various data 
sources already discussed. From the Van Walbeek (2005) data we can calculate the smoking 
intensity of the legal market. The Euromonitor estimates enable us to calculate an implied 
smoking intensity of the total market. By construction, the Euromonitor measures are higher 
than those of Van Walbeek. However, if we assume that illicit trade was non-existent over 
the whole period, then Van Walbeek’s data would also represent the total market. 
 
The All Media and Product Survey (i.e. the source of the prevalence data in Table 4.2) also 
measures smoking intensity amongst smokers in South Africa. A discrete measure has been 
used since 1998 and a continuous measure since 2001. The continuous measure implies 
smoking intensity of the total market by asking smokers how many cigarettes they smoked in 
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the previous day.
63
 The smoking intensity data for the legal market (Van Walbeek, 2005) and 
the total market (Euromonitor, 2007) are shown together with those of All Media Product 
Survey in Figure 4.2. The discrete measure asked respondents to classify their smoking 
behaviour as light, medium or heavy and is shown in Figure 4.3. 
 
Figure 4.2: Continuous measures of smoking intensity in South Africa 
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Source: Van Walbeek (2005), Euromonitor and All Media and Product Survey 
 
Figure 4.2 shows the distinct decline in smoking intensity of the legal and total market in 
South Africa since 1993 using continuous measures of smoking intensity. Van Walbeek’s 
(2005) measure indicates that smoking intensity has declined steadily since 1993 but less 
aggressively since the early 2000s. The Euromonitor (2007) estimate indicates that although 
smoking intensity fell aggressively in the late 1990s, this decline has moderated in the 
2000s.
64
  The All Media Product Survey estimates suggest that smoking intensity has 
declined steadily since it was first reported in 2001. However, we must consider that the 
                                                 
63
 This figure was then annualized to make it comparable to the other sources. It is important to recognize that 
this is a self-reported measure and is likely to underestimate significantly actual smoking intensity (see Warner, 
1978 or Stehr, 2005). This is consistent with the underreporting of consumption of other products like alcohol 
(Rundle-Thiele, 2009). Under reporting of alcohol consumption may reflect social desirability reporting 
(Baumgartner and Steenkamp, 2005) where respondents seek to look good according to current social trends 
(Mick, 1996). It is impossible to know how much this measure underestimates actual smoking intensity without 
specific research. We will consider the implications of this later in the paper. 
64
 Only the most recent Euromonitor (2007) estimate is shown here. 
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series only starts in 2001, by which time the most significant declines in intensity had already 
been seen. These three measures all tell similar stories and follow similar trends.  
 
We are able to conclude from Figure 4.2 that smoking intensity fell aggressively during the 
1990s but began to slow considerably in the early 2000s, and may have ended altogether by 
2009. The Euromonitor (2007) data corroborate the Van Walbeek data in the years they 
overlap until 2000, where they begin to diverge; the Euromonitor (2007) data show higher 
rates of consumption than Van Walbeek. If the Euromonitor data are to be believed the illicit 
market only became a significant entity after 2000. However, the remarkable consistency 
between the Van Walbeek and All Media Product Survey estimates would suggest little illicit 
trade. On the other hand, as previously indicated the survey methodology of the All Media 
Product Survey estimates is subject to a downward bias. 
 
Figure 4.3: Discrete measure of smoking intensity in South Africa 
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Source: All Media and Product Survey  
 
Figure 4.3 shows similar trends to those of Figure 4.2 with a general decline in smoking 
intensity. This is seen by a decline in those smokers who consider themselves heavy smokers 
with a commensurate increase in the number of smokers who consider themselves light 
smokers. At the same time, the proportion that considers themselves medium smokers 
remained relatively the same; there is, therefore, a clear indication that there has been a trend 
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away from heavy smoking and towards light smoking. As a result we can anticipate that a 
continuous measure of smoking intensity of the same sample would show consistent declines 
in smoking intensity. 
 
 
4.4 ESTIMATES 
 
The estimation of the size of the illicit market in South Africa requires a multi-stage 
procedure. Firstly, one needs to simulate smoking intensity and then apply this to the number 
of smokers in the population to calculate the size of the total market.
65
 Once one has an 
estimate of the total market, one is able to subtract the legal (and known) market from the 
total market to estimate the size of the illicit market. Essentially, we are solving equation 4. A 
and QL are known and PS is being simulated. 
 
The first assumption is that at the start of our analysis, the illicit market was non-existent. As 
such we set the smoking intensity of the total market equal to that of the legal market. We 
began the analysis in 1997, since both the tobacco industry and public health advocates 
acknowledge that illicit trade was insignificant at that time, and this is the start date for the 
Euromonitor (2007) estimate.
66
 The point estimate of the legal market smoking intensity in 
1997 from Van Walbeek (2005) is 4053 cigarettes per smoker per year.  
 
The second assumption we make is on how smoking intensity changes over time. The 
previous section suggests that smoking intensity declined significantly since 1997. It is 
unlikely that intensity declines in an organised and linear fashion. Figure 4.2 suggested that 
smoking intensity fell aggressively at first and then fell by smaller increments. As a result it 
is prudent to simulate smoking intensity in such a fashion – with a function that decreases at a 
decreasing rate. We use a geometrically decreasing non-linear continuous function Xt+1 = Xt × 
                                                 
65
 Even though we have estimates of smoking intensity they refer either to the legal market (Van Walbeek, 
2005) or are an implied calculation by Euromonitor. The only estimate of the total market smoking intensity, 
which is not implied by consumption data (like Van Walbeek, 2005) or the level of illicit trade (like 
Euromonitor), is from the All Media and Product Survey. However, the sample is very short and a simulated 
smoking intensity is used instead. 
66
 The Euromonitor (2007) estimate for 1997 is 0.8%. An alternative would be to assume that the illicit market 
occupied 0.8% of the total market in 2007 rather than 0%, however the results would not be significantly 
different.  
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Y
z
, where X represents smoking intensity, Y a decaying factor and z represents the number of 
years until the final year in the analysis.  
 
This function may seem arbitrary and it is. Decaying factors are specified in order to achieve 
a specific outcome in the final year of the analysis. Three outcomes are assumed. We first 
assume smoking intensity to be that implied by the continuous All Media and Product Survey 
measure of 3203 cigarettes per smoker per year in 2009 (a total decline of 21.0% from 4053 
in 1997). The second and third are based on this All Media and Product Survey estimate and 
represent a level 5% and 10% higher of 3393 and 3523 cigarettes per smoker per year in 2009 
(total declines of 16.3% and 13.1% respectively), and provide slack for the likely 
understatement of smoking intensity.
67
  
 
The simulated smoking intensity data are multiplied by the absolute number of smokers to get 
the total number of cigarettes smoked. The legal market is then subtracted from the total 
market and we are left with illicit market. Results for all three outcomes are shown 
graphically in Figure 4.4 for the available years between 2001 and 2007. Figure 4.5 compares 
the outcomes with the Euromonitor estimates. The percentages displayed indicate the size of 
the total market occupied by the illicit market.
68
  
 
From Figure 4.4 we can make some observations about the results from our simulations. 
Firstly, the simulations indicate that the illicit trade market penetration grew rapidly from 
1997 until peaking in 2000 at 9.1% to 12.7% of the total market. Since then, the illicit market 
has declined slowly, although it has remained volatile.  
 
More important than the point estimates, however, are the underlying trends. The first 
Euromonitor (2002) estimate should be considered unreliable since it is not consistent with 
any of the other estimates. Furthermore, the shortness of the sample reduces our ability to 
make judgements regarding the trend. We will focus our analysis on the estimates of this 
chapter, although we will not discard the two subsequent Euromonitor estimates. 
 
                                                 
67
 The decaying factors used in order to achieve these outcomes are 0.996985, 0.997725 and 0.998205 
respectively. 
68
 The data for the steps in this process are shown in the appendix. 
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Figure 4.4: Simulations of the illicit market penetration in South Africa, 1997-2009 
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Figure 4.5: Comparison of estimates of illicit trade in South Africa, 1997-2009 
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4.5 DISCUSSION 
 
This research aims to quantify the scale of illicit trade in South Africa. The research shows 
that, by some estimates, illicit trade is a significant problem in South Africa. The question is, 
how much of a problem? Estimates show that illicit trade has grown significantly, especially 
in the late 1990s. It shows that the illicit trade in cigarettes has most probably peaked in 2000 
and that the size of the illicit market stabilised in the 2000s. I estimate that the size of the 
illicit market peaked at 9.1% to 12.7% of the total market in 2000. The most recent estimate 
suggests an illicit market penetration of 3.1% to 11.9% in 2009. 
 
The anecdotal estimates of the size of the illicit market put forth by the Tobacco Institute of 
South Africa are an exaggeration. Claims of 20% of the total market are significantly higher 
than the estimates of this chapter and those of Euromonitor. Their previous claim of 15% 
market penetration in 2006 is also difficult to accept considering how, at that time, the illicit 
trade market penetration was most probably falling from its peak of significantly less than 
15% in 2000. Other anecdotal estimates by the Tobacco Institute of South Africa in 2004 of 
5.5% to 11% seem fair, and Sahawi’s estimate of 5% to 10% in 2007 is corroborated by these 
data. 
 
When considering whether illicit trade undermines tobacco control efforts we need to 
consider two specific things. Firstly, we need to consider the loss of tax revenue by the state, 
and secondly, the size of the total market. 
 
There are two separate taxes that jointly comprise consumption tax in South Africa, a specific 
excise tax levied per packet of cigarettes, as well as Value Added Tax (often referred to as 
VAT), levied at a flat rate of 14% of value added.
69
 Figure 4.6 below shows the estimates of 
real excise tax revenue (in constant 2009 prices) lost to illicit trade. Even when illicit trade 
decreased, the lost tax revenue remained high since the specific excise tax rose as well.
70
 Yet 
this picture is misleading; if these cigarettes were not sold on the illicit market but on the 
                                                 
69
 Value Added Tax is levied on all new goods and services in South Africa with only a few exceptions and is 
not specific to cigarettes. Almost all substitutes in consumption to cigarettes include Value Added Tax, and as a 
result, we do not consider it. Even illicit cigarettes (those which have been manufactured in South Africa on 
which tax is not paid) include some Value Added Tax since inputs in the production process include Value 
Added Tax and would not reimbursed if no Value Added Tax is paid on the sale of illicit cigarettes. 
70
 Essentially, the higher taxes were offsetting the declining levels of illicit trade. 
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legal market, the paying of the tax would raise the retail price of these cigarettes, thereby 
reducing their consumption.  
 
Figure 4.6: Real excise taxation lost as a result of illicit trade in South Africa, 1997-2009 
(constant 2009 prices) 
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Furthermore, one must consider that even while lost excise taxation grew significantly as 
illicit trade grew, so did total excise tax collections. As Abedian and Dorrington (1994), Van 
Walbeek (1996) and Van Walbeek (2005) all indicate, due to the price inelastic nature of 
cigarettes in South Africa, the increase in the specific excise tax was greater, in percentage 
terms, than the decline in (legal) sales. As a result, even though legal sales were falling, 
excise tax collections rose significantly. Between 1997 and 2009, total excise tax collections 
rose by over 133% in real terms, thereby dwarfing any potential loss through illicit trade.  
 
Figure 4.6 considers the tax lost to illicit trade while Figure 4.7 considers the net tax gain, by 
netting off the tax lost to illicit trade from the increase in excise tax collections that resulted 
from the higher specific excise. In Figure 4.7, the series labelled “base” is the increase in real 
excise tax collections between 1997 and 2009, without netting off illicit trade, while the other 
two series represent the netting off of illicit trade using the illicit trade estimates of this 
chapter and Euromonitor (2007) estimates. One can clearly see that the net impact of the tax 
increases is overwhelmingly positive. 
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Figure 4.7: Net gain in real excise taxation collections in South Africa, 1997-2009 
(constant 2009 prices) 
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A second consideration is the size of the total market. Previous studies have only considered 
the size and dynamics of the legal market, while our analysis in this chapter covers the size of 
the total market. Figure 4.8 combines the legal market of Van Walbeek (2005) with the illicit 
market estimates of this chapter, and indicates consumption in the total market. The dashed 
line indicates Van Walbeek’s estimates of the legal market, while the solid lines indicate the 
total market estimates. The clearest conclusion from this is that the total market declined 
rapidly in the 1990s and early 2000s. Essentially, as taxes and prices have risen, total 
consumption has fallen. Even as illicit trade grew the total market continued to decline, albeit 
at a slower pace. A small number of consumers have substituted their legal consumption with 
illicit consumption. Predictions that higher taxes would simply drive the tobacco industry 
underground have not come true.
71
 The total market has declined in size by 10.3% to 18.4% 
between 1997 and 2009, in spite of increases in illicit trade. All measures indicate a small 
increase in total consumption in the most recent years. This is a likely result of rapid income 
growth and a less aggressive tax policy, as indicated in previous chapters. 
 
                                                 
71
 The tobacco industry has used this argument to lobby against tax increases globally (see Van Walbeek, 2005). 
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Figure 4.8: Total consumption of cigarettes in South Africa, 1993-2009 
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One should also consider what drives illicit trade. The argument that higher taxes create 
greater incentives for criminal elements to enter into the illicit market has some strategic 
importance since the suggested “remedy” is to reduce taxes. Yet it must be considered that 
the tobacco industry has chosen to over-shift the tax and raise its profit margins in response to 
higher taxes (Van Walbeek, 2005) and thus should bear some, if not equal, responsibility for 
the rise in illicit trade. Furthermore, there is no correlation between our measure of illicit 
trade and real excise taxes and prices, which have been rising consistently throughout the 
period under consideration. All South Africa’s neighbouring countries have significantly 
lower excise taxes, thereby creating a natural incentive to smuggle cigarettes into South 
Africa.
72
 Yet significant quantities of illicit cigarettes confiscated by the South African 
Revenue Service do not come from South Africa’s neighbours but from further afield. 
Recently, one of the largest single confiscations of illicit cigarettes was of cigarettes 
originating in the United Arab Emirates and Egypt (The Times, 2009).
73
 Steinberg (2005) also 
notes China as a source of illicit cigarettes in South Africa. 
 
                                                 
72
 This could only account for cross border smuggling and not other forms of illicit trade. 
73
 This confiscation amounts to approximately 65 million cigarettes which would amount to 3.5% of the total 
illicit market (using the All Media and Product Survey +5% estimate). 
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It is likely that there are other reasons, in addition to higher excise taxes, that have 
encouraged the growth in illicit trade in South Africa. Steinberg (2005: 4) argues that illegal 
traders in South Africa specialise in trade routes rather than commodities, and that a “trade 
route can host an infinite array of commodities over time, and several commodities at the 
same time”. For instance, routes between South Africa and China include illicit trade in 
abalone, clothes, electronics, drugs, guns, human beings and diamonds, in addition to 
cigarettes. The illicit trade in a number of commodities has been able to grow in South Africa 
as a result of large and highly effective criminal networks. This has been compounded by 
weak border controls and corruption (Prinsloo and Naudé, 2009). The rise in the illicit trade 
in cigarettes mirrors increases in the illicit trade of many other commodities since the 1990s.  
 
Yet the illicit trade in cigarettes has declined substantially since peaking in 2000. One may 
speculate that this may be a function of the spectacular decline in tobacco production in 
Zimbabwe where production levels have fallen by over 70% since 2000 (Kwidini, 2008). 
Until the early 2000s, Zimbabwe was one of the world’s largest growers of tobacco and a 
significant producer of cigarettes.
74
 
 
We should, however, consider the limitations of this research in light of the experimental 
methodology and the data used. Data on legal consumption and excise taxes in South Africa, 
sourced from Van Walbeek (2005), are from official sources and represent actual data. 
However, the data on smoking prevalence sourced from All Media and Product Survey 
represent just that: a survey. The survey suffers from some problems, exposed by the 
volatility in the series, which may arise from sampling issues. However, the limitations of the 
survey are compensated for by the use of a consistent series throughout the analysis. 
Furthermore, the lack of a long times series of smoking intensity data has necessitated a 
reliance on simulating smoking intensity based on evidence of declining smoking intensity 
during the period of analysis. One must also keep in mind the potential understatement of 
smoking intensity in the All Media and Product Survey data. We have provided for this in the 
model by assuming a higher smoking intensity than that suggested by the All Media and 
Product Survey data. Even though it is expected that the All Media Product Survey smoking 
                                                 
74
 It has been anecdotally stated that Zimbabwe might have been the source of many cigarettes smuggled into 
South Africa given the large price differentials between the two neighbors. In 2006 the most affordable 
cigarettes in Zimbabwe cost $1.44 per pack of 20 while they cost $2.56 in South Africa (Blecher and Van 
Walbeek, 2009). Although the large majority of tobacco is exported, more than half of the cigarettes produced 
between 1996 and 2000 were exported, indicating a surplus in manufactured cigarettes (ERC, 2001). 
Furthermore, the ample supply of leaf would make counterfeit manufacturing possible. 
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intensity is understated the remarkable likeness between the All Media Product Survey and 
Van Walbeek’s implied smoking intensity measures could suggest very little, if any, 
understatement. This, together with the volatility of the Euronomintor estimates creates 
serious doubt about whether illicit trade occupies a significant portion of the market. As such, 
the estimates of this chapter should be considered to be at the upper end of estimates. 
Furthermore, more accurate data on smoking intensity would improve the accuracy of 
estimates of the size of the illicit market. 
 
Much research has been conducted on the illicit trade in cigarettes in North America and 
Europe, but South Africa is a unique case. Data limitations and the different nature of the 
illicit trade problem--that is, cross-border smuggling and contraband in South Africa versus 
cross-border smuggling from neighbouring states and domestic tax avoidance in North 
America and Europe--require innovative methods. This chapter is a first step to overcome the 
unique challenges regarding illicit trade research in South Africa. 
 
 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
 
It is clear that increased taxes and retail prices have resulted in very large declines in total 
cigarette consumption in South Africa, which are even more pronounced when considered in 
per capita terms. Thus, the strategy of increasing excise taxes to reduce cigarette consumption 
and increase government revenue has worked with dramatic effect, even in the face of the 
growth in illicit trade. Even though South Africa may have experienced a significant increase 
in illicit trade, it has not undermined tobacco control efforts, since total consumption has 
fallen and the net impact on tax revenue was positive.  
 
This research supports the strategy of increased cigarette taxation in South Africa. Although 
it identifies a significant illicit trade problem, it also finds that this problem has most likely 
peaked and has probably declined substantially since. At its current levels, illicit trade 
probably accounts for no more than 12% of the total market. It is likely that if the government 
pursues a more aggressive taxation strategy in the future, total consumption--not just legal 
consumption--will fall, and government revenue will rise, even if there is some growth in 
illicit trade. 
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4.7 POSTSCRIPT 
 
On the occasion of his appointment as Chief Executive Officer of British American Tobacco 
South Africa, Brian Finch gave an interview with the Sunday Times newspaper (Barron, 
2010). The Sunday Times is the largest and one of the most influential weekend newspapers 
in South Africa. Finch indicated that illicit cigarettes are British American Tobacco South 
Africa’s “biggest challenge”. The most recently available data indicates that British American 
Tobacco South Africa held 90% of the legal cigarette market in South Africa (ERC, 2007) – 
thereby operating with considerable market power which would, no doubt, result in 
significant pricing power. 
 
Finch stated that “company research suggests that one out of every five cigarettes smoked in 
South Africa is illicit”; this implies a total market penetration of 20%, significantly higher 
than the 2009 estimates of this chapter as well as those of Euromonitor (although the final 
Euromonitor estimate is from 2007). However, this is in line with the most recent claims of 
the Tobacco Institute of South Africa. The Tobacco Institute of South Africa is a trade group 
with very close links to British American Tobacco South Africa; some tobacco control 
advocates would simply consider the institute to be a mouthpiece for British American 
Tobacco South Africa. However, Finch takes this claim one step further by indicating that the 
illicit market had doubled in the last year.  
 
There are several inconsistencies which raise more questions than answers and bring serious 
doubt about the credibility of British American Tobacco South Africa on the issue of illicit 
trade. Firstly, if the market for illicit cigarettes has doubled in the last year, then the prior 
Euromonitor and Tobacco Institute of South Africa estimates of the size of the illicit market 
are greatly troubling. Since both the Tobacco Institute of South Africa and British American 
Tobacco South Africa have previously relied on these estimates in both the media and 
Parliamentary hearings, one would believe that they felt confident in them; however, Finch’s 
statement casts doubt on the credibility of the previous estimates. Since the generic 
recommendation from the tobacco industry to reduce illicit trade is to lower taxes, there is a 
clear incentive for the industry to argue constantly that recent tax increases have given rise to 
recent increases in illicit trade. There is no clear evidence that the levels of illicit trade have 
changed significantly in the last year or two, or even since the early 2000s.  
 
U
ni
v
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
  124 
Finch clearly identifies taxation and price as the drivers of illicit trade: “We can’t compete on 
price. If 52% of your price is tax that’s a hell of an incentive to offer any trader to sell your 
stuff…the opportunity to anyone wanting to indulge in illicit gains (sic) is huge”.75 Yet, as 
the previous chapter described, the use of the 52% benchmark has essentially turned the 
specific tax into an ad valorem tax. As a result, it is the tobacco industry itself which sets the 
tax via its pricing decisions. In 2009, cigarette prices rose by 15.2% in nominal terms and 
7.6% in real terms, requiring an increase in the specific excise tax to maintain the benchmark. 
However, in 2009, the excise tax increased by only 11.3% in nominal terms and 3.9% in real 
terms resulting in the total tax burden falling to 49.7%. This is well below the target, and was 
most likely a result of National Treasury underestimating the tobacco industry’s price 
increases, as well as a secondary price increase later in the year. What is clear is that the 
increase in tax was more modest than the increase in price. In fact the excise tax increase in 
2009 was one of the smallest increases, in real terms, since excise taxes began to increase in 
1993. Essentially, Finch claims that illicit trade has doubled as a result of tax increases in a 
year which saw the smallest tax increases in recent memory.  
 
Furthermore, Finch claims that government’s response to declining tax revenues from legal 
producers has been to increase tax on cigarettes. This statement is false for two reasons. As 
this chapter has indicated, tax revenues are rising and not falling, even in the existence of 
significant illicit volumes. Secondly, it is not the government which has been increasing the 
excise tax, but rather the tobacco industry, through their pricing strategy. The benchmark was 
met several years ago, and any increase in the excise tax, in real terms, is simply a reaction to 
the pricing decisions of the tobacco industry. It is a very weak argument to blame taxes for 
the supposed and unproven increase in illicit trade if you yourself are the driver of the taxes.  
 
However, it is possible to reconsider this question in a different light by asking: how much 
illicit trade would be required to undermine tobacco control and taxation policy? In other 
words, how much illicit trade would need to exist in the market for taxation revenues to 
actually fall, as Finch suggested? Calculations suggest that the number of illicit cigarettes in 
the market would need to be 4 or 5 times larger—an illicit market penetration of nearly 40% 
                                                 
75
 52% refers to the policy that 52% of the retail price should be occupied by excise taxes and Value Added Tax. 
As the previous chapter notes this is a target, which is met in a backward looking manner resulting in actual tax 
burden falling below the 52% target. 
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of the total market—in order for tax revenues to start declining.76 Thus, even under the 
tobacco industry’s “worst case scenario” tobacco control and tax policy efforts would not be 
undermined. The illicit cigarette market would need to be significantly larger than even the 
“worst case scenario” for this to occur.  
                                                 
76
 This is not to suggest that such a level of illicit trade would be acceptable but rather to indicate that the current 
levels of illicit trade are significantly lower than the position which would clearly undermine the policy 
objectives. 
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APPENDIX D: ADDITIONAL DATA 
 
 
Table D1: Euromonitor estimates of illicit market (2002) 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Legal sales* 32.6 30.4 25.3 25.7 25.7 
Contraband* 4.5 6.2 10.8 10.2 9.6 
Total* 37.1 36.6 35.5 35.9 35.3 
Penetration 12.1% 16.9% 29.9% 28.4% 27.1% 
Notes: * billions of sticks 
 
Table D2: Euromonitor estimates of illicit market (2005) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Legal sales* 26.7 25.5 24.7 23.5 23.0 22.5 
Contraband* 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 
Total* 27.2 26.1 25.4 24.4 24.1 23.8 
Penetration 1.9% 2.2% 2.9% 3.8% 4.6% 5.3% 
Notes: * billions of sticks 
 
Table D3: Euromonitor estimates of illicit market (2007) 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Legal sales* 31.5 29.9 26.7 26.7 25.5 24.7 23.5 23.0 22.5 21.9 24.4 
Contraband* 0.3 0.5 1.0 1.4 1.8 2.2 2.4 2.8 3.3 3.5 3.7 
Total* 31.8 30.4 27.7 28.1 27.3 26.8 25.9 25.8 25.8 25.4 28.1 
Penetration 0.8% 1.6% 3.6% 5.1% 6.4% 8.0% 9.3% 10.8% 12.8% 13.7% 13.1% 
Notes: * billions of sticks 
 
Figure D1: Simulated smoking intensity 1997-2009 
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Table D4: Summary of simulations 
Years Simulated smoking intensity Number of 
smokers 
Total market Legal market Absolute level of illicit trade Illicit market penetration 
Cigarette per smoker per year Millions of cigarettes Millions of 
cigarettes 
Millions of cigarettes Percentage of total market 
AMPS AMPS +5% AMPS +10% AMPS AMPS +5% AMPS +10% AMPS AMPS +5% AMPS +10% AMPS AMPS +5% AMPS +10% 
1997 4053 4053 4053 7781600 31540 31540 31540 31540 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
1998 3909 3944 3967 8022750 31360 31641 31824 29900 1460 1741 1924 4.7% 5.5% 6.0% 
1999 3781 3846 3889 8071470 30520 31045 31391 28440 2080 2605 2951 6.8% 8.4% 9.4% 
2000 3669 3760 3820 7999920 29350 30077 30558 26680 2670 3397 3878 9.1% 11.3% 12.7% 
2001 3570 3683 3759 7379400 26347 27181 27736 25520 827 1661 2216 3.1% 6.1% 8.0% 
2002 3485 3617 3705 7578880 26414 27412 28079 24680 1734 2732 3399 6.6% 10.0% 12.1% 
2003 3412 3560 3659 7351820 25086 26170 26898 24060 1026 2110 2838 4.1% 8.1% 10.5% 
2004 3351 3511 3619 7528840 25229 26437 27250 24040 1189 2397 3210 4.7% 9.1% 11.8% 
2005 3301 3472 3587 7352080 24268 25524 26372 23700 568 1824 2672 2.3% 7.1% 10.1% 
2006 3261 3440 3561 7483960 24406 25746 26653 24020 386 1726 2633 1.6% 6.7% 9.9% 
2007 3232 3417 3542 7919370 25594 27058 28052 24560 1034 2498 3492 4.0% 9.2% 12.4% 
2008 3212 3401 3529 7787520 25016 26487 27486 25020 -4 1467 2466 0.0% 5.5% 9.0% 
2009 3203 3393 3523 8031930 25723 27256 28298 24920 803 2336 3378 3.1% 8.6% 11.9% 
Note: The simulated smoking intensity is applied to the number of smokers which results in the total market. The legal (known) market is subtracted from the total market 
which yields the absolute level of illicit trade. The absolute level of illicit trade is divided by the total market to calculate the illicit market penetration. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
THE IMPACT OF TOBACCO ADVERTISING BANS ON CONSUMPTION IN LOW- 
AND MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES
77
 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The question of whether or not advertising of tobacco products affects the consumption of 
tobacco products is controversial.
78
 Tobacco control advocates and practitioners argue that 
tobacco advertising has a positive impact on aggregate consumption, and that restricting or 
even banning tobacco advertising altogether can reduce aggregate consumption. The tobacco 
industry argues that advertising has no positive impact on aggregate consumption but rather 
that it influences the relative market shares of individual brands, and is therefore not a public 
health issue. Economists have added empirical value to this debate by regressing cigarette 
consumption on advertising, controlling for other determinants of demand (i.e. price and 
income). Many studies have found that advertising has had a positive impact on aggregate 
consumption while, at the same time, many studies have shown no significant impact. Table 
5.1 details all studies published in peer reviewed journals that investigate the relationship 
between tobacco consumption and advertising expenditure. 
 
Saffer (2000) argues that the high level of aggregation of advertising expenditure data used in 
time series studies leaves little variation to correlate with consumption data. Since the 
marginal impact of advertising is very low—possibly even zero—it is possible that we would 
not find any relationship between advertising expenditure and consumption. Although this 
would not be true at all levels of expenditure, the marginal impact is likely to be low since 
cigarettes are one of the most heavily advertised products (where permitted). To support this, 
                                                 
77
 This chapter is an updated and extended version of work previously published as a working paper by 
Economic Research South Africa (Blecher, 2008a) and in the Journal of Health Economics (Blecher, 2008b). I 
would like to thank Corné van Walbeek, Paul Dunne, Sam Perlo-Freeman, Reza Daniels, Prabhat Jha, Frank 
Chaloupka and referees for Economic Research South Africa and the Journal of Health Economics for useful 
comments and suggestions and Angela McClean and Omar Shafey for providing data for this and prior versions. 
I would like to acknowledge the financial support of Economic Research Southern Africa. I would like to thank 
the American Cancer Society for allowing me to use proprietary datasets to which they subscribe. 
78
 The term advertising refers to advertising, promotion and sponsorship but not marketing. 
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Saffer (2000) quotes Advertising Age which reports that Philip Morris was the ninth largest 
advertiser in the world in 1996. Furthermore, since the marginal impact of advertising is 
likely to be high at low levels of advertising and fall progressively as advertising increases, it 
is likely to have a non-linear impact on consumption. Few if any of the studies that 
investigate the relationship between tobacco consumption and advertising expenditure take 
this potential non-linear relationship into account. 
 
Chapman (1989) also criticised the use of aggregate data, and in particular noted the inability 
of studies to examine all methods of promotion (including non-advertising) used by the 
tobacco industry. Econometric analysis only examines the effects of advertising on aggregate 
data, while advertising also has an influence on smoking related cognition and beliefs. In 
most cases they are unable to examine effects on specific population groups, like youth, 
women or the poor. He argued that it would be more relevant to analyse the industry’s use of 
marketing, deploying qualitative and quantitative techniques. 
 
In more recent times economists have begun to focus less on advertising expenditure and 
more on the impact of various advertising restrictions and bans on aggregate consumption. In 
the simplest context, Smee (1992) and Perkurinen (1989) compared what happened before 
and after an advertising ban was imposed in Norway and Finland, respectively, and found 
that the ban had a negative impact on per capita consumption. Subsequently, a significant 
body of literature has developed using cross-sectional time series data to test the impact of 
advertising restrictions and bans, mostly in high-income countries 
 
This chapter considers the impact that advertising bans have on tobacco consumption, paying 
particular attention to low- and middle-income countries. In order to do this I will model the 
demand for tobacco consumption at the aggregate country level in seventy-six countries. 
Section 5.2 considers the prior literature while section 5.3 focuses on the methodology and 
data. This is followed by an analysis of the data in section 5.4 and the estimation of the cross-
country demand models in section 5.5. Section 5.6 discusses the results and concludes the 
chapter. 
 
This chapter aims to improve the prior literature in several ways. Firstly, it includes a 
significant number of low- and middle-income countries in the sample, whereas the previous 
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literature included only high-income countries. Secondly, it makes some methodological 
improvements with respect to the manner in which advertising bans are modelled.  
 
Table 5.1: Studies investigating the impact of advertising expenditure on tobacco 
consumption 
Study Country Time Period 
No significant effect of advertising 
Grabowski (1976) United States  1956-1972 
Schneider et al. (1981) United States  1930-1978 
Yuclet and Kaynak (1984) United States  1955-1979 
Baltagi and Levin (1986) United States  1963-1980 
Johnson (1986) Australia  1961-1986 
Godfrey (1986) United Kingdom  1956-1984 
Hoffman (1987) West Germany  1969-1979 
McAuliffe (1988) United States  1957-1985 
Baltagi and Levin (1992) United States  1963-1988 
Wilcox and Vacker (1992) United States  1991-1990 
Duffy (1991) United Kingdom  1971-1987 
Franke (1994) United States  1961-1990 
Wilcox et al. (1994) South Korea  1988-1992 
Reekie (1994) South Africa 1970-1989 
Duffy (1995) United Kingdom  1963-1988 
Goel and Morey (1995) United States  1959-1982 
Duffy (1996) United Kingdom  1963-1992 
Gallet (1999) United States  1958-1991 
Duffy (2003) United Kingdom  1963-1996 
Duffy (2006) United Kingdom 1964-2002 
Significant positive effect of advertising 
Fujii (1980) United States  1929-1973 
Witt and Pass (1981) United Kingdom  1955-1975 
Young (1983) United States  1929-1973 
Bishop and Yoo (1985) United States  1954-1980 
Radfar (1985) United Kingdom  1965-1980 
Leefland and Reuijl (1985) West Germany  1960-1975 
Abernethy and Teel (1986) United States  1949-1981 
Porter (1986) United States  1947-1982 
Chetwynd et al. (1988) New Zealand  1973-1985 
Kao and Tremblay (1988) United States  1953-1980 
Harrison et al. (1989) New Zealand  1973-1985 
Seldon and Doroodian (1989) United States  1952-1984 
Tegene (1991) United States  1953-1985 
Smee (1992) United Kingdom  1960-1987 
Valdes (1993) Spain  1964-1988 
Tremblay and Tremblay (1995) United States  1955-1990 
Bardsley and Olekalns (1999) Australia  1963-1996 
Keeler et al. (2004) United States 1990-2000 
Peng and Ross (2009) Ukraine 1997-2006 
Source: Smee (1992), Saffer and Chaloupka (2000), Nelson (2006) and Blecher and Hastings (2011) 
Note: Many of the studies included would include marketing expenditures in addition to advertising 
expenditures. 
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5.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Since a number of countries now impose significant restrictions and even bans on tobacco 
advertising it is possible to estimate the impact that these policies have had on tobacco 
consumption using aggregate data. The first study to do this was Laugesen and Meads (1991) 
using data from twenty-two Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries for the period 1960 to 1986 to examine the impact of increasing 
advertising restrictions on per capita consumption. They construct a demand model in which 
they specify per capita consumption as a function of price, income, a number of demographic 
factors and an advertising restrictions score. The advertising restrictions score was bound by 
0 and 10, 0 implying no restrictions whatsoever and 10 implying a total ban on all advertising 
and sponsorship, along with strong and varied warnings on cigarette packaging.
79
 Laugesen 
and Meads found that increasing advertising restrictions had, since 1973, been associated 
with declining tobacco consumption. 
 
At this time advertising bans were still a relatively new phenomenon and the tobacco industry 
fought aggressively against them. In order to do so, the tobacco industry attempted to show 
that restrictions and bans did not result in their intended outcome of reducing tobacco 
consumption and as a result should not be implemented or should even be repealed where 
they already existed. At the time the tobacco industry did all it could to discredit research 
which showed that advertising bans reduced consumption; they commissioned their own 
studies, where necessary, to show that advertising bans had no impact on consumption. This 
was a full frontal war; Laugesen and Meads (1991), as well as subsequent studies (like 
Stewart, 1993b) were on the front line.  
 
Laugesen and Meads’ (1991) paper was written as an improvement on the report of the New 
Zealand Toxic Substances Board (1989) which was used as evidence in various Canadian 
court cases (High, 1999). Even though it was an improvement, High (1999: 27) indicates that 
it still “suffers from basic flaws in methodology and data that renders it unintelligible and of 
no probative value” while Stewart’s (1992) critique was described by High (1999: 37) as 
                                                 
79
 A point was awarded each for bans on (1) television, (2) radio, (3) cinema, (4) outdoor posters, (5) point of 
sale (shops), (6) press, (7) magazines and (8) sponsorship while restrictions earned half a point. A further point 
was scored if package warnings were the same on all packets and a second if the warnings were varied. 
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“devastating”. Stewart’s concerns included the quality of the data80, the use of the estimation 
techniques and the failure to control for country specific influences, such as different tastes, 
culture and attitudes. Furthermore, High (1999) raises a major concern with the use of the 
advertising restriction score since it implies that a ban in one particular media has the same 
impact as a ban in another media, and a restriction half that of a ban. The method implies that 
a score of two has double the impact of a score of one, and a score of three triples the impact.  
 
Stewart
81
 (1993b) attempts to correct the flaws of the Report of the New Zealand Toxic 
Substance Board (1989) and Laugesen and Meads (1991), using annual data from 22 OECD 
countries for 27 years from 1964 to 1990. High (1999: 37) indicates that “Stewart has 
produced among the best studies of advertising and consumption” in the tobacco control 
literature. However, the criticism of Laugesen and Meads’ (1991) pooling technique remains 
valid for Stewart (1993), since he does not control for differences across countries, either. 
 
Interestingly, Stewart (1993b) concludes that advertising bans had a positive impact on per 
capita tobacco consumption. Duffy (1996: 15 in High, 1999) explained the result as an 
artefact of the reduction in health warnings associated with reduced cigarette advertising. 
This could only be based on the assumption that people are therefore less aware of the health 
implications of smoking as a result of less advertising. This theory is flawed since health 
warnings have become more prevalent on packaging and at points of sale since advertising 
bans have been imposed.  
 
High (1999: 28) argues that Laugesen and Meads (1991) take an incorrect approach to 
estimate the effect of advertising bans on tobacco consumption by using the advertising 
restriction score. This same criticism stands for Stewart (1993b) in that he uses a single 
dummy variable to indicate a ban, making no allowance for a partial ban in one media and a 
complete ban in another. Saffer and Chaloupka (2000) correct this problem by categorising 
advertising regulations as weak, limited or comprehensive. They consider a total of seven 
                                                 
80
 However, Laugesen and Meads (1993) indicate that Stewart’s critique did not analyse the dataset used in the 
Laugesen and Meads (1991) paper, but rather an earlier version. 
81
 It is important to note that Stewart is/was a private consultant who worked for the Confederation of European 
Community Cigarette Manufacturers (Abbey Management Service, 1996). It is not known whether Stewart’s 
part in this debate was funded by the Confederation of European Community Cigarette Manufacturers, but the 
result of his study would be consistent with other tobacco industry funded research. Scollo et al. (2003) show 
that studies funded by the tobacco industry that attempted to estimate the impact of clean air legislation on 
hospitality industries consistently found that regulation had negative effects, while studies that did not receive 
tobacco industry funding found otherwise. 
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media: television, radio, outdoor, print, cinema, point-of-sale and sponsorship. They classify 
the regulation in a country and year as weak if bans existed in 0, 1 or 2 media, limited if bans 
existed in 3 or 4 media, or comprehensive if bans existed in 5, 6 or 7 media. They indicate the 
importance of investigating how bans in a number of media work together in influencing 
consumption since a greater number of countries have implemented more comprehensive 
bans and restrictions on tobacco advertising since the 1980s. Saffer and Chaloupka (2000) 
conclude that limited advertising bans have little or no effect on tobacco consumption while 
comprehensive bans reduce tobacco consumption.  
 
In Saffer and Chaloupka’s (2000) paper, regressions are estimated using per capita 
consumption as the dependent variable, including price, income, the unemployment rate and 
the percentage of filtered cigarettes as controls over the period 1970 to 1992. These variables 
are in addition to dummy variables for limited and comprehensive bans. The regressions are 
conducted using a two-way fixed effects model with fixed effects for countries and time 
periods. The coefficients of the limited and comprehensive ban dummies were generally 
found to be insignificant. Saffer and Chaloupka (2000) indicate that the inconsistent results 
may reflect a lack of variation in the ban variables in the years prior to 1983. They altered the 
specification of their model to include only years from 1984 onwards and found that the 
coefficients of both the limited and comprehensive ban dummies were negative. The limited 
ban coefficients remain insignificant, while the comprehensive ban coefficients are 
statistically significant. Furthermore, the magnitudes of the comprehensive ban coefficients 
were consistently greater than the coefficients of the limited bans. They conclude that 
comprehensive advertising bans resulted in a 7.4% decline in cigarette use in OECD 
countries.  
 
Saffer and Chaloupka (2000) draw some important conclusions, indicating that limited bans 
are not effective in reducing tobacco consumption since they ultimately will result in a 
substitution of advertising from the banned media to those that are still allowed.  They 
conclude that only comprehensive bans are effective in reducing consumption. This study 
also includes significant methodological improvements, particularly the treatment of the 
advertising bans as weak, limited or comprehensive bans, along with the use of fixed effects 
to control for differences between countries and time periods. 
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Nelson (2003) points out two specific problems in the prior literature (Laugesen and Meads, 
1991; Stewart, 1993b; Saffer and Chaloupka, 2000).
82
 He indicates that the early cross- 
country studies ignored the possibility that advertising bans are endogenously determined 
together with consumption. He also indicates the possibility of a structural break in the data 
noting that Saffer and Chaloupka (2000) find that comprehensive bans only become a 
significant determinant of tobacco consumption post-1984.  
 
Nelson (2003) limits his sample to 20 OECD countries for the period 1970 to 1995. The first 
sets of regressions are estimated to replicate and improve the prior literature. He includes 
dummy variables for (1) requirements for warnings on packaging and advertising material, 
(2) television and radio advertising bans, (3) moderate bans (if three or four specific media 
bans existed)
83
 and (4) strong bans (if five or more specific media were banned) as well as 
country and time dummies. Nelson (2003) diversifies his use of ban dummies to include 
some bans that he regards as important and intentionally looks at the difference between 
broadcast bans and other media bans. Nelson’s initial conclusions were that none of the bans 
play a role in the determination of cigarette consumption.  
 
The decision to use the shortened sample from 1985 to 1995 was based on testing for a 
structural break, which was done by using a recursive technique, successively estimating 
regressions with one less year, indicating a structural break in 1985. Nelson (2003) also tested 
the individual country autocorrelation in some of the regressions and found that the majority 
of countries have strong positive autocorrelation. He indicates that this may also account for a 
downward bias in standard errors, and hence may have led previous studies to accept that 
advertising bans had a negative effect on consumption, when in fact they had not. Nelson 
(2003) essentially rejects the previous attempts to measure the effectiveness of advertising 
bans on consumption in cross-country studies on the grounds of poor econometric techniques.  
 
Based on his conclusion—that advertising bans do not play a role in determining 
consumption—Nelson (2003) hypothesises a public choice model, arguing that advertising 
restriction should only be implemented once smoking prevalence has fallen so that smokers 
                                                 
82
 It is important to note that Nelson has ties to the tobacco industry and has worked as a consultant to industry 
bodies; he appeared for them as an expert witness in various legal proceedings. 
83
 Nelson (2003) considers a total of nine media, namely: television, radio, cinema, outdoor, newspapers, 
magazines, shop advertising, sponsorships, and indirect advertising such as brand names on non-tobacco 
products. 
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no longer constitute an “effective economic or political interest group” (Nelson 2003: 20). 
The rationale behind this hypothesis is that tobacco consumption has fallen since the mid-
1960s due to the public’s knowledge of the health risks associated with smoking; the decline 
is influenced by, amongst others, government reports, public education programs, health 
warnings and counter-advertising campaigns. Because of greater understanding of these risks, 
combined with higher taxation and direct measures such as age controls, tobacco 
consumption and prevalence fell, resulting in a swing in public opinion that allowed 
advertising bans to be legislated without much political cost. Nelson (2003) indicates that 
most comprehensive advertising bans were only legislated once large-scale falls in 
consumption had already taken place.
84
 To test this hypothesis that advertising bans are a 
result of a reduction in tobacco consumption, Nelson (2003) estimates a two-stage model 
treating advertising restriction endogenously.
85
  
 
Nelson (2003) finds that income and prices are statistically significant in predicting demand, 
that warnings are only statistically significant in the first sample period (1971 to 1995)
86
, and 
that the advertising restriction score is not statistically significant in any of the samples. 
Although not statistically significant, the coefficients are negative in all samples, which is 
inconsistent with the results Nelson (2003) found in the single equation models. The t-
statistics also decrease over the three samples, indicating that advertising restrictions have 
become less important in determining consumption. Nelson (2003) was unable to reject the 
null hypothesis that advertising bans were exogenous, meaning that advertising bans are 
endogenously determined together with consumption. He concluded that advertising bans and 
restrictions have had no effect on consumption. 
 
The literature described all considered advertising and advertising bans as an influence on 
tobacco consumption through the demand side. However, an alternative theory, developed by 
Tremblay and Tremblay (1999), states that advertising bans have an impact on consumption 
through the supply side, in addition to the demand side. They theorize that advertising bans 
reduce the extent of price competition, thereby increasing prices and reducing consumption. 
They indicate that this hypothesis is supported by empirical investigations in other industries. 
                                                 
84
 This may be the case in high-income countries but it is not the case in most, although not all, low- and 
middle-income countries where consumption is rising. 
85
 Instruments used are male smoking prevalence, female smoking prevalence, healthcare costs, legged tax 
revenue, population older than 65 years and an openness index.  
86
 The other samples used are 1977 to 1995 and 1985 to 1995. 
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Tan (2006) draws the same conclusions using a game theoretic dynamic oligopoly model, 
where firms compete on price and advertising. Declines in advertising, which would result 
from a policy intervention, reduce smoking rates because of higher industry concentration. 
Tan notes that between 1990 and 2000 the concentration in the tobacco industry in the United 
States has increased significantly.
87
 A number of empirical investigations of this hypothesis 
have been performed in the United States. Farr et al. (2001) show that the Fairness Doctrine 
and the Broadcast Advertising Ban reduced consumption and led to increased prices. The 
Fairness Doctrine (1968-1970) required one anti-smoking advertisement to be aired for every 
four pro-smoking advertisements on television and radio, while the Broadcast Advertising 
Ban (since 1971) has banned all cigarette advertisements from television and radio (Tremblay 
and Tremblay, 1999). Farr et al.’s method involves estimating a demand equation and a 
supply relation simultaneously, using aggregate data. Advertising enters both the demand and 
supply sides with advertising expenditure interacting with the various policy dummy 
variables. Iwasaki et al. (2006) shows that, in addition the Fairness Doctrine and the 
Broadcast Advertising Ban, the Master Settlement Agreement in 1998 restricted advertising 
and reduced consumption through price competition. In addition to damages paid, the 
agreement prohibited outdoor advertising, banned the use of cartoon characters to promote 
tobacco and provided funding for antismoking advertising. Iwasaki et al. (2006) follow a 
similar methodology to Farr et al. (2001), estimating demand and supply equations 
simultaneously. 
 
Yet none of this work has been conducted in low- and middle-income countries.
88
 Since a 
large amount of the work relating to the impact of economic interventions on tobacco 
consumption (particularly taxation and price elasticities) has shown significantly different 
results in low- and middle-income countries as opposed to high-income countries, there is no 
reason to suggest that the results of the literature with respect to advertising in high-income 
countries can be generically fitted to low- and middle-income countries. Thus the purpose of 
this study is to quantify the impact of advertising bans on tobacco consumption, paying 
particular attention to low- and middle-income countries. The aim of this chapter is not to test 
the impact of advertising, but rather the impact of advertising bans on aggregate 
consumptions with respect to low- and middle-income countries.  
                                                 
87
 However, market concentration has declined following the Master Settlement Agreement in 1998. 
88
 Blecher (2008a and 2008b) does consider low- and middle-income countries but since this chapter is an 
extension and improvement of Blecher (2008a and 2008b) we do not consider it as part of this review. 
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5.3 METHODS AND DATA 
 
A pooled model regresses the variables of all groups in all periods and implies that the 
estimated coefficients are the same for each group.
89
 Baltagi and Levin (1986) indicate that 
pure cross-sectional studies cannot control for country or group-specific effects, and pure 
time series models cannot control for unobservable (taste) changes over time. Thus they 
argue for pooling, since with this method we can control for both country or group-specific 
effects and changes over time. The pooled model ignores factors specific to each individual 
group and the time series effects are likely to be overpowered by the cross-sectional variation 
(Dunne and Perlo-Freeman, 2003). The pooled model is unable to capture the unobserved or 
immeasurable heterogeneity that may exist between groups (Baltagi et al., 2000), which is 
then observed in the error term. If such heterogeneity exists, the pooled estimator will be 
inconsistent, which is likely, given the vast differences between countries. The pooled 
regression can be formalised by equation 1 below: 
 
ititit uxy           [1] 
 
Where y is the dependent variable, x the independent variable, α and β the estimated 
coefficients, and u the error term, where i=1,…,N  represents the groups and t=1,…,T  the 
time periods. 
 
Panel models attempt to control for unobserved or immeasurable heterogeneity between 
different groups. Since pooled models are inconsistent where differences between groups 
exist, panel models allow one to estimate consistent coefficients. The most common 
technique is the fixed effects model, which allows the intercept to differ across groups, while 
the parameters of the independent variables remain global estimates. The model is 
formalised, as in Dunne and Perlo-Freeman (2003), in equation 2 below: 
 
ititit uxy βα i           [2] 
 
                                                 
89
 In a cross-country study each group is a single country but the term can make reference to any categorical 
grouping in a panel model. I will use the term group and country interchangeably. 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
  138 
The intercept term αi now represents the group-specific effects and removes the unobserved 
heterogeneity from the error term. A two-way fixed effect model, which also controls for 
unobserved heterogeneity between different time periods, is also possible (equation 3). In 
practice, fixed effects panel models are estimated using deviations from the group mean 
rather than the addition of dummy variables for each fixed effect (at the cost of degrees of 
freedom). Only within-group variation is considered, and the between-group variation is 
factored out by the imposition of the fixed effects (Dunne and Perlo-Freeman, 2003). 
 
itittit uxy βα i          [3] 
 
An alternative to the fixed effect model is the random effects model which treats the group-
specific effect as random. The estimated coefficients are often found to lie between the 
simple pooled and fixed effects model, and are sometimes not that dissimilar to the fixed 
effects estimates. Dunne and Perlo-Freeman (2003) indicate that the random effects model 
can be rendered inconsistent due to correlation between the fixed effects and the regressors.
90
 
 
The dataset has been drawn from a number of sources. Price data are sourced from the 
Economist Intelligence Unit’s World Cost of Living Survey. This is the largest dataset that 
includes a significant number of low- and middle-income countries, and that collects annual 
data on the retail prices of cigarettes. Data are collected on a city-wide basis for two different 
brands, an international or imported brand (usually Marlboro) and a locally produced popular 
brand, in two different types of retail stores. I define three price measures, the international 
price (Marlboro), local price and minimum price (the minimum of the international and local 
price). Within each category I also use the cheapest price available in each year and city. The 
suggestion for using the lowest price when using the same dataset is made by Blecher and 
Van Walbeek (2004); they suggest that, in most countries, the cheaper brand would be the 
most popular brand. In many high-income countries there is little difference between the 
prices of the two brands. Where more than one city is surveyed in a particular country, the 
average (unweighted) price is used. Prices are captured in a common currency, United States 
                                                 
90
 The fixed effects and random effects models can be easily compared using a Hausman test. Both fixed effects 
and random effects models were estimated in this chapter, however, Hausman test results consistently indicated 
that the fixed effects models were statistically preferable and thus the random effects results are not presented. 
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dollars, and converted into real terms (constant 2000 prices) using the United States 
Consumer Price Index City Average for All Items (United States Department of Labour).
91
 
 
Consumption data are sourced from the ERC Group and is converted into per capita terms 
using the adult population (aged 15 and older).
92
 The ERC Group, formerly known as the 
European Research Group, is an independent market research organisation that compiles 
annual country level reports on a number of markets, including cigarettes. Population data are 
sourced from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators Database. Income data are 
also sourced from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators Database. Per capita 
Gross Domestic Product in constant 2000 US dollars are used as a proxy of income rather 
than some measure of personal income, since it places a value on free state services and 
transfers (Laugesen and Meads, 1993). Furthermore, GDP is available for a far broader 
cross–section of countries (almost all countries, including low- and middle-income countries) 
than any other measure.
93
 
 
Data on advertising regulations in each country are captured from a number of sources. For 
European nations, the regional office of the World Health Organisation provides an online 
Tobacco Control Database which includes detailed information on each member country (26 
countries). A similar set of data exists for some members of the Pan American Health 
Organisation through the Pan American Tobacco Information Online System. This provided 
data for six countries. This was supplemented by data from the Tobacco Control Country 
Profiles (Shafey et al., 2003) since the Pan American Tobacco Information Online System 
only indicates the current policy and does not indicate the policy that existed previously. 
Fourteen countries that were not included in either of the aforementioned databases were 
surveyed using an online survey of eminent persons in each country. In other countries that 
were not surveyed due to language barriers or other logistical problems a search of both 
editions of Tobacco Control Country Profiles (Shafey et al., 2003; Corrao et al., 2000), the 
Tobacco Atlas (Shafey et al., 2009), MPOWER (World Health Organisation, 2008), the 
                                                 
91
 This is the same data source that was used in Chapter 2. The data are treated and used in the same manner as it 
was in Chapter 2. 
92
 Previous versions of this chapter including that published in the Journal of Health Economics used Tobacco 
Control Country Profiles (Shafey et al., 2003) for the consumption data. However, this source is not complete 
with many missing observations, especially in low-and-middle income countries. Furthermore, the Tobacco 
Control Country Profiles data has not been updated since it was published. 
93
 See Chapter 2 for a thorough discussion of different measures of income and a more detailed justification of 
the use of GDP as a measure of income. 
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Centre for Disease Control’s National Tobacco Information Online System and original 
source documents were employed. In total, data were collected for 68 countries.
94
 A detailed 
appendix of all sources in each country is included. A time series indicating the number of 
media in which advertising was banned in each particular year was constructed for each 
country., Following Saffer and Chaloupka (2000), seven media were considered television: 
radio, outdoor, print, cinema, point-of-sale and sponsorship. 
 
There are a number of methods available for including advertising bans and restrictions in the 
model. The first would simply be to create a discrete and bounded score, similar to Laugesen 
and Meads (1991), where 10 might represent a total ban on all advertising in all media and 0 
an unrestricted market. Alternatively the score would be bounded by 0 and 7 if the seven 
media that Saffer and Chaloupka (2000) classify are used. The Laugesen and Meads (1991) 
method has a distinct disadvantage in that it implies that a point scored for any reason implies 
the same generalised impact as any other. An alternative method is to create dummy variables 
for weak, limited and comprehensive bans as used by Saffer and Chaloupka (2000) where 0, 
1 or 2 bans are considered a weak policy; 3 or 4 bans a limited policy and 5, 6 or 7 bans a 
comprehensive policy. The weakness of this methodology would be the subjective nature of 
the application of a weak, limited or comprehensive ban to a particular country in a particular 
year. A third method would be to include dummy variables for bans and restrictions in 
different categories or media (e.g. television, radio, outdoor, print, cinema, point-of-sale and 
sponsorship) as suggested by High (1999). This solves the problems of the first two methods, 
however, the inclusion of so many dummy variables would require large dimensions of the 
dataset to ensure sufficient degrees of freedom. Furthermore, the use of individual dummies 
for each particular media also removes the ability to examine the interaction between bans in 
different media, or the cumulative effect of a number of bans that the Saffer and Chaoupka 
method allows by measuring the overall impact.  
 
Each method described has particular strengths and weaknesses. Rather than rely on the 
strengths of a single method, I propose the analysis of a number of methods. Firstly, I will 
replicate the Saffer and Chaloupka method. Secondly, I will employ a variation of the Saffer 
and Chaloupka method by conducting a sensitivity analysis on the subjective boundaries to 
                                                 
94
 Data on a further eight countries were collected since price or consumption data were available for them. 
However, for these eight countries, either price or consumption data were not available, thus making formal 
modelling for these countries in a demand framework impossible. However, in the next section I conduct a 
descriptive analysis for which the whole sample is used. 
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ensure that the boundaries themselves do not drive the result. This is done by making the 
Saffer and Chaloupka definition more restrictive and then less restrictive. Under the restricted 
definition, a weak policy includes 0, 1, 2 or 3 bans, a limited policy 4 or 5 bans and a 
comprehensive policy 6 or 7 bans. Under the relaxed definition, a weak policy includes 0 or 1 
bans, a limited policy 2 or 3 bans and a comprehensive policy 4, 5, 6 or 7 bans. Table 5.2 
provides a summary of the categorisation of the regulations based on the number of 
advertising ban dummy variables included in the model. Thirdly, I will follow the suggestion 
of High (1999) but instead of including a separate dummy variable for each media, I will 
include a separate dummy for 1 ban, 2 bans, 3 bans, 4 bans, 5 bans, 6 bans and 7 bans, 
irrespective of which media the bans occur in. In the regressions the base case will be one ban 
and thus this dummy variable will be excluded. Although some information is lost by not 
using the dummies to locate bans in specific media, this graduated bans method will allow 
bans to augment each other and remove the problem of the subjective nature of the weak, 
limited and comprehensive classifications. 
 
Table 5.2: Summary of advertising ban dummies 
 Weak Limited Comprehensive 
Restricted alternative 0, 1, 2, 3 4, 5 6, 7 
Saffer and Chaloupka (2000) 0, 1, 2 3, 4 5, 6, 7 
Relaxed alternative 0, 1 2, 3 4, 5, 6, 7 
 
 
5.4 DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Data on advertising regulations were collected for 76 countries, of which 26 are classified as 
high-income countries according the World Bank in July of 2006 (World Bank, 2006); the 
remaining 50 are classified as low- and middle-income countries.
95
 The analysis of 
advertising regulations covers the period 1990 to 2005. During this period there has been a 
strong trend towards the strengthening of advertising regulations, with many countries 
moving from weak policies to limited and comprehensive policies as defined by Saffer and 
Chaloupka (2000).
96
 In high-income countries this trend has been stable over the entire 
period, while in low- and middle-income countries it has been only been seen in the most 
recent years. 
                                                 
95
 The previous version of this analysis (Blecher, 2008b) included only 51 countries, 21 high-income and 30 
low- and middle-income countries. 68 countries are included in the regression analysis later in the chapter. 
96
 This part of the analysis uses the standard Saffer and Chaloupka (2000) definitions of weak, limited and 
comprehensive policies. 
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In 1990, 65% (17/26) of high-income countries and 90% (45/50) of low- and middle-income 
countries in the sample had weak policies in place and this number has declined to 26% and 
52% (13/50 and 26/50) respectively by 2005. Limited policies are generally not popular and 
could be found in only 8% (2/26) of high-incomes countries in 1990 and in only 2% (1/50) of 
low- and middle-income countries. Countries with limited bans tend to be scarce since they 
are usually countries in transition from a weak to a comprehensive policy. By 2005, the 
number of countries with limited policies had grown to 15% (4/26) of high-income countries 
and 6% (3/50) of low- and middle-income countries. Comprehensive bans were in place in 
27% (7/26) of high-income countries and in only 6% (3/50) of low- and middle-income 
countries in 1990. The number of countries implementing comprehensive advertising bans 
grew considerably to 62% (16/26) of high-income countries and 42% (21/50) of low- and 
middle-income countries by 2005. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 indicate the percentage of countries 
choosing weak, limited and comprehensive advertising bans in high-income and low- and 
middle-income countries, respectively.  
 
Figure 5.1: Advertising bans in high-income countries (n=26) 
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Figure 5.2: Advertising bans in low- and middle-income countries (n=50) 
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Low- and middle-income countries have been slower in taking up more rigorous policies. The 
majority of low- and middle-income countries still have little or even no regulation of 
advertising, while the majority of high-income countries have had comprehensive policies in 
place since 2003. Advertising bans are considered part and parcel of a comprehensive 
tobacco control strategy. Such strategies are not yet as popular in low- and middle-income 
countries as they are in high-income countries. 
 
Consumption varies across countries. High-income countries tend to have significantly higher 
levels of per capita consumption than low- and middle-income countries. Figure 5.3 describes 
the trends in per capita consumption in low- and middle-income and high-income countries 
and shows that there has been a consistent decline in per capita consumption in high-income 
countries between 1990 and 2005. Per capita consumption in low- and middle-income 
countries declined between 1991 and 1993 and has remained flat since. 
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Figure 5.3: Average annual per capita consumption  
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The important question is: what happens to consumption when a country implements a 
stricter policy? Figure 5.4 shows the average annual per capita consumption for countries that 
had weak policies in place in 1990. It indicates three different series for those countries that, 
by 2005, had implemented limited bans, and for those that had implemented comprehensive 
bans. It also includes those that kept weak policies in place over the 1990-2005 period. What 
is immediately noticeable is how countries that changed from weak bans to limited and 
comprehensive bans had higher per capita consumption to begin with relative to those that 
did not change. Countries that implemented limited and comprehensive strategies were most 
often high-income countries and those that kept weak policies in place were typically low- 
and middle-income countries. Furthermore, countries that implemented comprehensive bans 
had consistently declining per capita consumption over the period while countries that kept 
weak bans in place found that per capita consumption remained relatively flat and even 
experienced increases in tobacco consumption. Countries that implemented limited bans 
between 1990 and 2005 saw per capita consumption decline in the early years of the sample 
but rise in the later years (however, this is a small sample of only six countries). It is 
important to consider that countries which implemented more restrictive advertising regimes 
were more likely to have other policies in place that discouraged smoking, such has higher 
taxation and prices, which may affect the results. 
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Figure 5.4: Average annual per capita consumption for countries which in 1990 had 
weak policies 
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This analysis is suggestive of a link between advertising bans and tobacco consumption. 
Countries which implemented comprehensive advertising bans have seen tobacco 
consumption decline, while countries that have maintained weaker policies have seen 
consumption remain stable and in some cases increase. It must be remembered that countries 
that implemented comprehensive bans were also likely to have seen increases in the real 
prices of cigarettes, since both are components of a broader tobacco control strategy. The 
increases in the average real (minimum) prices for those countries in the sample which 
moved from weak or limited in 1990 to comprehensive bans by 2005 was 32.9% between 
1990 and 2005, while those that implemented limited bans from weak bans increased by only 
16.3%. Those that maintained weak policies saw prices increase by 18.4%. This analysis 
suggests a correlation between consumption and advertising bans without any suggestions of 
causation. 
 
Low- and middle-income countries are less likely to implement limited and comprehensive 
bans. Figure 5.5 breaks down low- and middle-income countries into two groups based on the 
status of their policies in the last year of the analysis in 2005 (weak or comprehensive). The 
data indicate declines in per capita consumption in those countries that chose to implement 
comprehensive bans between 1990 and 2005 with the most robust declines occurring between 
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1990 and 2000. At the same time, it shows that per capita consumption in countries that 
maintained weak policies remained flat or even rose slightly during the same period. This 
indicates that, although most low- and middle-income countries maintained weak policy 
regimes, comprehensive bans may play a role in reducing consumption in low- and middle-
income countries as they have in high-income countries.  
 
Figure 5.5: Average annual per capita consumption for low- and middle-income 
countries with weak and comprehensive policies in 2005 
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The figures presented show that high-income countries are more likely to implement 
comprehensive strategies than low- and middle-income countries. Furthermore, per capita 
consumption is declining in high-income countries and this trend has not been shared in low- 
and middle-income countries. It is easy to mistake the trend of declining consumption in the 
high-income countries with increased advertising bans. Yet at the same time there is some 
evidence to suggest that increasing advertising bans occur in countries with declining 
consumption. A more rigorous econometric analysis will now be undertaken. 
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5.5 ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
 
This section estimates the demand for tobacco in order to test the impact of advertising bans 
on consumption. Firstly, a fixed effects model is estimated employing only country-fixed 
effects (one-way model) and then employing both country- and time-fixed effects (two-way 
model). In each case I formally test to see whether the one-way or two-way model is the 
statistically preferred model using a Likelihood Ratio Test. The Likelihood Ratio Test, 
approximated by the Chi-squared distribution, is able to compare two models where one is 
nested in the other – in this case the one-way model is nested in the two-way model. The test 
statistic is calculated as follows: 
 
ealternativnull likelihoodlikelihoodD lnln2       [4] 
 
The degrees of freedom are calculated by difference in the degrees of freedom between the 
null and alternative models. Furthermore, the fixed effects models are also compared to 
random effects models using a Hausman (1978) test. In all cases in this chapter the Hausman 
test indicates that the fixed effects models are always preferred to the random effects models. 
The conventional Likelihood Ratio Test is not appropriate here since the random effects 
model is estimated using generalised least squares and the fixed effects model using 
ordinary least squares. The Hausman test statistic is the ratio of the squared differences 
between the fixed effects and random effects results and the differences between their 
variances; it is formalised by Johnston and Dinardo (1997: 404) below: 
 
FEREREFEFEREH
ˆˆˆˆ 1        [5] 
 
Where RE denotes random effects while FE denotes fixed effects; beta hat is the vector of 
estimated coefficients of the underlying model and sigma the variance. H will be distributed 
asymptotically as Chi-squared. The null hypothesis is that the random effects model is 
consistent and efficient and the alternative that the random effects model is inconsistent (and 
thus that the fixed effect model is consistent). 
 
Sixty-seven countries are included in the model over 16 years (1990 to 2005). The panel is 
not balanced since observations are missing for some countries in some years due to 
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unavailable data.
97
 The model is estimated in natural logarithms to allow for interpretation of 
the coefficients as elasticities and is formalised by equation 6 below: 
 
ititititittiit CompDLimDYPC )()(lnlnln 4321    [6] 
 
Where C represents per capita consumption, P real prices, Y real per capita income, D(Lim) 
and D(Comp) represent the dummy variables for limited and comprehensive bans, 
respectively; weak bans are the base case; the subscript it refers to country i and time period t. 
The fixed effects are denoted by αi and αt. 
 
I estimate the model in equation 6 using the three price measures (minimum, local and 
international) and three measures of weak, limited and comprehensive advertising ban 
variations (the base as well as the restricted and relaxed alternatives). The results are shown 
for all countries in Table 5.3 and for low- and middle-income countries only in Table 5.4. 
 
When considering the models including all countries, the one-way fixed effects models are 
preferred to the pooled models with no fixed effects for all variations of price and advertising 
bans. I used a Likelihood Ratio Test to compare the models; the test statistics are shown in 
Table 5.5. Subsequently, I also compared the two-way fixed effects to the one-way fixed 
effects model, also using a Chi-squared statistic, and found that the two-way fixed effects 
models are preferred to the one-way model for all variations of price and advertising bans. 
These tests are also shown in Table 5.5. Thus the results in Table 5.3 only refer to the two-
way fixed effects model, which is the preferred model. For completeness, I also compare the 
two-way fixed effects model to the pooled model and confirm that the two-way fixed effects 
models are preferred. 
 
When considering the models including only low- and middle-income countries, I find that 
the one-way fixed effects models are also preferred to the basic pooled model. The test results 
are also shown in Table 5.5. However, when I compare the two-way model to the one-way 
model, I find that the two-way model is not preferred for all variations. Thus Table 5.4 
includes only the results from the one-way fixed effects models and not the two-way fixed 
effects model, as in Table 5.3.  
                                                 
97
 The missing data occurs in the price series since not all countries were included in the Economist Intelligence 
Unit series in 1990. There are also some individual observations missing from seemingly random years. 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
  149 
Table 5.3: Regression results for all countries including group and time fixed effects 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Minimum price -0.159*** 
(0.020) 
-8.180 
-0.163*** 
(0.019) 
-8.370 
-0.160*** 
(0.019) 
-8.234 
      
Local price    -0.204*** 
(0.022) 
-9.411 
-0.209*** 
(0.022) 
-9.642 
-0.205*** 
(0.022) 
-9.441 
   
International price       -0.139*** 
(0.023) 
-6.135 
-0.138*** 
(0.023) 
-6.073 
-0.139*** 
(0.023) 
-6.135 
Income 0.435*** 
(0.063) 
6.865 
0.447*** 
(0.063) 
7.067 
0.441*** 
(0.064) 
6.929 
0.421*** 
(0.064) 
6.554 
0.436*** 
(0.064) 
6.801 
0.430*** 
(0.066) 
6.664 
0.444*** 
(0.065) 
6.885 
0.448*** 
(0.064) 
6.943 
0.447*** 
(0.065) 
6.901 
Limited ban 
Restricted definition 
-0.081*** 
(0.031) 
-2.655 
  -0.082*** 
(0.030) 
-2.732 
  -0.085*** 
(0.031) 
-2.752 
  
Limited ban 
Standard definition 
 -0.090*** 
(0.033) 
-2.708 
  -0.096*** 
(0.032) 
-2.959 
  -0.062* 
(0.034) 
-1.853 
 
Limited ban 
Relaxed definition 
  0.032 
(0.030) 
1.076 
  0.023 
(0.030) 
0.775 
  0.038 
(0.030) 
1.260 
Comprehensive ban 
Restricted definition 
-0.074*** 
(0.028) 
-2.599 
  -0.068** 
(0.028) 
-2.424 
  -0.078*** 
(0.027) 
-2.714 
  
Comprehensive ban 
Standard definition 
 -0.090*** 
(0.026) 
-3.414 
  -0.088*** 
(0.026) 
-3.407 
  -0.089*** 
(0.027) 
-3.316 
 
Comprehensive ban 
Relaxed definition 
  -0.067** 
(0.027) 
-2.519 
  0.069*** 
(0.026) 
-2.631 
  -0.065** 
(0.027) 
6.254 
Constant 3.449*** 
(0.530) 
6.541 
3.360*** 
(0.528) 
6.361 
3.393*** 
(0.531) 
6.389 
3.576*** 
(0.536) 
6.674 
3.467*** 
(0.534) 
6.495 
3.500*** 
(0.538) 
6.510 
3.411*** 
(0.538) 
6.341 
3.387*** 
(0.538) 
6.298 
3.377*** 
(0.540) 
6.254 
n 1031 1031 1031 985 985 985 1029 1029 1029 
R
2
 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.95 0.95 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis, t-statistics below parenthesis. 
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Table 5.4: Regression results for low- and middle-income countries including only group fixed effects 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Minimum price -0.112*** 
(0.024) 
-4.660 
-0.116*** 
(0.024) 
-4.753 
-0.115*** 
(0.024) 
-4.765 
   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Local price    -0.140*** 
(0.027)  
-5.219 
-0.146*** 
(0.027) 
-5.346 
-0.143*** 
(0.027) 
-5.320 
   
International price       -0.018 
(0.029) 
-0.620 
-0.017 
(0.029) 
-0.598 
-0.016 
(0.029) 
-0.546 
Income 0.243*** 
(0.066) 
3.684 
0.226*** 
(0.065) 
3.482 
0.247*** 
(0.066) 
3.712 
0.236*** 
(0.067) 
3.533 
0.221*** 
(0.066) 
3.364 
0.243*** 
(0.068) 
3.598 
0.245*** 
(0.068) 
3.616 
0.219*** 
(0.067) 
3.285 
0.242*** 
(0.068) 
3.536 
Limited ban 
Restricted definition 
-0.170*** 
(0.044) 
-3.865 
  -0.168*** 
(0.044) 
-3.827 
  -0.180*** 
(0.045) 
-4.002 
  
Limited ban  
Standard definition 
 -0.092* 
(0.056) 
-1.644 
  -0.104* 
(0.056) 
-1.858 
  -0.054 
(0.057) 
-0.947 
 
Limited ban 
Relaxed definition 
  0.030 
(0.050) 
0.590 
  0.025 
(0.054) 
0.463 
  0.051 
(0.052) 
0.982 
Comprehensive ban 
Restricted definition 
-0.207*** 
(0.042) 
-4.880 
  -0.205*** 
(0.043) 
-4.770 
  -0.224*** 
(0.043) 
-5.200 
  
Comprehensive ban 
Standard definition 
 -0.201*** 
(0.037) 
-5.407 
  -0.200*** 
(0.037) 
-5.341 
  -0.210*** 
(0.038) 
-5.544 
 
Comprehensive ban 
Relaxed definition 
  -0.186*** 
(0.037) 
-5.020 
  -0.186*** 
(0.038) 
-4.949 
  -0.190*** 
(0.038) 
-5.016 
Constant       
 
 
   
n 620 620 620 602 602 602 618 618 618 
R
2
 0.953 0.953 0.953 0.954 0.954 0.954 0.951 0.951 0.951 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis, t-statistics below parenthesis. 
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Table 5.5: Model selection test results 
Countries Price variable Advertising 
bans 
Table Model One-way fixed effects 
versus pooled 
Two-way fixed effects 
versus pooled 
Two-way fixed effects 
versus one-way fixed 
effects 
     χ2 df P-stat χ2 df P-stat χ2 df P-stat 
All Minimum Restricted 5.3 1 3046.442 66 0.000 3138.570 82 0.000 92.128 15 0.000 
All Minimum Standard 5.3 2 3042.336 66 0.000 3125.028 82 0.000 82.692 15 0.000 
All Minimum Relaxed 5.3 3 2949.512 66 0.000 3040.450 82 0.000 90.938 15 0.000 
All Local Restricted 5.3 4 2999.993 66 0.000 3087.020 82 0.000 87.027 15 0.000 
All Local Standard 5.3 5 2998.658 66 0.000 3075.080 82 0.000 76.422 15 0.000 
All Local Relaxed 5.3 6 2906.192 66 0.000 2989.429 82 0.000 83.237 15 0.000 
All International Restricted 5.3 7 2992.013 66 0.000 3100.394 82 0.000 108.381 15 0.000 
All International Standard 5.3 8 2987.788 66 0.000 3088.005 82 0.000 100.217 15 0.000 
All International Relaxed 5.3 9 2893.879 66 0.000 3003.068 82 0.000 109.189 15 0.000 
LMIC Minimum Restricted 5.4 1 1913.907 40 0.000 1928.614 56 0.000 14.707 15 0.473 
LMIC Minimum Standard 5.4 2 1889.309 40 0.000 1903.833 56 0.000 14.524 15 0.486 
LMIC Minimum Relaxed 5.4 3 1881.016 40 0.000 1895.511 56 0.000 14.495 15 0.488 
LMIC Local Restricted 5.4 4 1872.631 40 0.000 1892.269 56 0.000 19.637 15 0.186 
LMIC Local Standard 5.4 5 1848.098 40 0.000 1867.479 56 0.000 19.381 15 0.197 
LMIC Local Relaxed 5.4 6 1842.644 40 0.000 1861.693 56 0.000 19.049 15 0.212 
LMIC International Restricted 5.4 7 1881.064 40 0.000 1897.949 56 0.000 16.884 15 0.326 
LMIC International Standard 5.4 8 1857.347 40 0.000 1874.249 56 0.000 16.902 15 0.325 
LMIC International Relaxed 5.4 9 1850.271 40 0.000 1867.087 56 0.000 16.817 15 0.330 
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When considering the models including all countries (Table 5.3), I find negative and 
statistically significant price elasticities of demand for all specifications of equation 6. 
The price elasticities differ between the three price specifications, but not between the 
different specifications of the advertising bans. The price elasticities are -0.16 for the 
minimum price (models 1, 2 and 3), range between -0.20 and -0.21 for the local price 
(models 4, 5 and 6) and are -0.14 for the international (Marlboro) price (models 7, 8 and 
9). The magnitudes of the income elasticities are positive and statistically significant in 
all specifications and range between 0.42 and 0.45 without significant variation between 
price and advertising ban measures. When using the standard definitions of the 
advertising bans, i.e. those defined by Saffer and Chaloupka (2001) for models 2, 5 and 8, 
I find that the effect of both the limited and comprehensive advertising bans are negative 
and statistically significant in all specifications of price.  
 
The magnitudes of the limited advertising bans range between -0.06 and -0.10 and 
comprehensive advertising bans are -0.09; the three are not significantly different from 
each other. The advertising ban coefficients are interpreted as autonomous shift 
elasticities, meaning that the application of the ban results in a 6% to 10% decline in per 
capita consumption in a country and year when a limited ban is implemented, and a 9% 
decline when a comprehensive advertising ban is implemented. The stricter application of 
the advertising bans in models 1, 4 and 7 makes it more difficult to be considered 
comprehensive; I again find that both the limited and comprehensive advertising bans are 
negative and statistically significant in all specifications of price. The magnitudes of the 
limited advertising bans’ range between -0.08 and -0.09 and the comprehensive 
advertising bans’ range between -0.07 and -0.08 and are not significantly different from 
each other. When considering the weaker application of the advertising bans for models 
3, 6 and 9 (i.e. making it easier to be considered comprehensive), I find that the 
comprehensive advertising bans remain negative and statistically significant at -0.07; 
however, the limited advertising bans are no longer statistically significant. With the 
exception of the limited advertising ban, in the weaker application of the bans, the models 
are relatively robust to variations in the price variable and the definition of the advertising 
bans.  
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The model is then re-estimated, this time including only low- and middle-income 
countries. Forty-one countries are included in the model over 16 years (1990 to 2005). 
The panel is not balanced since observations are missing for some countries in some 
years due to unavailable data. Again three models were estimated, a pooled model 
including no fixed effects, and one- and two-way fixed effects models. As indicated 
previously, the one-way fixed effects models are preferred and are shown in Table 5.4. 
 
Negative and statistically significant price elasticities of demand are estimated for the 
minimum and local prices, but not the international (Marlboro) price, which is negative 
but not statistically significant. The price elasticities differ between the three price 
specifications, but not between the different specifications of the advertising bans. The 
price elasticities range between -0.11 and -0.12 for the minimum price (models 1, 2 and 
3), -0.14 and -0.15 for the local price (models 4, 5 and 6) and are -0.02 for the 
international (Marlboro) price (models 7, 8 and 9).  
 
The magnitudes of the income elasticities are positive and statistically significant in all 
specifications and range between 0.22 and 0.25 without significant variation between 
price and advertising ban measures. When using the standard definitions of the 
advertising bans in models 2, 5 and 8, I find that the comprehensive advertising ban is 
negative and statistically significant in all specifications of price. The limited advertising 
bans are negative in all specifications of price but only statistically significant using the 
minimum and local prices (models 2 and 5).  
 
The magnitudes of the comprehensive advertising bans range between -0.20 and -0.21 
and are significantly higher (in absolute terms) than the magnitudes of the limited 
advertising bans, which range between -0.09 and -0.10 where statistically significant. 
When considering the stricter application of the advertising bans in models 1, 4 and 7 (i.e. 
making it more difficult to be considered comprehensive), I find that both the limited and 
comprehensive advertising bans are negative and statistically significant in all 
specifications of price. The absolute magnitudes of the comprehensive advertising bans 
range  between -0.21 and -0.22 and are greater (in absolute terms) than the magnitudes of 
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the limited advertising bans, ranging between -0.17 and -0.18, in all specifications of 
price (although this difference is not statistically significant).  
 
When considering the application of the relaxed advertising bans in models 3, 6 and 9 
(i.e. making it easier to be considered comprehensive), I find that the comprehensive 
advertising bans are negative (-0.19 in magnitude) and statistically significant in all 
specifications of price; however, the limited advertising bans are no longer statistically 
significant in any specifications. Again, with the exception of the limited advertising ban 
in the weaker application of the bans and, additionally, with the exception of the lack of 
statistical significance of the international (Marlboro) price measure, the models are 
relatively robust to variations in the price variable and the definition of the advertising 
bans. 
 
The third method of accounting for advertising bans allows for easy interpretation by 
presenting the coefficients of the graduated ban dummy variables graphically. 
Regressions similar to the ones above are performed and include price and income as 
independent variables, along with the dummy variables for 1 ban, 2 bans, 3 bans, 4 bans, 
5 bans, 6 bans and 7 bans (no bans is the base case). The two-way fixed effects model 
that includes country and time-period fixed effects is used for the model including all 
countries (Figure 5.6) and the one-way fixed effects model (including only country-level 
fixed effects) is used for the model including only low- and middle-income countries 
(Figure 5.7) in order to remain consistent with the estimates presented in Tables 5.3 and 
5.4.  
 
When considering all countries, only the dummy variables on the 3
rd
, 4
th
, 5
th
 and 7
th
 bans 
are negative. Furthermore, only the coefficients on the 1
st
, 2
nd
 and 7
th
 dummy variables 
are statistically significant. These results are consistent across all three price measures. 
The most important result is the trend: generally as one adds more advertising bans 
consumption falls as indicated by the declining trend in the magnitudes of the dummy 
variables. This trend is even more evident and pronounced when considering only low- 
and middle-income countries (see Figure 5.7). Although the dummy variables for 1
st
, 2
nd
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and 3
rd
 bans are positive (only the first two are statistically significant, and the third is 
only statistically significant when using the international price), the coefficients of the 
dummy variables for the fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh ban are negative (the 5
th
, 6
th
 and 
7
th
 bans and also statically significant). Furthermore, the magnitudes become greater, in 
absolute terms, as more bans are added, indicating that successively more bans have a 
greater impact in reducing consumption. Furthermore, the results support the results of 
the models in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 indicating that advertising bans have a greater impact on 
reducing consumption in low- and middle-income countries relative to high-income 
countries, since the absolute magnitude of the coefficients in Figure 5.7 is greater than 
those in Figure 5.6. Furthermore, they support the results in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 by 
reducing the reliance on the subjective categorisation of the advertising bans. 
 
Figure 5.6: Coefficients of graduated advertising ban dummy variables for all 
countries 
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Note: Includes country and time-period fixed effects. The horizontal axis shows the number of bans out of 
a total of seven. 
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Figure 5.7: Coefficients of graduated advertising ban dummy variables for low- and 
middle-income countries 
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Note: Includes only country-fixed effects. The horizontal axis shows the number of bans out of a total of 
seven. 
 
 
5.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter attempts to estimate the impact of advertising bans on tobacco consumption 
by estimating a number of cross-sectional time series models. Generally it was found that 
cigarettes are price inelastic and normal goods with mostly statistically significant 
coefficients on price and statistically significant coefficients on income. This is consistent 
with our expectations. Advertising bans were generally found to have negative and 
statistically significant impact on consumption, especially for low- and middle-income 
countries.  
 
The models estimated in this chapter have provided a number of innovations. Firstly, the 
chapter includes a significant number of low- and middle-income countries in the sample 
and is the first study to focus attention on the impact of advertising bans in this context. 
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Secondly, a number of improvements are made to the manner in which advertising bans 
are accounted for in the model. The Saffer and Chaloupka (2001) method of classifying 
bans as either weak, limited or comprehensive is used as a base, but a sensitivity analysis 
of this method is also employed. In addition to the Saffer and Chaloupka method a 
“graduated ban” method is used to remove the subjectivity of weak, limited and 
comprehensive bans but to still allow bans in different media to augment each other. 
Thirdly, three measures of price are included in the model. 
 
The different definitions of price have little impact on the results of the advertising bans. 
However, the sensitivity analysis of the advertising bans does provide some interesting 
results. The standard Saffer and Chaloupka definitions show that limited and 
comprehensive advertising bans are negative and significant—but the magnitudes of the 
limited and comprehensive advertising bans are not statistically different from each other 
in the model including all countries. However, the magnitude of the comprehensive 
advertising ban is similar to that of Saffer and Chaloupka’s (2001) findings (-9% in this 
chapter versus -7%). When looking only at low- and middle-income countries using the 
Saffer and Chaloupka definitions, we find that comprehensive bans are significantly 
stronger than limited bans in reducing consumption; this is consistent with the findings of 
Saffer and Chaloupka (2001). When the definitions of the advertising bans are restricted, 
the results of the models including all-countries remain similar. However, this is not the 
case for low- and middle-income countries, where the limited and comprehensive 
advertising ban dummies are now of a similar magnitude. Many countries which were 
previously classified as having limited or comprehensive advertising bans are now 
classified as having weak or limited advertising bans. The coefficients of the limited 
advertising bans have higher t-statistics in absolute terms, whereas the coefficients of the 
comprehensive bans have lower t-statistics in absolute terms relative to the base scenario.  
 
When the definitions of the advertising bans are relaxed, many countries which were 
previously classified as having weak or limited advertising bans are now classified as 
having limited or comprehensive advertising bans. Results for both the all-countries 
model and the low- and middle-income country models are now consistent with the 
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results of Saffer and Chaloupka (2001), where only comprehensive advertising bans play 
a role in reducing consumption. The results indicate that the boundaries make a 
difference to the results. However, the boundaries chosen by Saffer and Chaloupka 
(2001) were, to some extent, endogenous.  
 
The graduated bans remove the subjectivity while still supporting the conclusions of the 
other methods by indicating that adding more advertising bans reduces consumption. 
Furthermore, a small number of advertising bans does little to reduce consumption. It 
also supports the notion that advertising bans are more effective in reducing consumption 
in low- and middle-income countries. 
 
The results are consistent with those found in the literature. They are supportive of the 
results of Saffer and Chaloupka (2000) in particular since we find that comprehensive 
advertising bans are more effective in reducing consumption than are limited advertising 
bans (although in only one definition in the all-countries models and two definitions in 
the low- and middle-income countries models). When including all countries in the 
model, I find that comprehensive advertising bans result in a 6.5% to 9.0% reduction in 
per capita consumption while in low- and middle-income countries I find that 
comprehensive advertising bans result in a 18.6% to 22.4% reduction in per capita 
consumption (depending on the specification used). The graduated bans models indicate 
that a complete advertising ban (a ban in all seven media) reduces consumption by 11.1% 
to 14.2% in all countries and 15.7% to 19.0% in low- and middle-income countries 
(relative to advertising bans in no media). 
 
An interesting question arises: why should advertising bans have such a large impact on 
consumption in low- and middle-income countries relative to the entire sample? The 
literature indicates that the impact of price changes has a larger impact on consumption in 
low- and middle-income countries vis-à-vis high-income countries. Van Walbeek (2005: 
80) indicates that “the consensus view is that the price elasticity of demand is around -0.4 
for developed countries and between -0.4 and -0.8 for developing countries”. 
Furthermore, changes in income may also have a greater impact on consumption in low- 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
  159 
and middle-income countries than high-income countries (see IARC, 2011). It seems that 
the demand for tobacco is more sensitive to its determinants in low- and middle-income 
countries relative to high-income countries. Thus, consumers are possibly more sensitive 
to demand-side interventions, whether it be price or non-price measures including 
advertising bans, public smoking bans and social factors.  
 
There are a number of reasons for this greater sensitivity; firstly, the price of cigarettes 
takes up a greater portion of a consumer’s income in low- and middle-income countries 
than it does in high-income countries (Blecher and Van Walbeek, 2004). As a result, an 
increase in price has a relatively greater impact on a person’s budget. Furthermore, 
consumers in poorer countries are likely to have lower levels of education and would 
have a poorer understanding of the health consequences of smoking. Thus the impact of 
advertising may be stronger in low- and middle-income countries since a greater number 
of smokers are enticed by advertising due to the poorer understanding of the health 
consequences.  
 
A second hypothesis surrounds the age profile of low- and middle-income countries 
relative to high-income countries. The population of low- and middle-income countries 
is, on average, younger than that of high-income countries, and advertising might have a 
greater impact on encouraging younger people to initiate smoking (see US Department of 
Health and Human Services, 1994; National Cancer Institute, 2001). Thus, banning 
advertising may reduce initiation rates more significantly in low- and middle-income 
countries relative to high-income countries.  
 
This study provides an important ratification of prior literature as well as extending the 
validity of its conclusions to include a larger set of countries, particularly low- and 
middle-income countries. The study has used several innovations and thus makes 
considerable improvements on the prior literature. Yet the study does suffer from some 
limitations and drawbacks. Firstly, the dataset is not as robust as one would wish it to be. 
Data on prices, consumption and advertising bans all suffer from one weakness or 
another. The price data is of a specific price rather than the average price paid, although I 
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attempt to mitigate this risk by using three specifications of price. The results of the 
advertising ban variables are not sensitive to the choice of price specification. The dataset 
on advertising bans is complete, although it is not necessarily as consistent as one might 
like since it is compiled from a number of different sources. Finally, the sample covers a 
period 1990-2006 and as a result does not include the implementation of advertising bans 
in a number of countries which implemented comprehensive bans on advertising prior to 
1990. 
 
Furthermore, the chapter, along with the prior literature, only considers static models. 
Static models—which specify an econometric model where consumption is a function of 
price and income—are unable to account for the addictive nature of tobacco use. Most 
studies which use aggregate data make use of an econometric specification that accounts 
for the addictive nature of tobacco use, using either the myopic addiction model or the 
rational addiction model. These models include past consumption or both past and future 
consumption in the econometric specification to account for addiction. However, as 
Hsiao (2003) indicates, the fixed and random effects estimators are not always 
appropriate when considering dynamics within a panel model.
98
 A number of dynamic 
panel estimators exist, but the complexity of them has not made them popular tools.  
                                                 
98
 He also indicates that the implications of the estimation are also different to those considered when a 
static model is used. Hsiao (2003) says that when a static model is considered, the primary focus on 
whether or not to choose a fixed or random effects model relates to the efficiency of the estimates and the 
independence between the regressors and the effects. When the independent variables are strictly 
exogenous, the fixed-effects assumption gives us a best linear unbiased estimate and a consistent and 
unbiased estimate under the random-effects assumption, even though not an efficient one if the time period 
is fixed. The ordinary least squares estimator of the fixed effects model does not suffer any bias due to the 
omission of individual attributes that are correlated with the exogenous independent variables, since their 
effects have been differenced out. Yet, when a random effects model is estimated using generalised least 
squares it will be biased if the same occurs. In a static model, if the independent variables are correlated 
with the effects, a random effects model that is correctly formulated will lead to the same estimates as the 
fixed effects model. Hsiao (2003) indicates that this is why the fixed effects model has assumed so much 
importance in the literature.  
However, when a lagged dependent variable is included as an independent variable, strict exogeneity of the 
regressors no longer holds. Thus the ordinary least squares estimate of the fixed effects model is no longer 
consistent in a panel with a large number of groups and short time-series. The generalised least squares 
estimate of the random effects model also poses some problems and the consistency depends on the way 
that the number of groups and time periods tend to infinity. Thus the use of either the fixed or random 
effects is not appropriate, and other techniques, such as instrumental variable techniques, which can treat 
the lagged dependent variable as endogenous, have been proposed. It has also been argued that as the time 
period grows the bias in the lagged dependent variable shrinks, and that as the time period under 
consideration grows to infinity, the fixed and random effects estimators become consistent.  
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Not only is the decision whether or not to pool of importance, but how to deal with 
pooling is also an essential question. Baltagi and Levin (2000: 117) indicate that there is 
controversy about which pooled estimator “yields the most plausible estimator”. In this 
chapter, models estimated using the fixed effects estimator assume homogeneity, since 
the intercept varies by group (country), but the estimated parameters are global estimates. 
The prior literature (Laugesen and Meads, 1991; Stewart, 1993b; Saffer and Chaloupka, 
2000; and Nelson, 2003) also assumes homogeneity. A growing literature now prefers a 
heterogeneous estimator (see Robertson and Symonds, 1992; Pesaran and Smith, 1995; 
and Maddala et al., 1994 for examples). However, Baltagi et al. (2000) prefer the 
homogenous estimators, although this is for state level data in the United States. 
Individual states surely have more in common than individual countries, especially a very 
diverse group of countries. In simple terms, South Africa and Nigeria are very different to 
the United States and the United Kingdom. While it was recognised that pooling provided 
better estimates than cross-sections or time series models by themselves, the most 
appropriate method of pooling is not always clear. Smith and Fuertes (2004), Baltagi 
(2008) and Hsiao and Pesaran (2007) provide more comprehensive reviews of the 
heterogeneity issues. Furthermore, heterogonous estimators, like the random coefficients 
model, do not suffer from the same problems as the traditional pooled estimators when 
considering dynamic specifications. 
 
A final consideration is that of the endogeneity of advertising bans. Nelson (2003) 
proposes that advertising bans are only implemented once tobacco consumption and 
smoking prevalence have fallen enough to provide the political space for policy to be 
implemented. Although he finds empirical support for this, his sample is exclusively in 
high-income countries. As Figure 5.3 shows, consumption is not falling in low- and 
middle-income countries. In fact consumption and prevalence is rising in many low- and 
middle-income countries (see Chapter 1). Even if advertising bans are endogenous in 
high-income countries there is no reason to believe that this is the case in low- and 
middle-income countries. However, I am unable to test this empirically. The empirical 
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test for endogeneity is to employ a two-stage model where advertising bans are 
instrumented by smoking prevalence in the first stage. Nelson (2003) uses male smoking 
prevalence, female smoking prevalence, healthcare costs, lagged tax revenue, the 
population older than 65 years and an openness index. If advertising bans are endogenous 
we should find that smoking prevalence (at least amongst males) has a negative and 
statistically significant effect on advertising bans in the first stage. In low- and middle-
income countries this technique creates an insurmountable challenge since smoking 
prevalence data are not widely available and time series on smoking prevalence in 
individual countries is almost non-existent. Generally, the driver for implementation of 
advertising bans in low- and middle-income countries has been the “exogenous” policy 
recommendations of international institutions, especially Article 13 of the Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control. 
 
Future literature will, it is hoped, address both these econometric issues: estimating 
models that take into account the addictive nature of cigarettes, as well as the potential 
heterogeneity in a diverse sample of countries. 
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APPENDIX E: DATA SOURCES 
 
Table E1: Sources of information on advertising bans in individual countries 
Country Source 
Argentina  Survey 
Australia  TCCP; Acts of parliament 
Austria  WHO Regional Office for Europe Tobacco Control Database 
Azerbaijan WHO Regional Office for Europe Tobacco Control Database 
Bangladesh  Survey 
Belgium  WHO Regional Office for Europe Tobacco Control Database 
Brazil Survey; MPOWER; TCCP 
Bulgaria WHO Regional Office for Europe Tobacco Control Database 
Canada Survey 
Chile  Pan American Health Organisation PATIOS Database; TCCP 
China  Survey 
Colombia  Pan American Health Organisation PATIOS Database; TCCP 
Costa Rica Pan American Health Organisation PATIOS Database 
Croatia WHO Regional Office for Europe Tobacco Control Database 
Czech Republic WHO Regional Office for Europe Tobacco Control Database 
Denmark  WHO Regional Office for Europe Tobacco Control Database 
Ecuador  Pan American Health Organisation PATIOS Database; TCCP 
Egypt Survey 
Finland  WHO Regional Office for Europe Tobacco Control Database 
France  WHO Regional Office for Europe Tobacco Control Database 
Germany  WHO Regional Office for Europe Tobacco Control Database 
Greece  WHO Regional Office for Europe Tobacco Control Database 
Guatemala  Pan American Health Organisation PATIOS Database; TCCP 
Holland  WHO Regional Office for Europe Tobacco Control Database 
Hungary  WHO Regional Office for Europe Tobacco Control Database 
India  Survey 
Indonesia  TCCP; NATIONS 
Iran  TCCP; NATIONS; World Health Organisation (Undated) 
Ireland  WHO Regional Office for Europe Tobacco Control Database 
Israel  WHO Regional Office for Europe Tobacco Control Database 
Italy  WHO Regional Office for Europe Tobacco Control Database 
Ivory Coast TCCP 
Japan MPOWER; TCCP 
Jordan TCCP 
Kenya  TCCP; Acts of parliament 
Kuwait MPOWER; TCCP 
Malaysia  Survey 
Mexico  Survey 
Morocco MPOWER; TCCP 
New Zealand  Survey 
Nigeria  TCCP; NATIONS 
Norway  WHO Regional Office for Europe Tobacco Control Database 
Pakistan  TCCP; NATIONS 
Panama  Pan American Health Organisation PATIOS Database; TCCP 
Paraguay  TCCP; Acts of parliament 
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Country Source 
Peru  Pan American Health Organisation PATIOS Database; TCCP 
Philippines TCCP 
Poland  WHO Regional Office for Europe Tobacco Control Database 
Portugal  WHO Regional Office for Europe Tobacco Control Database 
Romania TCCP 
Russia  WHO Regional Office for Europe Tobacco Control Database 
Saudi Arabia Tobacco Atlas; TCCP 
Senegal  TCCP; NATIONS; Acts of parliament 
Serbia and Montenegro WHO Regional Office for Europe Tobacco Control Database 
Singapore TCCP 
South Africa  Survey 
Spain  WHO Regional Office for Europe Tobacco Control Database 
Sweden  WHO Regional Office for Europe Tobacco Control Database 
Switzerland  WHO Regional Office for Europe Tobacco Control Database 
Thailand  Survey 
Tunisia  TCCP; Survey 
Turkey  WHO Regional Office for Europe Tobacco Control Database 
United Arab Emirates TCCP 
United Kingdom  WHO Regional Office for Europe Tobacco Control Database 
United States  TCCP; NATIONS; Nelson (2003) 
Uruguay  Survey 
Vietnam Tobacco Atlas; TCCP 
Zimbabwe Survey; TCCP 
Note: The names and details of the persons surveyed are available on request from the author. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
This thesis has provided an analysis of three important issues in tobacco control in low- 
and middle-income countries, namely: (1) affordability, (2) the illicit trade in cigarettes 
and (3) the impact of advertising bans on tobacco consumption. Two chapters have 
provided a global view, while two chapters have used the case study of South Africa to 
provide the analysis. In this context, South Africa is an important country, since it is a 
middle-income country that has embarked on a tobacco control strategy that is well- 
known and well-documented. Tobacco consumption and smoking prevalence are rising 
rapidly in low- and middle-income countries, and interventions are required to arrest and 
reverse this trend. These interventions tend to be economic in nature and global best 
practices have been developed in order to assist policy makers in implementing effective 
tobacco control policies. The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control and the World 
Health Organisation’s “MPOWER Strategy” have provided formal frameworks, while the 
World Bank publication, Curbing the Epidemic,  provided an earlier framework. This is 
in addition to many other formal and informal frameworks on regional and global levels. 
 
Chapter 2 provided a thorough review of previous attempts to develop methods to 
examine the affordability of cigarettes across countries and over time. Affordability has 
emerged as an important metric to asses tax and price policies, since many low- and 
middle-income countries are experiencing rapid economic growth that is making 
cigarettes more affordable to consumers. Furthermore, the chapter considers which 
measures are the most appropriate in different contexts and explores the advantages and 
disadvantages of the various methods. It concludes that although the minutes of labour 
method, developed by Guindon et al. (2002), does provide an easy-to-understand metric, 
it is unable to provide estimates for a large cross section of countries, particularly low- 
and middle-income countries. Furthermore, it is only able to estimate affordability at 
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discrete points in time. The relative income price method, first proposed by Blecher and 
Van Walbeek (2004), is able to provide long and consistent time-series estimates for the 
largest group of countries, including a considerable number of low- and middle-income 
countries. However, this metric is more difficult to understand and interpret.  
 
The chapter also examines the trends in affordability over time and concludes that, since 
1990, cigarettes have become less affordable in high-income countries and more 
affordable in low- and middle-income counties, at an increasing rate in the 2000s. What 
drives these changes in affordability is especially important from a tobacco control 
perspective since it is a deliberate policy intervention (i.e. raising taxes) that is most 
likely to result in declining affordability. In those countries where affordability has 
declined, it was shown that increases in prices outweighed increases in incomes. In a very 
small number of countries economic shocks resulted in declining incomes which made 
cigarettes less affordable. Of those countries where cigarettes became more affordable 
incomes generally outgrew prices. This is of concern as an outcome since many low- and 
middle-income countries will continue to experience rapid economic growth which will 
make cigarettes more affordable in the future, unless governments take deliberate action 
to make cigarettes less affordable through increases in taxation.  
 
Until recently, tax policy prescriptions and guidelines said little about affordability. The 
World Bank’s seminal publication Curbing the Epidemic (Jha and Chaloupka, 1999) said 
nothing about affordability. Instead it suggested that “[the] strategy, tailored to individual 
country needs, would include: (1) raising taxes, using as a yardstick the rates adopted by 
countries with comprehensive tobacco control policies where consumption has fallen. In 
these counties, tax accounts for two-thirds to four-fifths of the retail price of cigarettes”. 
The World Health Organization’s “MPOWER Strategy” in 2008 (World Health 
Organisation, 2008) argued that “[increasing] the price of tobacco through higher taxes is 
the single most effective way to decrease consumption and encourage tobacco users to 
quit”, again paying no attention to rising incomes as a threat to tobacco control and public 
health. Article 6 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control also ignores the 
issue: “The Parties recognize that price and tax measures are an effective and important 
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means of reducing tobacco consumption”. The tobacco control community’s view was no 
different. The declaration of the 14
th
 World Conference on Tobacco or Health in 2009 
said nothing about affordability instead declaring that “[by] 2012, 80% of the countries 
would have raised tobacco taxes to over 60% of the retail price”. 
 
More recently, most likely as a result of the growing literature focusing on the 
affordability of cigarettes, international best practices have begun to focus less on price as 
the explicit metric, but rather on affordability. The updated 2009 version of the World 
Health Organisation’s “MPOWER Strategy” (World Health Organization, 2009: 56) 
indicates that “[cigarettes] should become less affordable over time to reduce 
consumption”. In addition to this strategy, the recent World Health Organisation 
Technical Manual on Tobacco Tax Administration (World Health Organisation, 2010: 
99) also focuses on affordability as an explicit policy measure, especially in low- and 
middle-income countries, indicating that countries should “[increase] tobacco taxes by 
enough to reduce the affordability of tobacco products. In order to maximize the public 
health impact of higher tobacco taxes, while at the same time generating higher revenues, 
governments should raise taxes so as to raise prices and reduce the affordability of 
tobacco products. In many low- and middle-income countries, tobacco use increases with 
incomes and incomes are rising faster than tobacco product prices so that these products 
are becoming more affordable. In order to reduce affordability, tax increases need to 
result in real price increases that are higher than the increases in real incomes.” These 
statements are very encouraging from a tobacco control perspective, and indicate the 
impact that this growing literature has had and is having on tobacco control policies. The 
Technical Manual on Tobacco Tax Administration is one of the most important additions 
to the list of international policy documents. It is a comprehensive guide not only to tax 
policy but also to tax administration and is less reliant on a “one size fits all” approach 
than any of its predecessors. Even though it advocates a tax burden benchmark (excise 
taxes should account for at least 70% of price) it also suggests that tax increases should 
also account for growing incomes, thereby creating a “compromise” policy rule. 
Chapter 3 builds on Chapter 2 by conducting a case study on tax policy in South Africa. 
South Africa follows the World Bank’s suggestion by targeting the percentage of the 
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price of cigarettes occupied by taxes. The chapter begins by reviewing the rationale for 
such a policy and also the problems associated with it. It shows that high taxes, as 
measured by the percentage of price comprised of taxes, does not necessarily result in 
high prices in absolute terms. It then proposes a new policy rule that links tax and price 
policy to affordability. The affordability policy rule is shown to adjust taxes dynamically 
and prices in such a manner that, at a minimum, keeps pace with inflation and economic 
growth. Low- and middle-income countries are growing at the most rapid and robust rate 
in recent history and maintenance of an affordability policy rule will ensure that 
cigarettes become less affordable, reversing the trend found in Chapter 2, where 
cigarettes have been found to be becoming more affordable since the 1990s, and more 
aggressively so in the 2000s. 
 
Chapter 4 also conducts a case study on tax policy in South Africa, although it does so by 
focussing the lens on the illicit trade in cigarettes. Economic theory suggests that higher 
taxes on cigarettes will create greater incentives for illegal traders to engage in the 
evasion and avoidance of taxes on cigarettes. The tobacco industry has used this 
argument to lobby against tax increases in South Africa and many other countries. 
Furthermore, they state that higher taxes in South Africa have resulted in dramatic 
increases in the volumes of illicit cigarettes and that such volumes are growing. However, 
little to no evidence has been presented to support these claims.  
 
This chapter used an innovative method to measure the volumes of illicit cigarettes over 
time. The results indicate that the volume of illicit cigarettes has grown significantly in 
South Africa and that the illicit market now occupies a considerable portion of the 
general market. However, the estimates of this chapter indicate that these levels are also 
significantly less than is claimed by the tobacco industry.  
 
This chapter also considers whether the growth in illicit trade has undermined tobacco 
control and fiscal policy in South Africa. The purpose of such an analysis is to see 
whether the net benefit of tax policy is positive, that is, whether the fiscal gains of higher 
taxation and the health gains of lower consumption/prevalence outweigh the lost revenue 
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of higher consumption/prevalence resulting from illicit trade. The chapter finds that the 
net fiscal and public health benefits of increasing excise taxes are overwhelming. 
Furthermore, it shows that the levels of illicit trade required to undermine fiscal policy 
and tobacco control policy are significantly higher than claims made by the industry. The 
chapter concludes that, even in the face of illicit trade, increasing tobacco taxes are an 
effective fiscal and public health policy and that reducing illicit trade through non-tax 
measures will likely result in even greater benefits. 
 
The interaction between Chapter 3 and 4 is also interesting. Chapter 3 uses estimates of 
the price and income elasticities of demand to forecast the impact of tax changes on 
consumption. However, the estimated elasticities may be overestimates since they are 
calibrated using only legal consumption data and since the size of the illicit market is 
significant and the total market is significantly larger than the legal market. How to 
improve the estimates of the elasticies to take this into account is unclear; however, the 
estimates using only legal consumption are still appropriate for a number of reasons. 
First, previous estimates of price and income elasticities using only legal consumption 
have proven to be appropriate tools in forecasting future consumption. Secondly, the 
percentage of the market occupied by illicit trade has remained relatively constant in the 
last few years and thus changes in the total market have been similar to changes in the 
legal market. Thirdly, an overstatement of the elasticies impacts all simulations in the 
same manner and thus the implications for choosing a policy rule are not serious. In other 
words, the conclusion in Chapter 4 of an affordability policy rule resulting in the largest 
decline in consumption remains unaffected if smaller price and income elasticites (in 
absolute terms) are used. 
 
Chapter 5 moves back into the realm of the cross-country aggregate level analysis to 
consider the impact of advertising bans on tobacco consumption, paying particular 
attention to low- and middle-income countries. Restriction and bans on advertising were 
popular tobacco control interventions in high-income countries in the 1960s, 1970s and 
1980s. As the focus of tobacco control has moved to low- and middle-income countries 
more and more advocates are calling for restrictions and bans on advertising. However, 
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just as with any other tobacco control intervention, there is a need for relevant research to 
provide an evidence base for this intervention. This chapter attempts to provide the 
evidence base for advertising bans in low- and middle-income countries. It follows a 
similar methodology to an existing literature, heretofore exclusive to high-income 
countries, that models the demand for tobacco over time for a cross-section of countries.  
 
This chapter provides two important innovations, firstly, by including a significant 
number of low- and middle-income countries in the sample, and secondly, by improving 
the methodology by which advertising bans are included in the model. The chapter finds 
that comprehensive advertising bans are able to help reduce tobacco consumption; this 
finding is particularly strong in low- and middle-income countries. Importantly, the 
chapter also finds that comprehensive advertising bans are significantly more effective in 
reducing consumption in low- and middle-income countries than they are in high-income 
countries. Furthermore, these results are consistent using a variety of methods. 
 
Considering these chapters together, this thesis has provided a number of important 
policy implications. Firstly, affordability is an important and appropriate metric in the 
analysis of taxation policy in low- and middle-income countries. Rapid and robust 
economic growth requires that tax increases not only account for inflation, but also for 
rapidly growing incomes in order to, at a minimum, maintain affordability. Making 
cigarettes and tobacco products less affordable is an important tobacco control policy 
goal in order to ensure that consumption and smoking prevalence decline, or at least do 
not increase. Secondly, countries which are experiencing rapid economic growth are 
advised to follow tax policy rules which take into account rapidly growing incomes. 
Thirdly, the experience of South Africa indicates that illicit trade in tobacco products 
should not be a reason to decrease excise taxes. Even though illicit trade may increase as 
a result of tax increases, illicit trade is unlikely to undermine tobacco control policy; net 
tax revenues will increase and net consumption will decline as a result of tax increases. 
Furthermore, governments should focus on reducing illicit trade through non-tax 
measures in order to see the largest benefits from tax increases in terms of revenue gains 
and consumption declines. The generalisability of this result to other low- and middle-
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income countries has not been analysed; however it is an important result given the 
attention that has been paid to South Africa as an example of a successful tax policy. 
Finally, comprehensive advertising bans are an appropriate measure in reducing tobacco 
consumption, especially in the context of low- and middle-income countries, where 
comprehensive advertising bans have a greater impact on reducing consumption than 
they do in high-income countries. This research clearly supports the measures adopted by 
the World Health Organisation and the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control as 
global best practice in tobacco control. 
 
This research is a starting point for further research in these areas.  More measures are 
required to continue supporting tobacco control policies and interventions. Improved 
research methods will provide stronger evidence while more targeted research will assist 
policy makers in implementing polices that target vulnerable populations and regions. 
Avenues for future research include: 
 
 The continued surveillance of the affordability of cigarettes in the broadest 
sample of countries over time. This will enable policy makers to benchmark tax 
policy to peer countries and to ensure that cigarettes become less affordable over 
time. 
 Locating improved sources of price data to ensure accuracy of affordability 
measures and to include the largest cross-section of countries, particularly low- 
and middle-income countries, where price data are scarce. A specific 
improvement may be the use of price data that are a true average of the country 
rather than that of one city (or in some cases several cities). 
 Locating improved sources of income data to develop appropriate measures of 
affordability. Although GDP data are an acceptable source of income data, 
narrower measures of income allow for easier interpretation of affordability 
metrics. Narrow measures of income that are available in a time-series format for 
a large number of low- and middle-income countries will be useful to tobacco 
control advocates and policy makers in those countries. 
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 Furthermore, the tracking of affordability could be linked to consumption and 
prevalence data. This will enable policy makers to identify better the link between 
affordability and the usage of tobacco products. 
 Analysis of tobacco industry price reactions to tax increases in South Africa is 
required. As Chapter 4 has shown, recent price increases in South Africa have far 
outweighed excise tax increases (over-shifting of the tax by the tobacco industry). 
Ultimately, this has allowed the tobacco industry to take most of the rents of the 
increases in tax. From a pure tobacco control perspective this has resulted in 
lower consumption than expected for the given tax increases. Specifically, 
research into understanding market structures and pricing power is necessary. 
Even though the incumbent dominant manufacturer has a very large market share 
and is a de facto monopoly there is no imminent risk of losing this monopoly 
position. Either there is no credible threat of new entrants, no credible threat of 
price competition or some other mechanism that allows them to over-shift tax 
increases so aggressively. The implications of such research are significant in that 
it will allow us to understand industry behaviour better but also to make more 
accurate forecasts of how tax changes will impact on tobacco consumption, 
smoking prevalence and tax revenue. 
 Conduct more detailed county-level analysis of illicit trade in order to understand 
the magnitudes of illicit trade. This will allow for a more accurate and 
constructive debate surrounding the impact of illicit trade on tax policy. 
Furthermore, more accurate measures will allow a more detailed assessment of 
the drivers behind illicit trade and a more accurate assessment of which 
interventions work in reducing illicit trade. The methods employed in this thesis 
are innovative, although their accuracy is dependent on the accuracy of the 
underlying data and thus improved data on, particularly, smoking intensity will be 
of benefit. 
 The cross-country demand modelling employed in Chapter 5 has weaknesses in 
methodology, since it does not account for addiction in the econometric 
specification. Furthermore, it also assumes homogeneity of cross-sections in the 
models. Future research should adequately address both addiction in the 
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specifications and the use of heterogeneous modelling techniques. Heterogeneous 
modelling techniques may be particularly useful in low- and middle-income 
countries, where cross-country differences are more explicit. 
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